

PEACEKEEPING to PEACEBUILDING:
LESSONS FROM *the PAST*
BUILDING *for* THE FUTURE

*The Report on the UNA-Canada 50th Anniversary
of UN Peacekeeping International Panel Series
2006 – 2007*

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FORWARD

The United Nations Association in Canada is very proud to present the policy and community discussion facilitated to mark *50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping* in 2006 and 2007. This anniversary noted the important landmarks of the world's first designated UN peacekeeping mission to resolve the Suez Crisis, as well as Lester. B. Pearson's award of the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in proposing this first peacekeeping mission. To reduce tensions in the Suez region, the Canadian proposed that the United Nations send a multinational contingent to the region. "My own Government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force, a truly international peace and police force," said Mr. Pearson.

The concept of peacekeeping was an idea nudged along and supported by the Opposition critic for External Affairs (now Foreign Affairs) at the time, John Diefenbaker. We can be proud that the UN has always drawn broad-based and non-partisan support in this country. The United Nations has succeeded most obviously in sustaining the sometimes fragile dialogue that has averted the horror of a third world war, in encouraging multinational dialogues and the development of international law, and in providing a forum for interaction between governmental and non-governmental entities. Ninety percent of the work of the UN remains development, especially directed in support of the poorest.

Like much of the work of aspiring to world peace, peacekeeping (and peacebuilding) carries many serious risks. Canadians know, perhaps more than many countries, what it is to put our men and women on the line for this goal. Faced with some ambivalence among Canadians about our current role in Afghanistan, it is a serious moment to reaffirm an understanding that peacekeeping, and meeting our commitments to our membership in the United Nations, have been tasks of honour for Canada and Canadians. While we have dropped significantly in the troop numbers for UN peacekeeping, Canada remains committed to providing both troops and, increasingly, specialized support, to countries lacking the peace and prosperity which we enjoy.

With serious risks to the peace and security of the world confronting the global commons, we have never needed the UN more than we need it today. Therefore, this 50th Anniversary has not only served to celebrate and more deeply value Canada's lasting contribution to a more peaceful world, but to encourage Canadians to continue to support peace, development, diplomacy and global citizenship.

I would like to thank all of those who contributed to the success of this initiative. Through this publication, the innovative and enlightened thinking and experience of leading Canadians and world experts is presented in the hope of moving these issues forward. There were many thousands of others — in schools, through public lectures, through community engagement including UNA Canada's own branches across the country. Most importantly I would like to acknowledge the work of Emily Schroeder. Ms. Schroeder was the engine and heart of this year long initiative. Her hard work, clear thinking and care ensures these discussions and initiatives contribute in their way to the national and global progress toward peace.

Finally, UNA-Canada acknowledges and is grateful to the many courageous Canadian soldiers, police and civilians who are risking their lives to lend their support to enhancing or ensuring democratic freedoms and basic human rights around the world.

Therefore, I am very pleased to present this report on behalf of UNA-Canada. This report brings together the thousands of views and data collected and analyzed throughout the Peacekeeping Project's events, roundtables, and public dialogues which took place in Canada from August 2006 to March 2007, into a comprehensive set of findings and recommendations. It is my hope that the report will be a valuable addition to the evolving dialogue in this complex field.

Kathryn White, Executive Director
United Nations Association in Canada
March 2007

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The United Nations Association in Canada acknowledges the following individuals and organizations that have given valuable assistance and direction in the development of this publication to mark the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping.

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A special thanks also goes to **Maria Banda**, a young Canadian who has had her Rhodes Scholarship extended into a DPhil at Oxford University. Her paper on Responsibility to Protect provides a useful map for civil society, governments, and others to move the R2P agenda forward. It can be found on the UNA-Canada website, and it will most definitely contribute to R2P's consolidation as an advocacy tool for civil society.

Various people contributed to the framing of these roundtables, the organization and logistics across the 10 provinces, reporting after each meeting, as well as background research, editing and feedback, which deserve to be acknowledged here.

Robert O'Brien, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Association of Veterans in UN Peacekeeping, served as a programme manager for the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping project for six months. His good humour, exceptional logistical abilities, and thoughtful contributions were welcomed. As a former UN peacekeeper, he contributed an important veteran's voice to the findings and recommendations of this report.

Local partners for the events were: UNA-Canada St. John's Branch, Past president, **Bob Olivero**; University of King's College School of Journalism, Director, **Kim Kierans**; Queen's Centre for International Relations in Kingston, Director, **Charles Pentland**; UNA-Canada Edmonton Branch, President, **Chaldeans Mensah**; UNA-Canada Quebec City Branch, President, **Marc Perron**; UNA-Canada Winnipeg Branch, President, **Ashok Athavale**; UNA-Canada Vancouver Branch, President, **Patsy George**; Forum on Children and Armed Conflict, CPCC, Coordinator, **Kathy Vandergrift**; and University of Victoria, Political Science Department, **Michael Webb**.

Local liaisons were individuals based in each city who acted as the focal person to implement the event, assisting in the logistics, identification of local participants, as well as undertaking local communications. UNA-Canada is immensely grateful to the local partners and liaisons for their on-the-ground assistance with each local event: **Bob Olivero** (St. John's); **Brent Butcher** (Halifax); **Nicole Waintraub** (Kingston); **Joy Fraser** (Edmonton); **Daniel Atangana** (Quebec City); **James Johnston** (Winnipeg); **Dr. Michael Webb** (Victoria); **Lisa Mighton**

(Vancouver); **Nicole Adoranti** (Toronto); **Jennifer Adams**, Plan Canada (Toronto).

The writing of this report would have been impossible without the ten skilled rapporteurs who brought together the comments, findings and recommendations from the roundtables and public dialogues. A special thanks to following rapporteurs: **Samantha White** (St. John's); **Jason Oliver** (Halifax); **Monica Chohan** (Kingston); **Tonia Anselmo** (Edmonton); **Vincent Sosthène Fouda** (Quebec City); **Jodi Alderson** (Winnipeg); **Michael Bloomfield** (Victoria); **Lisa Mighton** and **Janine Edgerton-McGhan** (Vancouver); **Kathy Vandergrift** (Toronto); and **Marja Hughes** (Ottawa).

In addition, the following individuals contributed their exceptional moderating skills to the roundtables and public events, ensuring a coherent and well structured discussion at each event. UNA-Canada thanks the following individuals who acted as moderators: **Dave Perry** (closed roundtable) and **Kim Kierans** (public dialogue), Halifax; **Ambassador (ret'd) Louis Delvoie** (roundtable) and **Jane Bouliden** (public dialogue), Kingston; **Bob O'Brien** (roundtable), Edmonton; **Julie Gagné** (roundtable) and **Marc Perron** (public dialogue), Quebec City; **Shannon Sampert** (roundtable), Winnipeg; **Michael Webb** (roundtable), Victoria; **Kathryn Gretsinger** (both roundtable and public dialogue), Vancouver; **Kathy Vandergrift** (both roundtable and public dialogue), Toronto; **Justin Trudeau** (high school debate on Darfur) and **Kate White** (public dialogue on R2P), Ottawa.

The acknowledgements would not be complete without thanking the many distinguished participants who gave informative and thought provoking *panel presentations* at the public dialogues (listed in Annex 1) and the hundreds of *key experts and stakeholders* who attended the roundtables (listed in Annex 2). In addition, we wish to thank the members of the *general public* who attended the public events, asking insightful questions and providing useful comments on the presentations, which were worked into the findings and recommendations of this report.

Thank you to all of the countless other interns, volunteers, and supportive staff at UNA-Canada, especially **Rebecca Cohn** and **Jason Oliver**, Communications Officers, **Amy Brathwaite**, Project Officer, **Rebecca Smith**, Consultant, for their support for organizing, logistics and communication surrounding the events.

This ambitious project to mark the 50th Anniversary of UN peacekeeping was made possible thanks to the very generous support by a number of concerned partners. These include the *Canadian International Development Agency*, *Veterans Affairs Canada*, *Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade*, the *Department of National Defence Security and Defence Forum*, the *Royal Canadian Mounted Police*, and the *local branches of UNA-Canada*. This partnership enabled Canadians to consider together how they and the UN continue to work towards peace, as Lester B. Pearson did through his modest proposal fifty years ago.

Emily Schroeder, Project Officer
50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping, UNA-Canada

INTRODUCTION

In celebration of the 50th Anniversary of United Nations Peacekeeping, the United Nations Association in Canada (UNA-Canada) facilitated a series of public dialogues and closed experts' roundtables exploring the multiple facets of United Nations Peacekeeping in the past, present and future, focusing primarily on cutting-edge issues of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The public discussions took place in ten communities across Canada during the fall 2006 and winter 2007.

Drawing on Canadian and international expertise from a broad network of government actors, academics and researchers, field practitioners, civil society organizations, leading think tanks, and the media, the series of forward-looking dialogues addressed the development of a multifunctional response strategy to Canadian and international involvement in post-conflict societies, with specific attention given to key priority areas like Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan. The report is intended to provide focused recommendations to the United Nations, international and local non-governmental organizations, and the various government departments' policy development on peacekeeping, as well as propose tools and strategies for relevant stakeholders.

The report is based on the combination of a series of briefing papers elaborated in advance of each dialogue and the various experiences, views and recommendations expressed by the participants during the roundtables and public forums. In seeking to provide an accurate reflection of the views expressed during the public dialogues, a draft of the report and its recommendations was made available to all participants, and revised in light of their comments. The opinions expressed and recommendations made in this report are derived from UNA-Canada's consultation process and are not necessarily the views of the organization. In addition, the recommendations do not represent agreement by consensus among the participants, and may not include all views outside of this limited consultation process. The views expressed by the participants also reflect their personal opinions and should not be attributed to their institutions. It should be noted that all participants contributed actively and constructively to the discussions. However, not all individual interventions could be incorporated in the final report.

The intention of the series of roundtables and public dialogues was to explore the complexity of UN peacekeeping, while simultaneously seeking to elaborate concrete recommendations for strengthening policy and practice.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN PEACE AND SECURITY

Most people agree that UN peacekeeping has evolved enormously since the 1990s. However, recent news articles and media analyses have expressed a variety of opinions surrounding the value of UN peacekeeping as a mechanism of peace and security and its possible role in the future. Some view UN peacekeeping as the way of the future. Some have gone as far as saying that “peacekeeping is dead.” Others, still, are unsure, questioning its effectiveness but recognizing its strengths. Clearly, peacekeeping is not a static concept. Peacekeeping changes and evolves over time, building on past experiences and lessons learned. The United Nations have drawn numerous lessons from past operations and many in the international community are working relentlessly to strengthen UN peacekeeping capacity and efficiency.

The past few years have been extremely challenging for the United Nations, and such challenges are likely to continue in the future. The surge in the number, size and complexity of UN peacekeeping missions are examples of the challenges faced by the United Nations. Recent figures put the number of military and civilian personnel deployed as part of UN peacekeeping missions at over 93,000. This number is projected to reach 140,000 once planned deployments in Lebanon, Timor-Leste and Darfur are fully implemented.

The importance of this surge is two-fold: while it represents a stark example of the crucial and evolving role of UN peacekeeping in conflict management, it also demonstrates the vulnerability of the United Nations system and its limitations in the face of adversity. Not surprisingly, the surge is causing a dramatic strain on the UN’s capacity to strengthen ongoing operations and to undertake new missions. More operations also translate into financial implications for the UN system, putting more pressure on Member states. In fact, the annual budget of UN peacekeeping has tripled in the last ten years. It currently lies in the range of \$6 billion.

Of all the myths that make up Canadians’ sense of who we are as a nation, perhaps one of the most pervasive is that Canada is a peacekeeping country. Yet, this is an exaggeration, and the current commitment shows a sharp decline in Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping. Peacekeeping has been shown to be a proud Canadian tradition but its current contribution is meager. Much to the surprise of most Canadians, as of June 2007, Canada ranked 59th out of 114 countries in terms of military and police contributions to UN operations. While a growing number of states are recognizing what Canada has long acknowledged, that peacekeeping is beneficial to the international community, Canada’s financial contribution to the UN peacekeeping budget is minimal. Canada contributed 3% of the 2006 assessed contributions to UN Peacekeeping Budget.

Canada has an exemplary record in UN peacekeeping, yet the extent of its contribution, both in terms of peacekeeping personnel and percentage of cost of peacekeeping missions, are on a clear decline. As an increasing number of states are becoming more involved in UN peacekeeping, and as the cost of peacekeeping is increasing, Canada is contributing less. The extent to which Canada’s future commitment to UN Peacekeeping will be sustained or increased remains to be seen.

In light of the above, the present report is opportune. The objective in further exploring the challenges to and opportunities for strengthening UN peacekeeping, is to come up with a set of recommendations for bolstering and reinforcing UN peacekeeping, and for fostering greater engagement on the part of Western countries, with particular attention given to Canada.

For the purpose of this report, the term ‘peacekeeping’ refers to operations authorized by the United Nations (under Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of the UN Charter) to monitor cease-fires and/or support the implementation of peace agreements, and to initiate peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities.

OVERVIEW OF REPORT

Each public dialogue focused on a specific topic and included both Canadian and international expertise.

Chapter 1 explores the changing nature of training needs for UN peacekeepers before and after the Cold War, and examines specific training requirements for today’s peacekeepers. The chapter looks at the development of a systematic approach to training in Canada, identifies a number of Canadian and international training initiatives, reflects on lessons learned, and provides some guidance for a more comprehensive approach to peacekeeping training.

Chapter 2 looks at the role of international media in UN peacekeeping. In particular, the chapter explores tools and processes for UN peacekeeping missions in the field to get their message out to the international community and addresses several obstacles to greater dissemination of information both in the field and internationally. The chapter also looks at the role of media in Canada, and pays a special attention to the difficulty of presenting news stories as emerging, pressing and relevant to target audiences at home.

Chapter 3 examines the debate surrounding international and Canadian strategies for rapid response to crises. The chapter explores UN rapid response capabilities, as well as Canada’s role in preventing and assisting in crises, and its contribution to global security. Specifically, the chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the system’s current strengths and weaknesses, and gives specific insights as to the barriers preventing the realization of concrete outcomes.

Chapter 4 discusses issues related to local capacity building and sustainable strategies in UN peacekeeping. The chapter examines the role of the international community and of Canada in promoting capacity building. The chapter also looks at ways to ensure the success of local capacity building in UN peacekeeping missions in the future.

Chapter 5 discusses the situation of security and rule of law in Haiti, within the context of the present United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). In particular, the chapter explores strengths and weaknesses of the mission through an assessment of local conditions. The chapter also discusses Canada’s contribution in Haiti and looks at possible ways forward.

Chapter 6 explores issues related to human security in UN peacekeeping. The chapter explores the concept of human security, both in theoretical and practical terms, and examines the role of Canada and the international community in promoting the concept. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the application of human security to UN peacekeeping and looks at ways of improving human security in field operations.

Chapter 7 discusses a gendered perspective on Canada's commitment to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Among the themes explored are the various roles of women in post-conflict societies and the importance of bringing a gendered approach to the institution of peacekeeping. The chapter also looks at ways of better institutionalizing the inclusion of women in peace operations.

Chapter 8 looks at issues related to children and armed conflict and UN peacekeeping, examining in particular the implications of *The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups* (the Paris Principles). The chapter provides insights from the experiences of young adults who lived through war as children, and looks at ways the public can become engaged in this issue. The chapter also looks at ways of improving programmes to address children and armed conflict in field operations.

Chapter 9 explores Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the role of Canadian civil society. The chapter provides an overview of lessons from other existing networks on R2P and considers Canadian civil society efforts to solidify the normative understanding of R2P. Chapter 9 is a special chapter linking an earlier conference on the Responsibility to Protect and is largely drawn from a paper written by Maria Banda, Oxford PhD candidate and researcher, entitled "The Responsibility to Protect: Moving the Agenda Forward."

Chapter 10 discusses the changing nature of UN peace operations. In particular, the chapter examines new challenges to UN peacekeeping in the 21st century and identifies opportunities for strengthening UN peace operations in the future, and for encouraging greater engagement on the part of Western nations, including Canada.

The concluding chapter pulls together common themes and findings that emerged from this comprehensive consultation process. In addition, recommendations arising from the roundtables and public dialogues are summarized. The international community has drawn lessons from the past operations and is working to strengthen the United Nations peacekeeping capacity in a number of areas. The objective of this publication is to bring forward a myriad of views and perspectives on emerging issues in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, while clearly articulating lessons learned and suggested recommendations. The ultimate goal is to positively influence Canada's engagement on the issue, as well as impact policy development on the national and international levels.

1

TRAINING NEEDS FOR TODAY'S UN PEACEKEEPERS

This chapter derives from a United Nations Association in Canada (UNA-Canada) public dialogue, held on August 6th, 2006 in St. John's, Newfoundland, to mark the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping. Panelists at the public event discussed the changing nature of training needs for UN peacekeepers before and after the Cold War, and examined specific training requirements for today's peacekeepers. Panelists reflected on lessons learned and provided recommendations to address training needs as peacekeeping becomes increasingly complex. Although participants focused primarily on the experience of Canadian peacekeepers, most lessons drawn from the public forum apply to peacekeeping more widely. The opinions expressed in this chapter and the recommendations are derived from UNA-Canada's consultation process and are not necessarily the views of the organization. In addition, the recommendations do not represent agreement by consensus among the participants, and may not include all views outside of this limited consultation process.

The public forum featured **Trista Grant**, PhD Candidate, University of Western Ontario; **Alex Morrison**, MSC, CD, President, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies; **Dave Munro**, President of the Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans Association; **Mike O'Brien**, Military Historian, Memorial University; and **Emily Schroeder**, Project Officer, UNA-Canada.

BACKGROUND: TRAINING AND UN PEACEKEEPING¹

Today, training of military, police and civilian personnel for UN peacekeeping is widely recognized as a necessary factor in the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions on the ground. However, this was not always the case. Participants noted that training for peacekeeping missions differed immensely before and after the Cold War. It was not until the beginning of the 1990s that the need for additional training specifically tailored to peacekeeping was recognized. In particular, the evolving complexity and multi-dimensional nature of peacekeeping, in conjunction with the new challenges presented by contemporary post-conflict contexts prompted the need for changes in specialized training. The UN, as well as Canada, quickly realized that ideal peacekeepers, apart from their training as soldiers, required additional training that was more geared towards peacekeeping contexts.

The approach to training, both within the UN and in peacekeeping training centres around

¹ In this chapter, the term 'peacekeeping' refers to operations authorized by the United Nations (under Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of the UN Charter) to monitor cease-fires and/or support the implementation of peace agreements, and to initiate peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities.

the world, is now considered to be ‘multi-pronged,’ based on both hands-on experiences and in-classroom training. For its part, Canada has come a long way in developing a systematic approach to training for UN peacekeeping. Despite achievements in training, however, concerns remain as to the persisting ad hoc nature of the training received by peacekeepers and the difficulty of tailoring training to reflect specific environments, especially considering the unpredictability of today’s conflicts. As more peacekeepers are deployed in the field, ensuring compatibility between forces will become ever more critical. It is equally important to ensure adequate levels of training and discipline across all peacekeepers, as well as to ensure that they have the necessary equipment and resources to undertake ever more complex and dangerous tasks.

THE EVOLVING NATURE OF TRAINING NEEDS

Participants first addressed the evolution of training needs for UN peacekeepers and discussed the changing attitudes towards peacekeeping-specific training within the Canadian context.

PRE-COLD WAR TRAINING

Participants noted that before the 1990s, there was a lack of standardized peacekeeping training beyond general military skills, despite four decades of Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations. As Mike O’Brien noted, Canadians gained their peacekeeping reputation during the period where soldiers received only limited peacekeeping training. The common understanding within the Canadian Forces (CF) was that soldiers could best prepare for peacekeeping situations with soldier-first training, with an emphasis on combat and occupational skills. The view among CF was that a good soldier who was trained for fighting in the Cold War context was well outfitted for peacekeeping duties. While such training may have been sufficient, it visibly lacked an emphasis on doctrines, standards, and evaluations methods surrounding peacekeeping operations.

Using her doctoral dissertation as point of reference, Trista Grant addressed the development of training for Canadian peacekeepers more specifically. In particular, she discussed the specific changes in specialized training prompted by the rapidly evolving role of peacekeeping in the early 1990s. As part of her research, Grant interviewed Canadian peacekeepers that were deployed from the 1960s to the late 1990s. While her findings demonstrated that all soldiers deployed extolled the virtues of strong basic military training, the concern she found was that soldiers were expected to engage with the local population and essentially, win the hearts and minds of the population. These were significant tasks for which soldiers had not been trained.

In 1964, standard operating procedures were developed for soldiers participating in peacekeeping missions, which provided them with additional training such as briefings on issues specific to a mission. According to Grant, however, the extent of pre-deployment training was often limited to background information on the country of destination, such as geography and population, as more specific training was mostly done at the discretion of the commanding officers. Based on her research, additional training was provided only if

the commanding officer deemed it necessary, and when training took place, it was sporadic at best and focused mostly on police-type duties. Grant observed that of the majority of peacekeepers she interviewed, only a few received more specific training for peacekeeping before the late 1980s. For example, one retired Major who participated in four missions to Cyprus between 1960 and 1980 reported receiving additional training, including background information on the area to which he was being deployed and rules of engagement, in addition to receiving refresher courses on standard military skills. However, this was more an exception than the rule; pre-deployment training was more often inconsistent, varying across missions, deployments, and time period.

POST-COLD WAR TRAINING

As mentioned in the introduction, it is in the 1990s that the need for training specifically tailored to peacekeeping was recognized. As Grant explained, while these training needs were not new, the international community was slowly realizing the need for specific training that would allow peacekeepers to respond to both traditional and more robust types of peace operations.

The CF, for its part, recognized that the ideal peacekeeper not only needed to be ‘combat-capable’ and ‘multi-purpose,’ but also required additional skills in the areas of negotiation and mediation, general knowledge of the UN system and mandates, a thorough understanding of rules of engagement, understanding of civil-military cooperation and humanitarian assistance, as well as mission-specific knowledge such as local customs, culture and language. As peacekeepers were increasingly being deployed to hostile situations, their responsibilities not only increased but became more dangerous and demanding. Recognizing the changing environment and its related requirements, the CF began to focus much more on peacekeeping training. More specifically, Grant observed that while there is much evidence suggesting that skills, other than military combat skills, have always been necessary in peacekeeping contexts, it is only in the 1990s that the CF began to realize the added value of these skills and to institutionalize the learning of these skills.

In an effort to strengthen the training of Canadian soldiers deploying as part of peacekeeping missions, the Canadian government developed several reports between 1993 and 1996 addressing training needs in UN peacekeeping. While the reports acknowledged the adequate performance of Canadian peacekeepers to date, they also recognized the need for new skills in dealing with such situations as those presented in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and Rwanda. According to the reports, even if the best trained peacekeeper was a full member of the military, it was no longer acceptable for soldiers to get by on basic military training, underlining the importance and necessity of additional peacekeeping skills. With the NATO intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the CF view that core military training is an absolute necessity was reinforced, though they also realized the crucial value of supplementary training in changing security environments.

Echoing the CF, Alex Morrison agreed that the primary role of the CF is to engage in basic combat and unless they can do that, they are not equipped to carry out other jobs. This is an important reason behind the need to train every military officer, including reservists,

for combat. He mentioned, however, that military training is not always a primary focus for members of armed forces in other parts of the world, effectively limiting their ability to undertake any kind of peace support operations. On the other hand, Morrison iterated that peacekeeping is not a purely military activity, and questioned if it ever was. In this regard, he believes additional training provided via the UN as well as national and regional training Centres have proven to be extremely valuable to peacekeepers around the world. Before looking at these initiatives, however, it is important to understand the nature of more recent training requirements.

IDENTIFYING NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINING PEACEKEEPERS

While participants did not address new training requirements for peacekeepers specifically, Morrison described how peacekeeping has been redefined as a cooperative activity, requiring the integration of a multiplicity of actors within peacekeeping missions, as well as coordination between a UN mission and other players in the field that are not directly linked to the mission (e.g. civilians, governments, police forces, humanitarian aid workers, the media, etc.).

In this context, the new complexity of peacekeeping missions and the challenges encountered by peacekeepers on the ground have created a number of additional requirements to training needs. These include, but are not limited to, gender issues, children's rights and child protection, sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), human trafficking, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), and cultural awareness and sensitivity. For example, the need for gender training was recognized as a priority area by the UN to ensure that peacekeepers learn about gender issues as articulated in Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. Support from CIMIC units and activities in the field have also become a necessity in peacekeeping operations to enhance the military's ability to communicate and coordinate efforts with civilians groups. In addition, cultural awareness training as well as human rights and gender training, contribute significantly to peacekeepers' (military and civilian) adaptability to the local environment. Indeed, many practitioners argue that there needs to be greater understanding of the contextual framework of peacekeeping. Language barriers among peacekeepers themselves, differing rules of engagement, and different training backgrounds have also made it much more difficult to bring different contingents together in the field, emphasizing the need for a level of commonality in training across contingents.

CANADA'S ROLE IN TRAINING CANADIAN AND FOREIGN PEACEKEEPERS

In an attempt to standardize peacekeeping training for Canadian soldiers, the Canadian Forces were mandated to establish a peacekeeping centre. In this regard, the creation of the Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston, Ontario helped to standardize peacekeeping training for Canadian soldiers. The Centre also helped to create a “centre of excellence” which gathers peacekeeping expertise and disseminates knowledge to practitioners. Other Canadian training initiatives, including the Military Training Assistance Programme, the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, and the Gender Training Initiative have also proven extremely beneficial to Canadian and international peacekeepers, military and civilian alike. Canadian institutions can also play a more significant role in the training of UN peacekeepers abroad, and in strengthening their effectiveness by engaging in capacity-building exercises. As many UN peacekeeping troops lack in preparation and equipment, participants recognized that UN forces would benefit from increased training and technologies provided by Canadian military and police personnel.

PEACE SUPPORT TRAINING CENTRE (PSTC)²

The PSTC in Kingston is responsible for training CF members selected for deployment on an individual basis (i.e., they are not part of a contingent or unit). The PSTC offers two types of courses, which are scheduled throughout the year: a basic five-day training course for members selected to undertake international operations and an eighteen-day training course for officers selected for military observer positions. In an attempt to enhance global training standards, the PSTC maintains close relations with other centres across Canada and around the world, and encourages instructor exchanges and the sharing of courseware. Courses are also open to officers from foreign militaries. In addition to individual training, it should be noted that the PSTC has two ‘Training Assistance Teams’ (TAT) that provide peace operation advice, assistance and support to formed units and contingents both in Canada and abroad.

The Centre takes both a theoretical and hands-on approach to training through classroom lectures, and field exercises and simulations. This approach seeks to better prepare peacekeepers to perform their duties in increasingly complex environments. As a result, students receive a general understanding of topics such as the Law of Armed Conflict, Risks and Threats, Stress Management, Preventive Medicine, Mine Awareness, Negotiation and Mediation Techniques and Cultural Awareness.

² Peace Support Training Center, 2007. Available at: <http://armyapp.dnd.ca/pstc-cfsp/main.asp?lng=Eng>.

³ Andrew P. Rasilius, “The Military Training Assistance programme (MTAP): An Instrument of Military Diplomacy,” *Canadian Military Journal* 2, no. 3 (2001): 63-64. Available at: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content.asp?id={0836DC33-B9C2-4329-9F01-589BE14CD880}>. See also, Department of National Defence, “Directorate Military Training Assistance programme (DMTAP),” December 2006. Available at: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/content.asp?id={0836DC33-B9C2-4329-9F01-589BE14CD880}>.

MILITARY TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME (MTAP)³

First developed in the 1960s to provide military training assistance to a number of newly independent Commonwealth countries, MTAP was subsequently extended to non-NATO countries. At present, the programme is entirely funded and administered by the Department of National Defence (DND), in close consultation with DFAIT and other departments as required. MTAP is said to play a vital role in promoting Canadian defence and foreign policy interests in the countries in which it operates. The programme, which trains over 1300 students from more than 60 countries every year, not only reinforces Canada's efforts in strengthening peacekeeping, but also assists in the capability development of foreign troops and enhances their compatibility with CF forces. MTAP focuses on three major training areas:

- Language training — to improve communication among international forces;
- Professional development and staff training — to improve the interoperability between different foreign contingents; and
- Peace support operations training — to improve the understanding by military and civilian participants of multilateral peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.

By supporting training of peacekeepers worldwide, MTAP is contributing to raise Canada's profile as a valuable player on the international scene, at the same time as building the peacekeeping capacity of other troop contributing countries and solidifying training standards with other peacekeeping partners.

PEARSON PEACEKEEPING CENTRE (PPC)⁴

Morrison, founder of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC), described the establishment of the centre, and his vision of uniting people from different countries to learn about the art of peacekeeping. Established in Cornwallis in 1994, PPC began operations in 1995 and with the encouragement of the Canadian government, military, police and civilian personnel from around the world came to the centre.

Morrison explained that in the beginning, the centre upheld the importance of basic military training for peace support operations, though with time, additional training became necessary. The additional training offered by PPC covered a diverse range of topics, including advanced first aid, interventions between hostile factions, mine awareness, stress management, survival skills and the use of force. While the Centre recognized that these additional topics could not prepare soldiers for the horrors of war, the new training was seen as a vital preparation tool. In fact, Morrison insisted that lounge and dining room conversations played an essential role in the training process because of the stories and

⁴ See also Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. Available at: <http://www.peaceoperations.org/en/index.asp>.

experiences that were shared.

Today, the PPC, which receives core funding from DND and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), encompasses an extensive research programme, conducts seminars and workshops, and organizes multinational multi-disciplinary training exercises. While courses are offered both in Canada and abroad, the majority of the Centre's formal courses are now conducted abroad in Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. To date, the PPC has conducted training in over 30 countries in English, French and Spanish. The PPC is also active in capacity building, through partnerships and direct involvement. For example, the PPC is partnering with the South Africa Police Service (SAPS) to assist in the management of the growing police demand in peace operations in both Africa and around the world. Additionally, the PPC has been actively supporting the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana and The West Africa Police.

GENDER TRAINING INITIATIVE (GTI)⁵

The Gender Training Initiative (GTI) was developed by Canada and the United Kingdom for military and civilian personnel. The GTI provides training material for a three-day course on gender perspectives in peace support operations, addressing issues such as violence against women and international humanitarian law, and looking at specific case studies. A pilot training session was conducted in 2002 for a mixed military and civilian audience. The UN has since used the GTI in the development of its own training modules for peacekeepers. While a useful tool and reference, its limited attention to practical applications and its emphasis on the need to integrate gender issues as opposed to the 'how' are major reasons why some gender trainers prefer using other tools. Also, as gender training is not mandatory, it isn't clear who uses the tool and who does not.

OTHER TRAINING INSTITUTIONS AND CENTRES

In addition to Canadian initiatives, other training is being undertaken by the UN and other international and regional peacekeeping training centres around the world. For example, the UN Institute for Training and Research — Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operation (UNITAR POCI) provides distance training for current or aspiring peacekeepers, UN staff, civilian police, humanitarian workers, and any other person interested in developing further knowledge in the area of peacekeeping⁶. Courses are standard, common, universal and low-cost, accessible to anyone worldwide, and delivered using both the internet and printed materials. They are designed to allow students to study at their own pace and can be taken either in preparation for deployment or as additional training while on a mission. Examples of courses include gender perspectives in UN peacekeeping operations, ethics of UN peacekeeping, logistics support, history of

⁵ See Gender & Peacekeeping Online Training Course, 2002. Available at: <http://www.genderandpeacekeeping.org/>.

⁶ United Nations Institute for Training and Research – programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operation (UNITAR POCI). Available at: <http://www.unitarpoci.org/>.

peacekeeping, mine action and international humanitarian law.

An important regional training institution is the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, which assists in the training of civilian, police and military components in West African states through the development and provision of effective training of personnel being deployed on peacekeeping operations.

UNDERSTANDING THE PERCEPTION AND ROLE OF CANADIAN MILITARY PEACEKEEPERS

According to Grant, the CF personnel she interviewed believed that their effectiveness as peacekeepers and high level of competency stem from their solid combat training, their training on more peacekeeping-specific issues, and their high level of organizational skills. These positive attitudes within the CF, although highly desirable, have proven harmful in that CF have been expected to assume their responsibilities regardless of the resources they have. Furthermore, she found that CF view themselves as good peacekeepers because they perceive themselves as having national character traits that are often demanded of peacekeepers, such as neutrality, impartiality, and non-discriminatory. It should be noted that not all Canadian military peacekeepers are CF, as some are drawn from the Navy or Air Force. However, the focus of Grant's research is on the CF.

One problem she noted was that in certain cases, training was becoming so extensive and time-consuming that it interfered with the ability of peacekeepers to do their job. This was particularly the case in the 1990s when operational tempo was high, though it remains a concern. Based on the interviews she conducted, many Canadian peacekeepers felt that all they did was prepare and train for operations. Moreover, even with additional training, the ad hoc nature of peacekeeping make it difficult to identify which concerns are of greatest importance for specific missions, as the context of missions are always different.

Beyond the issue of training, participants addressed a number of other concerns regarding the present role of the military in peace operations. Grant argued that there is a two-fold concern among military personnel related to Canada's peacekeeping activities. First, there is a growing concern among military staff that the Canadian military has become a peacekeeping only military and that peacekeeping is the only way to get field experience. Second, there is a concern that members of the military are viewed by the Canadian public as peacekeepers first, rather than soldiers first. In reality, however, with 2500 troops in Afghanistan under the NATO-led ISAF operation in January 2007, and an additional 184 were divided across 16 other international commitments, it is clear that UN peacekeeping is not part of the present focus⁷.

In Grant's opinion, peacekeeping in Canada has come a long way, though many people think

⁷ See Department of National Defence, "Current Operations," 28 February 2007. Available at: http://www.dnd.ca/site/operations/current_ops_e.asp.

that the Canadian military is no longer strictly involved in peacekeeping activities. Irregardless of the type of operations the military decides to undertake in the future, Grant believes that soldiers will almost certainly need their peacekeeping expertise. In her view, peacekeeping training will not suddenly become irrelevant, as the set of skills required in peacekeeping operations remains extremely useful for more robust operations. A prime example is the operation in Afghanistan, which requires among other things, the capacity to project force, the ability to engage with the local population, and knowledge of civil-military relations. As a result, Grant insisted that the peacekeeping experience and knowledge acquired by the military over the past decades should not be ignored. While the changing security environment requires that soldiers maintain a high state of readiness in terms of combat skills, Canadian soldiers' growing peacekeeping training and expertise should also be supported and further developed.

RETURNING HOME: LOOKING AFTER PEACEKEEPERS

Dave Munro, president of the Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans Association (CPVA), discussed the challenges that both soldiers and peacekeepers face when returning from a deployment. Munro stressed the importance of looking at these challenges in order to be in a better position to address them in the future. As he argued, the explicit contrast that exists between extreme war-zone circumstances and Canadian society are a proof that action needs to be taken upon arrival home to ensure that veterans and their families are taken care of, mentally, physically, and financially. For example, upon their return, soldiers not only have to face drastic culture shocks, but often have to deal with Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSD).

Munro stated that help is currently available to veterans, and that additional help is on the way. The CPVA, for example, provides a 1-800 assistance number for veterans as well as their families and friends, for referrals on a wide range of problems including PTSD and financial issues. The concern, however, is that a growing number of young people are requiring assistance from the CPVA.

In this regard, the Association is presently working on a number of projects that include an independent review mechanism aimed at resolving situations where more than one department is involved. For instance, the CPVA often assists with the application for a veterans' affairs disability award, a process which is described as extremely complicated. On a more legal basis, Munro also made reference to the development of the New Veterans Charter, which he believes will greatly improve the lives of peacekeeping veterans and their families. Munro added that the new Charter will be beneficial in that it will provide one point of entry for soldiers discharged from the military, as opposed to having to go to several different departments to make sure his or her family is looked after. As he affirmed, this is just one of several important modern era peacekeeping issues that will continue to necessitate attention.

RECOMMENDATIONS

While Canada has come a long way in developing a systematic approach to training for peace operations, the general perspective among the participants was that more needs to be done. In particular, it was mentioned that training should reflect and build on lessons learned from past experiences. Participants also felt that training needs to be much more comprehensive and should, to the extent possible, be made mandatory for all military and civilian personnel selected for deployment on a peacekeeping mission. Looking at the role of Canadian Forces more specifically, participants recognized the need for continued core military training, but also for maintaining efforts at developing training standards and requirements that are more specific to peacekeeping. For example, training is still limited in many areas related to peacekeeping, including gender, child protection, human rights and sexual exploitation and abuse. Participants also suggested that perhaps more outreach to the Canadian public is necessary to promote accurate views regarding the military's role in peacekeeping.

There is no question that as UN peacekeeping continues to evolve, so will the training needs of UN peacekeepers. Still, while the evolving nature of training needs underlines the need for continued efforts in the areas of training, it also highlights the importance of creating strong partnerships between a UN peacekeeping mission on the ground and all other actors in the field, in order to utilize and build on the expertise that each partner offers. Indeed, for peace operations to be more effective, civilians and military personnel need to know more about each other and cooperation between the two must be much tighter.

Several recommendations emerged from the August 6th event. These are presented below.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO):

1. DPKO should continue to strengthen training and discipline of military and civilian components of peacekeeping operations. More specifically:
 - a) Training requirements should focus on increasing cooperation between a multiplicity of actors.
 - b) DPKO should support efforts to build standardized skill sets for training military, police, and civilians.
2. DPKO could encourage troop contributing countries to ensure minimum training requirements among all peacekeepers, military, police and civilian. Doing so would strengthen compatibility among peacekeepers, and could even go as far as raising the morale and discipline of contingents.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS:

1. The Government of Canada should nurture and maintain the peacekeeping expertise it has accumulated over the years, by developing further joint simulations and exercises with other troop contributing countries.
2. The Government of Canada should allocate more resources to Canadian peacekeeping training centres so that they can:
 - a. Uphold high standards of training;
 - b. Ensure the adequate training of all Canadian military (and civilian) personnel to deploy on peacekeeping missions;
 - c. Provide more in-depth training on gender and the protection of women and children by direct training by experts on these issues;
 - d. Promote greater intercultural exchange by allowing centres to bring foreign trainers, and by accepting a larger number of foreign students;
 - e. Conduct more peacekeeping training abroad; and
 - f. Assist other peacekeeping centres around the world in the development of training curriculum and in “training their trainers.”
3. The Government of Canada should ensure that all Canadian military, police and civilian personnel that plan to deploy as part of a UN peacekeeping mission receive the minimum level of training required for the specific job they will be doing.
4. The Canadian government should ensure that all military, police, and civilian personnel deployed as part of a peacekeeping operation receive basic training in civil-military cooperation. This could be achieved through the elaboration of training guidelines or requirements for Canadian peacekeeping personnel, which define the level of training each component should receive.
5. Canada should take advantage of its strong training expertise to build the capacity of foreign peacekeepers abroad. Africa is of particular interest as the African Union becomes more involved in peacekeeping missions.
6. The Government of Canada should ensure that more actions must be taken to ensure that veterans and their families are attended to, mentally, physically, and financially.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO PEACEKEEPING TRAINING CENTRES IN CANADA AND INTERNATIONALLY:

1. Peacekeeping training centres should put greater emphasis on culture-specific training for personnel planning to deploy, including language, local culture and customs.
2. Peacekeeping training centres should put greater emphasis on gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping training, particularly during pre-deployment, but also within missions on the ground. This could be achieved by ensuring, to the extent possible, a minimum ratio of women peacekeepers in classrooms, and by having women trainers and experienced women peacekeepers give courses on gender and the protection of women and children.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS)⁸:

1. Civil society and leading NGOs could encourage greater communication with military and police officers in their home country, the goal being to increase understanding of the role of each organization, and to strengthen interaction in the field. This could be achieved through roundtable discussions, working groups, conferences and joint training.

⁸ These recommendations are targeted primarily at Canadian civil society and non-governmental organizations. However, they can also apply to civil society and NGOs around the world, as well as INGOs.

2 INTERNATIONAL MEDIA AND UN PEACEKEEPING

This chapter builds on a United Nations Association in Canada public dialogue event to mark the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping on October 5th, 2006 in Halifax, which included a public forum and a closed experts' roundtable. Participants of the closed experts' roundtable and panelists at the linked public dialogue event discussed the role of international media in UN peacekeeping. An identified challenge was the difficulty in presenting news stories as emerging, pressing and relevant to target audiences at home. The participants explored tools and processes for UN peacekeeping missions in the field to get their message out to the international community and to help build support for UN peacekeeping more generally. The opinions expressed in this chapter and the recommendations are derived from UNA-Canada's consultation process and are not necessarily the views of the organization.

Feature panelists at both events included **Douglas T. Coffman**, Public Information Officer, UN Department of Public Information; **Tim Dunne**, Former Military Public Affairs for DND & NATO; **Alex Morrison**, President, MSC, CD, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies; **Olivia Ward**, Toronto Star; **Kim Kierans**, Director, University of King's College School of Journalism, Moderator. Please refer to Appendix 1 for a complete list of participants.

BACKGROUND: INTERNATIONAL MEDIA AND UN PEACEKEEPING¹

Media is often described as a double-edged sword². When employed positively, media can become an instrument of conflict resolution and a catalyst for peaceful change. However, when employed as a means to propagate intolerance and hatred, and to incite violence, media becomes a negative force among efforts to foster peace. International media exerts a powerful influence on people and on their perceptions of the world they live in. International media's primary role is to report and disseminate objective information. Media is also increasingly mobile and has the unique ability to reach many at an unprecedented rate, making it an unparalleled tool for disseminating information. This information should be accurate and balanced, and should be a fair representation of the diverse views, to allow the public to make well-informed choices.

¹ In this chapter, the term 'peacekeeping' refers to operations authorized by the United Nations (under Chapters 6, 7 and 8) to monitor cease-fires and/or support the implementation of peace agreements, and to initiate peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities.

² Ross Howard, *An Operational Framework for Media and Peacebuilding*, report prepared for IMPACS, Vancouver, B.C. (2002). http://www.impacs.org/files/MediaProgrammes/framework_apr5.pdf.

International media and UN peacekeeping are closely linked. International media can act as a tool to promote conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations. According to one author, “there is an emerging belief that the media may well be the most effective means of conflict resolution and preventing new wars.”³ Indeed, the media plays a critical role in garnering both international and local support for peace operations. Information and communication are vital to build trust and ensure the support of the local population for the mission. Information is also crucial to gather support from external actors, including donor countries. The media can also hold leaders and officials accountable, monitor human rights, and act as an early warning tool for conflict.⁴ On the other hand, peacekeeping missions may provide the media with a secure environment in which to work. These roles are explored in the next section.

Before doing so, however, it is important to recognize that as UN peacekeeping operations become more complex, so do the needs of the media. In fact, new approaches are emerging facilitating the media to find ways to adapt to the changing environment. Stories increasingly reflect the changes to UN peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War and its evolving complexity, media actors have greater access to technology, while the use of the internet is conducted with much more scrutiny than before, and the media is increasingly building strategies and partnerships with the UN and its peacekeeping missions, NGOs, and governments.

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN UN PEACEKEEPING?

As mentioned above, one of media’s primary roles within UN peacekeeping is to report and disseminate objective information. Media also plays a key role in fostering both international and local support for peacekeeping missions and in building trust between peacekeepers and the local population. International media is necessary to help build support for a mission, to advise donors that their help is needed, and to solicit more funding. At the same time, the UN also wants to inform the population of the programmes it is undertaking, and seek their participation in identifying their strengths and difficulties. Unlike any other source of information, media increasingly has the ability to reach, inform, and shape the opinions of the international and global public.

There is no doubt that the media’s impact on conflict management and resolution has been enhanced since the end of the Cold War.⁵ As conflicts increasingly occur within sovereign states, the conditions under which a peacekeeping force is deployed become more complex and problematic. As a result, journalists may have a greater role to play in presenting events in a way that will garner international attention and interest. Indeed, international media is often believed to have a significant influence on the funding earmarked to specific regions or projects. While

³ Howard.

⁴ Howard.

⁵ Peter Vigo Jakobsen, “Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management is Invisible and Indirect,” *Journal of Peace Research* 37, 2 (2000): 131-143.

this influence may not be as direct as often thought of when referring to the CNN effect, media “provides the people with the opportunity to develop empathy for the plight of others and hence creates the space for common understanding and social interaction.”⁶ Although creating an understanding of a specific situation is an advantage for peacekeeping operations, some criticize the media’s predisposition to cover actual conflicts or humanitarian crises, as opposed to peacekeeping missions. As a matter of fact, it is argued that the media’s ignorance of conflicts in their pre and post-conflict phases and its selective coverage often cause a shift in the focus and funds from more cost-effective long-term preventive and rebuilding efforts to short-term emergency relief.⁷ Indeed, the international media is often accused of losing interest once a conflict is over. There is even less attention given to peacekeeping success stories.

Concurrently, governments are also capable of “driving” media to mobilize support for a peacekeeping force.⁸ The role of media and of governments in disseminating information is discussed in the section on the Role of Local and International Media in Canada.

The next section explores various tools and processes for UN peacekeeping missions in the field to get their message out to the international community and to help build support for UN peacekeeping more generally.

TOOLS AND PROCESSES FOR DISSEMINATING MESSAGES AND INFORMATION

Coffman observed that in the past, the interest of the news media in peacekeeping missions was limited. Today, news media is only one aspect of public information. Other tools to get the messages out include the distribution of newspapers, the use of dance troops and comedians and the creation of radio and television programmes. Evidently, much attention is being focused on how to get the messages out and how to develop an effective and gripping sound bite. Participants explored various tools and processes for UN peacekeeping missions to disseminate messages and information. The tools are divided into three types of tools for disseminating information: general media tools, mission specific public information programmes, and advocacy.

First, however, let us define what is meant by media. For the purpose of this chapter, media consists of editorialists, columnists, and reporters whom disseminate information through various mediums such as the newspaper, radio or television. In addition to understanding what media is, several participants raised the importance of knowing the target audience of the media in order to influence their point of view. Indeed, the message is not “to” media, but “through” media. In this context, target audiences consist of the global public, the population of a country where a peacekeeping mission is deployed, and the population in countries participating (or contemplating participation) in the mission.

⁶ Charles Hunt, “Public Information as a Mission Critical Component of West African Peace Operations,” KAIPTC Monograph No. 5 (2006): 10.

⁷ Jakobsen, 131.

⁸ See Jakobsen, 134.

GENERAL MEDIA TOOLS

While raising moral and financial support is always part of the UN's agenda, peacekeeping missions also want to inform the public about what they are doing, and involve them in identifying strengths and weaknesses of peace efforts. In coordination with the Department of Public Information at the UN headquarters in New York, press conferences and press releases on UN peacekeeping objectives and activities are perhaps the most effective tools the UN can use to reach both local and international audiences. UN peacekeeping missions are increasingly learning to use the media positively as a conflict management tool, especially through the use of radio. Doing so involves "the formulation of clear information and public relation strategies from the outset of an operation to target international as well as local audiences, an ability to provide the media with timely and reliable information, and an ability to inform the local media and the local population about the purpose of the operation in order to counter misinformation and propaganda."⁹

For journalists that cannot report from within a peacekeeping mission, other options exist for acquiring information. Journalists have access to peacekeeping information through press conferences, press briefings, op-eds, teleconferencing meetings. For example, every head of mission goes to New York to give press briefings. Heads of mission will also take advantage of video teleconferencing technology and hold internal meetings and press conferences with journalists in New York from their mission location. The Secretary-General may release op-eds, which are translated and distributed around the world. Journalists will also have access to information disseminated through the UNDPI. Generally, the UNDPI will provide information to a spokesperson in New York, who will then give the information to a reporter, encouraging them to focus on the peacekeeping perspective. The UNDPI also uses UN news wire service, where countries can reproduce articles for free. Information is also disseminated using press releases, though most missions have limited distribution lists. In many cases, press releases are just sent to colleagues at UN headquarters and journalists in the mission area, as opposed to being widely disseminated. Nevertheless, UNDPI is trying to improve its distribution.

UNIFEED is another system used by the UN to get its messages out. The system is used globally and provides footage from the field via satellite to AP news service. While it does not provide for a complete picture of the mission, it shows what people are doing on the ground. It is possible for national news media to request footage, for example Canadian media can request footage of Canadians on the ground. New media can also subscribe to the service.

⁹ Jakobsen, 141.

¹⁰ Hunt.

MISSION-SPECIFIC PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAMMES

When peacekeepers are deployed to a post-conflict environment, the local media infrastructures are often lacking capacity, or are altogether destroyed. Local media is often the first institution in society to be disrupted by conflict. Insecurity becomes a major obstacle to the development of media in post-conflict environments, causing imposed or self-censorship to occur, and inhibiting freedom of expression. In this context, it is primordial that a neutral environment be created where media can re-emerge as an independent and reliable source of information. Peacekeeping operations thus play a key role in fostering such neutral environment and in providing a safe environment for media development. For example, since the UN's mission in Namibia in the late 1980s, UN peacekeeping has developed internal mission public information programmes, using its own forms of media to promote awareness of the operation and its mandate.

As peacekeeping operations are inherently dependent on the approval and support of the local population, public information programmes have become a crucial element of contemporary peacekeeping.¹⁰ Indeed, public information is said to lie at the heart of a peacekeeping operation, ensuring its credibility and legitimacy both in the field and abroad.¹¹ The Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations further refers to a mission public information programme as an “excellent tool for enhancing confidence in the peace process, building trust among parties to a conflict, and generating support for national reconciliation.”¹² As a result, many agree that a mission specific public information programme is central to a peace mission, and should be deployed in advance of the rest of the mission.¹³ As Coffman explained, the role of the UN Department of Public Information is not only to inform, but also to convince people to buy-in to the process. Media can foster that process by talking to political parties and individual citizens, discussing success stories and coping mechanisms. Another example is in Sudan, the mission's Public Information unit distributes simplified and translated versions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to the local population. Media can also reach out to refugee populations to ensure basic humanitarian requirements are being met.

Still, questions arise regarding the impact of international media on local media development. Some denounce the gap between the financial resources received by the international media and those received by the local media infrastructures, and question the impact of the unequal playing field on the capacity of the local media to develop. Realizing this deficiency, some NGOs such as Journalists for Human Rights or IMPACS are working towards developing greater local capacity.

¹¹ Hunt.

¹² Handbook on Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, 2003.

¹³ Patrick Coker, “The Role of the Media and Public Information,” in *Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery*, eds. Mark Malan, Sarah Meek, Thokozani Thusi, Jeremy Ginifer, and Patrick Coker, 77-88. Institute for Security Studies, South Africa. <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/1046/coker.pdf>.

ADVOCACY

Participants also discussed the role of advocacy in disseminating peacekeeping information and asked whose responsibility it is to advocate. While the UN undertakes a large part of its advocacy, participants recognized that there is only so much it can do, especially when no one is receptive to the message. Tim Dunne suggested that like-minded nations advocate among themselves. While he acknowledged the challenge of getting people interested, it is especially difficult to do so when there is a highly politicized indigenous media that is communicating against goals you are trying to achieve. The example of Haiti was mentioned where the UN was being inundated by the pro-Aristide media. In such circumstances, there is a need for greater dissemination and distribution of UN media to help persuade those opposed to the UN mission and presence. At the same time, public Information offices in UN peacekeeping missions need capacity building to focus their messages.

While international media is often regarded as being too reactive, many believe that the media's greater mobility and flexibility, due in part to the use of satellite phones, lightweight laptops, and digital cameras, is a sign of hope that things may be changing, as greater mobility and access may in fact increase the ability of the media to be proactive. Being proactive would in fact strengthen the international media's ability to serve as an indicator or early warning device for conflict and genocide.

OBSTACLES FACING UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE MEDIA

Participants identified a number of obstacles that UN peacekeeping missions and international media are confronted with when attempting to get out messages. These obstacles have to do with media access, with the training and professionalism of journalists, with media coverage, time pressures and resources, and with the practice of embedding journalists and the need to ensure the safety of media practitioners.

MEDIA ACCESS

Participants argued that above all else, journalists require access. They require access to authoritative spokespersons, to activities and venues, and once on location, to facilitators, interpreters, and sometimes bodyguards or troops, to help them understand what is happening, to help them interpret events and policies, and to ensure that they do not jeopardize their security. According to Dunne, however, news media are often dismissed as being obstacles to meeting an objective in a peacemaking, peace sustainment, or peace implementation context; they are marginalized and at the very least, not given the support they require. In Dunne's view, commanders of peace support operations need to look at journalists in a different light. Journalists should be looked upon as facilitators, and not as problems. If given the opportunity, journalists can promote a peaceful resolution to challenges.

Alex Morrison also mentioned that the media should take advantage of the expertise and knowledge of NGOs that work alongside peacekeeping missions. For example, the International Committee for the Red Cross can comment on constraints and limits of war that are being broken and can report on what is going on the ground.

TRAINING AND PROFESSIONALISM OF JOURNALISTS

A major concern regarding the media and UN peacekeeping is the fact that reporters are often limited in their background knowledge of the situation they are covering. For example, Tim Dunne observed that Canadian journalists who visited Canadian troops abroad in the 1980s were largely ignorant of the larger policy, diplomatic and military issues that were involved. However, he noted that when the first Gulf War began in 1990, a programme was implemented to inform interested journalists about the concept of operations for maritime, air and land operations, too many journalists are still without the requisite background knowledge needed to cover complex peace operations. This realization has led many to suggest the need for issue-specific education or training of journalists. While most participants agreed with the idea of 'educating' or training journalists, one participant questioned the idea, describing it as 'pointless and naïve.'

Nevertheless, participants commented that such a process is already happening, mentioning training programmes through Dalhousie University and the Royal Institute. Internationally, an initiative is being undertaken by the Red Cross with much success. The Red Cross is training journalists on issues of international law, and in doing so, has found that journalists often report differently when exposed to the law perspective. Others also recommended looking at strategies and partnerships between the UN and journalists, as a means to enhance understanding on the part of the media.

Journalists are also required to be responsible, accountable and professional in the exercise of their profession, in the same way that all other professionals are ethically required to conduct themselves. However, as Tim Dunne noted, in places like the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo and in some African nations, the level of professional conduct of journalists is often lacking, and their abilities to meet journalistic standards of fairness, objectivity and balance are mostly absent. Some journalists have even adopted reporting styles that promote ethnic hatreds and political extremism, which remind us of the consequences of the broadcast of extremist and genocidal messages by the Rwandan radio station, Radio des Milles Collines, an example of the politicization of news rooms in the most extreme.

Finally, the need for sensationalizing events was also mentioned as an obstacle to greater in-depth peacekeeping coverage. According to Ron Griffiths, journalists are restricted by the audience's craving for sensationalism and tabloid-like journalism. Ann Griffiths also commented that media and UN peacekeeping are working at contradictory purposes. In her view, the goal of peacekeeping is to maintain the status quo, that is, peacekeeping is successful when there is peace, without situations of drama. For the media, however, situations where nothing is happening are not worth their attention. The real challenge, thus, consists of 'fixing' this contradiction, and trying to realign the fundamental purpose of the media to better serve the goals of peacekeeping. Evidently, in order to accurately report on the status of peacekeeping operations, journalists need to go beyond the 'simple' sound bite.

MEDIA COVERAGE, TIME PRESSURES AND RESOURCES

Participants commented that international media often loses interest after the fighting has ceased. Participants also observed that the attention given to peacekeeping success stories is even more trivial. The media tends to be more preoccupied with new wars and the eruption of violence, than with successes at preventive diplomacy or peacemaking. While complex peacebuilding operations are situated very low on the media radar, conflict prevention receives even less attention. As Olivia Ward observed, once a conflict is over, media interest migrates elsewhere, even if turbulences continue. Reporters who are able to remain in post-war zones most often see their stories diminish in importance, getting less and less air time and column space, to the point where their influence with the public or with governments is close to nil. In Ward's opinion, the message is brutally clear: with new threats emerging everywhere—both real and imagined—the highly competitive news business moves on. Ward also argued that when examining the media's role in peace missions, the issue of politics also cannot be underestimated. Indeed, the media is generally more involved where the United States is present, as seen from the media coverage given to Afghanistan and Iraq.¹⁴

Time pressures also restrict the ability of journalists to adequately report on a specific issue. Reflecting on his own experience, Ross Lord noted that journalists have a limited amount of time in which to write. While he tries to explore avenues that he does not know or that the public does not know, in the end, the final product is only two minutes. As a consequence, the story can only be so comprehensive. More often than not, reporters never get to tell the entire story.

As a consequence of such pressures, the media can sometimes become a source of confusion rather than comprehension. For example, within the Canadian context, participants recognized that Canadian citizens do not understand the exact nature and objectives of the mission in Afghanistan, nor do they understand the nature of Canada's contribution and the reality on the ground. In Ward's opinion, the media is partly to blame for the confusion and uncertainty surrounding peace operations such as the mission in Afghanistan. In her view, the media has often failed to illuminate the nature of peacemaking missions and the divisions between them and UN peacekeeping missions. In addition, Ward argued that the majority of the time, the media is not taking the time and space to explain the complexity of peace efforts, which are not short, isolated campaigns, but a continuum: peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. While she sees the creation of the UN Peacebuilding Commission as recognition by governments of the need for a long-term approach to building peace, she insisted that the hard political sell that sustaining peace requires, often calling for the support of the media, is barely beginning.

¹⁴ Human Security Report 2006.

Finally, limited resources also constrain the level of information the public receives. Coffman observed that very few media outlets have full staff for international coverage beyond CNN and BBC. Even in the case of CNN, there is only one full-time African-desk reporter, a limited number when considering that most peacekeeping missions are in Africa. Local newspapers fare worse, as they rarely have adequate budgets to send people on short notice to cover conflict zones. In such circumstances, a tool commonly used is news wires. AP, BCC and Reuters, for example, sell their fact-based stories to news media and they are always present.

EMBEDDING JOURNALISTS AND SAFETY OF MEDIA PRACTITIONERS

Ensuring the safety and impartiality of journalists in conflict situations is a major challenge that must be addressed. Journalists must be aware of how fragile their own security can be in some of these operations. According to Reporters Without Borders, in 2005, 63 journalists and 5 media assistants were killed for doing their jobs, at least 807 journalists were arrested, and over 1,300 physically attacked or threatened. Iraq was the deadliest country for the media, with 24 journalists and 5 media assistants killed.¹⁵

While the practice of embedding journalists is not new, it nonetheless remains controversial. Although the media is for the most part trying to distance itself from the military, the latter is crucial to ensure the safety of journalists when accessing remote or highly volatile areas. Embedding journalists thus becomes a necessity for journalists in areas of high insecurity such as Afghanistan and Iraq. However, embedded journalists may also face restrictions, in particular with respect to reporting content. While the public's concern is that the media is being "filtered," non-embedded journalists often face harsher work conditions and greater security challenges. While embedding within UN peacekeeping missions has never actually taken place, owing in general to the level of stability of most missions, the practice could become a practical option to raise awareness of UN peacekeeping missions in areas where security is more volatile.

However, Olivia Ward explained that the reason why the growing tendency to embed journalists in the military has worked to some extent, is because it requires journalists to conform to certain rules and restrictions, which they would otherwise reject. Psychologically, embedding has the disadvantage, too, of making journalists part of an "us or them" scenario in which they share the conditions of the military, and view the landscape outside of their unit as hostile or irrelevant. In this regard, Ward emphasized the fact that embedding can work against efforts to communicate the reality behind peace missions, because it gives reporters little, if any opportunity, to view the real conditions of those who live in the countries they are covering — including civilians, fighters, rebels or insurgents. In her view,

¹⁵ Reporters Without Borders, *Press Freedom in 2005*, 2006. http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=16088. The figures refer to journalists everywhere, and not just in conflict situations.

without this vital knowledge, journalists can only contribute a superficial and skewed view of reality on the ground, and of the long-term problems faced by those whose job is to ensure the peace.

ROLE OF LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA IN CANADA

As argued above, governments are also capable of “driving” media to mobilize support for the use of force.¹⁶ Indeed, national media can help build support for domestic participation in UN peacekeeping by telling the stories of Canadian contributions to UN efforts to keep peace through patrols, confidence building, as well as logistical and material support to post-conflict reconstruction. Alternatively, media can be an effective tool for justifying Canada’s non-involvement, without necessarily addressing a range of perspectives, or views on how Canada’s role in UN peacekeeping has and could evolve. While increased coverage of international conflict has increased awareness of UN peacekeeping operations more generally, most participants agreed that peacekeeping is understood by very few in Canada and by the media in general. It can also be said that general knowledge of Canada’s contribution to UN peacekeeping remains limited and somewhat confused. As Morrison insisted, journalists are not always adequately prepared to report on Canada and UN peacekeeping. He also mentioned that there are very few Canadian military writers and journalists, and that there are even fewer writers of peacekeeping.

On this issue, participants agreed that the national media was in part responsible for fostering certain myths that Canada is more involved in UN peacekeeping than it really is. Concomitantly, this is a myth that may work to the advantage of certain political actors who seek support for other sorts of international operations. In fact, it is not often discussed that Canada’s contribution to UN peacekeeping as of August 30, 2006, amounted to 126 military observers, UN police and troops.¹⁷ This is in comparison to 2,286 as part of Canada’s contribution to the NATO led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. This discrepancy is one that deserves further attention and explanation in the media. Still, Morrison stressed that Canada’s smaller contribution to UN peacekeeping does not mean that Canada believes peacekeeping is not worth it. In his view, it simply suggests that Canada has shifted focus to another area. For example, the Canadian military is investing heavily in the training of peacekeepers. Accordingly, peacekeeping is one of the many things that the Canadian military does.

Another example of the media and the public’s misunderstanding of peacekeeping is the media’s common reference to Afghanistan as a peacekeeping operation. In echoing this point, Olivia Ward mentioned that Afghanistan may in fact be the best (or perhaps the worst) example of how much needs to be done to explain to Canadians and other Westerners what

¹⁶ See Jakobsen, 134.

¹⁷ UNDPKO Website: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/>.

creating peace really means. As a result, participants agreed that the media should inform the debate on the war in Afghanistan. The media should also help to explain to Canadians the difference between what Canada is doing in Afghanistan, and what UN peacekeeping could do in Darfur to help end the violence. Moreover, Dunne argued that the Canadian public could be better served if there were more staff in the news room, and if those staff members were able to learn about the issues on which they report. Issues surrounding governance, international development and emerging democracies are not simple to understand and they require a knowledge of history, politics and international affairs. In his view, too many journalists are not given the time and the resources to adequately cover these issues.

Support for peacekeeping by the Canadian public is closely linked to the support from the media; without the media's cooperation, support for peacekeeping could disappear. Why should Canadians be interested in the DRC, Liberia or Haiti? In answering this question, participants acknowledged the importance of finding ways to spark the interest of the Canadian public by taking a Canadian angle and making stories relevant to the Canadian public. Personalizing stories, with for example specific references to Canadian troops or personnel, can help to generate more interest. As mentioned above, international correspondents must also be equipped with an ability to relate and describe the context to their viewers. While the media should focus on shaping and personalizing its stories, one participant also noted that the local populations have a responsibility in educating themselves and creating a demand vis-à-vis the media. In the participant's view, local populations are the first level of engagement for the media.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

Overall, participants recognized the media's crucial responsibility toward the public and agreed that journalists and media practitioners should continue to ensure objective news reporting and uphold high standards of accuracy and accountability. In the end, it is crucial that the United Nations and governments involved in peace efforts focus on making the media part of the solution, rather than part of the problem.

Many themes and directions for future work emerged from the October 5th event. These are presented below.

Recommendations to the United Nations DPKO:

1. DPKO should explore ways in which the media can promote a peaceful resolution to challenges. For example:
 - a. DPKO could explore the use of media to foster a national dialogue between the government, rebel leaders, and the local population.
 - b. DPKO could explore the use of media to promote and manage expectations DDR programmes, the rule of law, human rights, etc.
2. DPKO should promote greater involvement by the media in reporting on military, civil, and humanitarian affairs in peacekeeping missions as a way to benefit the wider understanding of peacekeeping.
3. DPKO should encourage the media, including journalists and reporters, to take part

in peacekeeping missions. This could be achieved by:

- a. Exploring opportunities for embedding journalists within UN missions.
 - b. Facilitating the travel and transport of journalists by giving them greater access to UN flights and giving them the option of being accompanied by UN troops.
 - c. Providing translators and interpreters.
4. DPKO should explore different ways to promote and reach mainstream and alternative-media reporters that have an interest in peacekeeping missions.
 5. DPKO should encourage the media to highlight both successes and problems with UN peacekeeping. Highlighting successes could put political pressure where necessary and help gain support for specific missions, while highlighting problems could help to tell UN Member states that the UN needs more help.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT

1. The Government of Canada should promote initiatives to train Canadian journalists on issues of peace and security.
2. The Government of Canada should promote the presence of Canadian journalists in missions where Canadian troops and personnel are present.
3. The Government of Canada should help raise public awareness and understanding of UN peacekeeping missions and of Canada's role in Afghanistan. For example, departments of the Government of Canada (i.e. Foreign Affairs, CIDA, DND and RCMP) involved in peacekeeping missions could:
 - a. Promote and support public dialogues on UN peacekeeping missions and on Canada's role in Afghanistan.
 - b. Partner with Canadian media, NGOs, civil society, and universities to help Canadians understand the role of UN peacekeeping, as well as the similarities and differences between UN peacekeeping missions and Canada's involvement in Afghanistan.
4. Public Affairs sections across departments of the Government of Canada involved in peacekeeping missions could coordinate media strategies to streamline messages and effectively impact Canadian domestic media.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND PRESSURE GROUPS¹⁸

1. Civil society and NGOs should continue to provide backgrounders and factsheets focused on specific peacekeeping issues, to facilitate journalists' research.
2. Civil society and NGOs working on peacekeeping issues should promote peacekeeping missions by speaking on their behalf to politicians, by producing op-eds, as well as talking points.
3. Civil society should coordinate media strategies with the military as a means to achieve their goals. Doing so involves defining their objectives and mandate to come up with common messages.
4. Universities and schools of journalism should explore the possibilities for developing mentorship programmes whereby journalists from Canada share their expertise and techniques with journalists from post-conflict societies.
5. NGOs, universities and schools of journalism could help to track and monitor news stories. Doing so would help in understanding how news media is being portrayed and even distorted depending on the source.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO NEWS BROADCASTERS

1. News broadcasters should ensure that their international correspondents are equipped with the ability to relate and describe the context there are covering to their viewers. For example:
 - a. News broadcasters should promote the 'education' of journalists on peacekeeping and military affairs.
 - b. News broadcasters should invest more resources in strengthening their capacity to cover international news, particularly stories in conflict zones.

¹⁸ While these recommendations are targeted primarily at Canadian civil society and NGOs, they can also apply to civil society and NGOs around the world.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS

1. Media should look at strategies and partnership between them and the UN, as a means to enhance understanding on the part of the media. Such partnership could also help in building strategies for disseminating targeted messages. For example:
 - a. Media could play a role in making sure troop contributing countries know that the UN is thankful for their support and that their sustained engagement is required.
 - b. Media could increase awareness with respect to UN missions and let donors know that peacekeeping operations need more financial contributions.
2. Media should provide equal weight to the successes and problems of peacekeeping. Doing so could help to foster support for peacekeeping missions, at the same time as contribute to enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping.
3. Media should allocate time and resources to get the story, use limited time for a story to provide context, and explore creative ways of delivering messages.
4. Media should explore ways to shape its message in a way that it is relevant to the people they are targeting. For example, Canadian media should explore ways to shape their messages in a way that is relevant to Canadians. One way of doing so is by personalizing the story, by making specific references to Canadians and by directly linking what is going on abroad to the lives of individual Canadians.
5. Media should watch out for 'spins' by balancing evidence with human interest stories.
6. Media should provide links to documents, so that people can follow up with a story by reading the report.
7. Media should emphasize the importance of evidence and should not take information at face value. Journalists need to be engaged; when not given all information, they need to know why.
8. Media should take advantage of the expertise and knowledge of NGOs that work alongside peacekeeping missions.

3

CANADIAN AND INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIES FOR RAPID RESPONSE TO CRISES

This chapter builds on a United Nations Association in Canada public dialogue event to mark the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping from October 19 to 20, 2006 in Kingston, Ontario, which included a public forum and a closed experts' roundtable. Participants of the closed experts' roundtable and panelists at the linked public dialogue event discussed the debate surrounding international and Canadian strategies for rapid response to crises. Participants explored UN rapid response capabilities, as well as Canada's role in preventing and assisting in crises, and its contribution to global security. The discussion provided a comprehensive overview of the system's current strengths and weaknesses and specific insights as to the barriers preventing the realization of concrete outcomes from previous discussions about rapid response to global crises. The opinions expressed in this chapter and the recommendations are derived from UNA-Canada's consultation process and are not necessarily the views of the organization.

Participants at both events included **Stephen Kinloch-Pichat**, Strategic Planning Officer, UNDP, Haiti; **Col. Michael Hanrahan**, Director of Peacekeeping Policy, National Defence; **Peter Langille**, Department of Political Science, University of Western Ontario; **Brig.-Gen. Greg Mitchell** (Retd), Former Force Commander of SHIRBRIG in Sudan, Canadian Forces; and **Lt. Col. Michael Voith**, Former Commanding Officer, Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), Canadian Forces. Please refer to Appendix 1 for a complete list of participants.

BACKGROUND: RAPID RESPONSE AND UN PEACEKEEPING ¹

A key requirement for peace operations and of peacekeeping in particular, is the ability to respond rapidly and effectively to developing crises. Indeed, the timing with which a mission is approved and deployed is a major component of that mission's capacity to respond to crises or avoid a relapse into conflict. While the UN has acquired much expertise in conducting traditional peacekeeping operations, it still lacks the capacity to rapidly undertake more complex operations and to effectively sustain them. In general, the days and weeks immediately following a cease-fire or peace accord constitute a critical period for stabilizing

¹ In this chapter, the term 'peacekeeping' refers to operations authorized by the United Nations (under Chapters 6, 7 and 8) to monitor cease-fires and/or support the implementation of peace agreements, and to initiate peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities.

² Baramki, Gabi, Gerard Toulouse, and Peter Langille. 2003. "Report on Working Group 3 International Cooperation and Human Security." 53rd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Nova Scotia, 17-21 July. <http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac53/wg3.htm>.

the situation and for establishing the grounds for peace; beyond this point, the credibility and effectiveness of the force deployed are seriously affected. Traditionally, it took on average four to six months for a peacekeeping operation to be deployed following a Security Council approval.² Ironically, it took only six weeks for the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide to kill an estimated 800,000 innocent victims. While response times have improved — they are now defined as 30 days for a traditional peacekeeping mission and 90 days for a more robust mission — they remain difficult to achieve.

The mid-1990s, and more specifically in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, numerous studies set out to tackle the issue of rapid response to global crises. In 1995, Canada presented a report to the General Assembly, based on widespread participation by Canadian organizations and agencies, as well as officials from around the world.³ The proposal, entitled *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*, sought to improve the UN's ability to deploy peacekeeping operations rapidly during situations of crisis. Among its conclusions, the report stated that "As long as sovereign states retain the right to decide on the deployment of their national units, there will never be complete assurance that a UN force can meet an urgent situation on time."⁴ While this remains true today, several efforts have been made to address the challenge and to improve the UN's rapid response capacity.

In 2000, the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (Brahimi report) identified several key conditions to increase the success of future complex operations including the need for political support, rapid deployment and credible force.⁵ As the Panel explains "all [actors] agree on the need for the United Nations to significantly strengthen capacity to deploy new field operations rapidly and effectively." Indeed, the logic follows that to respond to the challenges of the 21st century, forces need to be mobile, flexible, effective, and sustainable in the field. In response to the report, important changes were made to the way the UN manages peacekeeping operations. Even with such changes, however, future attempts by the UN to undertake complex peace operations on its own, are largely inhibited by the resistance of Member States "to establish the building blocks for the UN to acquire the operational ability to deploy rapidly and effectively."⁶ In light of these constraints, other response mechanisms have been gaining acceptance and are increasingly being called upon to respond to crises where the UN cannot.

The international community has come a long way since the mid-1990s in pushing for greater rapidity and effectiveness in responding to crises. Despite these efforts, however, the lack of progress on the issue of rapid response to global crises is particularly apparent when considering the ongoing atrocities in Darfur. While the need for a rapid response in Darfur has long passed, it is imperative that issues of rapid deployment be further explored if future responses to crises are to occur in a timely manner.

³ Government of Canada. September 1995. *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*. The report was prepared by an International Consultative Group co-chaired by Sir Brian Urquhart of the Ford Foundation and Dr. John C. Polanyi, Nobel Laureate of the University of Toronto.

⁴ *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*, 63.

⁵ United Nations. 2000. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (Brahimi Panel) http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/. The report mentions a viable peace-building strategy as a fourth factor.

WHAT CONSTITUTES A RAPID RESPONSE?

The primary objective of a rapid response is to respond rapidly to imminent tensions that, if left unattended, could degenerate into war. More specifically, a rapid response is deployed to an area to stabilize and secure the environment as soon as possible, so as to allow for a larger UN peacekeeping force. While the objective of a rapid response may be obvious in theory, its deployment in practice is much more challenging.

First, many participants identified the notion of a rapid response as misleading. *Rapid* can mean anything from hours, days, months, or years, and as such, the rapidity of a force does not matter. What is important, however, is its timing. The timing of an intervention is central to any deployment strategy, especially when attempting to quell an emerging crisis or prevent the resurgence of conflict.⁷ For example, the 6 to 12 week time-frame immediately following a ceasefire or peace agreement is often viewed as the most critical period for establishing the foundations for a stable peace.

In conjunction with timing are the credibility and political momentum of a response. These are important elements in the success of an operation; once lost, these factors are difficult to regain.⁸ As mentioned by Brig.-Gen. Mitchell, rapid response forces must be credible, properly equipped to achieve desired outcomes, and be capable of successfully communicating intended political messages. It is also essential that political expectations with respect to military capabilities be realistic. In other words, a rapid deployment should be accompanied by the rapid employment of forces on the ground. This involves preparations prior to a force's deployment, as well as plans for its employment and its departure based on identified measures of success.

Participants also recognized the fact that military solutions alone will not resolve conflicts, and that civilians are increasingly viewed as crucial for the success of a mission and for its rapid deployment. The rapid deployment of both military and civilian personnel is essential for communicating political messages to relevant actors in a crisis. The content of political messages, in turn, determines the type of response that is deployed, ranging from military observers to combat units. Finally, flexibility and effectiveness are also necessary components of a rapid response, since decision-making processes can range from hours to months, and must address short-term needs while at the same time establishing the building blocks for future efforts.⁹

The most significant obstacles facing the deployment of a rapid response are delays in decision-making and those caused by the UN's own internal oversight mechanisms. The single greatest factor causing these delays is political. As identified by the participants, responses are driven by a multitude of political factors including national interests, domestic

⁶ See St-Pierre, Kristine. 2006. "Empty Rhetoric or Genuine Effort, Evaluating the Potential Effectiveness of Rapid Reaction Forces in Preventing Conflict." *Paterson Review* 7, no. 3, 8.

⁷ See St-Pierre.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Peter Langille. 2002. *Bridging the Commitment-Capacity Gap: Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment*. Geneva: Center for UN Reform Education.

media, domestic and international public opinion, and what some referred to as standing resolution ‘tripwires.’ As one professor argues,

...failing to act in an escalating violent situation is the difference between a situation that can be contained and a humanitarian disaster that can spiral beyond control and result in thousand of people being displaced or killed. A failure to act quickly, early and decisively not only leads to conflict escalation but incriminates the Western powers directly in the ensuing violence and severely damages the legitimacy of international norms.¹⁰

In recent years, conflicts have increasingly demonstrated the need for rapid integrated responses — involving military, civilian, and humanitarian personnel. The recent crises in Lebanon and Darfur are the most recent examples of crises where a rapid and integrated response was required. Both cases also highlight different limitations to UN rapid response capacity, as identified above. The case of Lebanon demonstrated the difficulty of getting Member States to commit troops and to uphold their commitments, as well as the delays involved in requiring parliament approval. In the case of Darfur, the crisis illustrates the difficulties that questions of sovereignty and national interest pose for rapid response operations. While calls for the deployment of a UN rapid response force to Darfur have been made incessantly over the past three years, lack of cooperation from the Sudanese Government remains a major factor restricting the UN’s ability to intervene. The case of Darfur also demonstrates the contribution of regional organizations to peacekeeping and the need for greater creativity and flexibility in the design of peacekeeping forces.

The next section explores the various mechanisms that exist for rapid response.

MECHANISMS FOR RAPID RESPONSE

According to Mr. Kinloch-Pichat, the evolution of the international order, due to more recent concerns with international security and humanitarian considerations, has resulted in a wider range of objectives for the UN. As a consequence, there are concerns that by taking a narrow focus on improving the UN’s rapid response capacities, these improvements may come at the expense of meeting other objectives. Although he believes improvements to rapid reaction times are critical to speeding up deployment, he senses that these may be insufficient to improve the UN’s overall effectiveness.

In light of these acknowledgements, the participants agreed that there is a clear advantage to having a wide range of political choices when dealing with global crises. As Col. Hanrahan mentioned, more choices means that Member states are not compelled to rely only on the UN as a response mechanism, and allows for greater flexibility as different mechanisms may be more suitable for different situations. Accordingly, the participants identified a number

¹⁰ Carment, David. 2005. “Effective Defence Policy for Responding to Failed and Failing States.” *Research Paper Series*. Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 21.

of mechanisms for timely response, each of which exhibit unique advantages and challenges. These mechanisms are presented in Table 1 below with corresponding examples.

TABLE 1. TYPES OF RESPONSE MECHANISMS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Response Mechanisms	Examples of Peacekeeping Operations
UN Missions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIH), 1995–2002 · UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), 1996–1997 · UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), 1997–1999
Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), July 2000–present · UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), March 2005 to present
Coalition of the Willing and Regional Organizations or Arrangements (UN-Authorized)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · NATO-led force in Bosnia (IFOR), 1995–1996 · NATO-led international force in Kosovo (KFOR), 1999–present · International Force East Timor (INTERFET), 1999–2000 · British forces' joint rapid reaction force to Sierra Leone, 2000 · ECOWAS deployment in Liberia (ECOMIL), 2003 · EU Rapid Reaction Force (using NATO assets) in Macedonia, 2003 · African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB), 2003–2004 · African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) force in Darfur, 2004–present

While traditional UN missions, as well as military arrangements under standby agreements such as SHIRBRIG, are preferable owing to their legitimacy and impartiality, they both encounter difficulties in obtaining consent from the national governments of participating countries, often resulting in their ineffectiveness. The UN does not have a standing force, and does not have the ability to recruit forces without the authorization from the Security Council and cooperation of donor countries. In addition, although both types of deployments are initially mandated to deploy for six months, they face the possibility of being extended indefinitely, causing potential troop-contributing countries to back down. The UN's ability to respond rapidly to imminent crises is also impeded by the lack of political will to undertake more robust interventions with Chapter VII provisions. As a result, Chapter VII missions have increasingly been relegated to coalitions of the willing or regional organizations, following authorization by the Security Council.

Coalitions of the willing and regional organizations often portray a more limited legitimacy, due in part to concerns about impartiality. At times, however, specific organizations have enjoyed greater legitimacy than even UN missions, as seen with the AU force in Darfur. Interventions by coalition of the willing or regional organizations are often restricted in their scope and duration because of limited capacities. While they have the possibility to stay in

theatre for an extended period of time, they are mostly considered as short-term solutions, providing the necessary capacity before a UN peacekeeping force can be deployed. Although all ad hoc peacekeeping operations are often faced with deployment and mandate delays, coalitions and regional organizations can often portray greater flexibility in deploying more robust operations more rapidly. In fact, while the ad hoc basis of peacekeeping operations may, in most cases, be viewed as a source of inefficiency, Mr. Itani suggested that the flexibility of such an approach may allow for more creative and context-specific solutions, as well as prevent institutional rigidity in responding to crises.

The next section looks at the strengths and weaknesses of two types of mechanisms in terms of rapid response, SHIRBRIG and regional organizations.

MULTINATIONAL STAND-BY HIGH READINESS BRIGADE (SHIRBRIG)

The Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), an initiative of the Danish and the Canadian Governments, became operational in January 2000. It is a rapidly deployable peacekeeping force available to the UN, with a projected response time of 15 to 30 days, and a brigade which comprises 4000 to 5000 troops when fully deployed. The intent of the force is to buy time to generate forces; it can remain in the field for up to 6 months. The force allows participating Member States to maintain their national sovereignty, and provides complete transparency with regards to the commitments required, as it does not commit Member States to remain in the field for more than six months.

According to Brigadier General Mitchell, former brigade commander for the SHIRBRIG force in Sudan, SHIRBRIG is an important element of peacekeeping operations and has proven an effective and efficient contributor to UN operations.¹¹ Since it was declared operational in January 2000, SHIRBRIG has undertaken four missions (UNMEE, UNMIL, UNAMIS, and UNMIS) and has provided planning assistance to both ECOWAS (as part of UNOCI) and the DPKO in Darfur. However, the force faces several challenges when it comes to strengthening its rapid response capacity.

- Participation in SHIRBRIG missions is based on conditional commitments from Member States, whom decide on a case-by-case basis, based on national interest considerations, whether their forces and equipment can be used. In recent years, Member States' participation in other missions (including the NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan and the US-led coalition in Iraq) has resulted in increasing pressure on the ability of the brigade to deploy at full capacity.

¹¹ Mitchell, Gregory B. 2006. "Briefing to the Danish Institute of International Studies." http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Events/2006/SHIRBRIG/mitchell_briefing_diis.pdf.

¹² Armstrong-Whitworth, Peter. 2006. "SHIRBRIG: The Future of Canada's Contribution to UN Peace Support Operations?"

- The Brigade was originally established to undertake peacekeeping operations with Chapter VI provisions. However, every mission to date has had a Chapter VII component (SHIRBRIG's deployment to Sudan is under Chapter VII provisions). While the SHIRBRIG Steering Committee has agreed to consider deployments to more robust missions on a case-by-case basis, to date, no formal amendment has been made to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which established the Brigade.¹² As peacekeeping operations requiring a Chapter VII mandate are increasingly the norm, it is important that SHIRBRIG takes part in these missions if it is to remain credible and relevant to the United Nations.¹³
- SHIRBRIG is sustainable in the field for a period of six months, reducing the force's flexibility in responding to crises.
- SHIRBRIG is composed of military personnel only; no police or civilians are included in the force.

SHIRBRIG's experience has demonstrated that cohesion between all military and civilian components is necessary for mission success. As a result, Member States can improve SHIRBRIG by including expertise in civil affairs, human rights, and the rule of law into its operations. The additions would make SHIRBRIG more effective in its rapid response operations, as well as enhance its credibility as an organization. As SHIRBRIG was designed to provide the UN with a rapid reaction capability, it can be argued that "[its] relevance to the UN is dependent on its capacity to fulfill the UN's requirements for rapid reaction."¹⁴

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ARRANGEMENTS

In the 2005 report of the Secretary-General *In Larger Freedom*, Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledged that the need for rapid action cannot be achieved solely through the mechanisms of the United Nations. As a result, he urged Member States to improve the UN's deployment options by "creating strategic reserves that can be deployed rapidly, within the framework of the United Nations arrangements."¹⁵ The report also called on the establishment of "an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the United Nations to work with relevant regional organizations in predictable and reliable partnerships."¹⁶ Accordingly, other organizations have already undertaken to reorganize their military capability to ensure greater rapidity and effectiveness in future deployments, notably the EU, NATO, and the AU. In fact, the report applauds the European Union and the African Union for their decision to create high-readiness standby brigades that could reinforce United Nations missions, and calls on other nations to develop similar capacities and asks that these be placed at the disposal of the United Nations.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ United Nations. March 2005. *In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*. Report of the Secretary General, A/59/2005, 31. <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/>.

¹⁶ *In Larger Freedom*, 31.

Recent examples of rapid deployments include the British forces' joint rapid reaction force to Sierra Leone in 2000, the EU Rapid Reaction Force (using NATO assets) in Macedonia under Operation Concordia in March 2003, and the EU Interim Multinational Emergency Force and French-led Operation Artemis to Bunia, DRC in June 2003.¹⁷ As these interventions have proven successful and have in certain cases facilitated the deployment of UN peacekeepers, regional organizations, with their increasing rapid response capacity, could in fact act as a complementary mechanism to UN deployments. The increasing role of regional organizations in peace operations, however, also raises the question of whether these regional forces are adequate and sufficiently credible for a mission to succeed, as seen with the deployment of African Union forces in Darfur.

OBSTACLES TO GREATER RAPID RESPONSE CAPACITY

Apart from the challenges facing the response mechanisms identified above, the participants considered a number of other obstacles to greater rapid response capacity. They are political will, civil-military cooperation, and the responsibility to protect.

POLITICAL WILL

The lack of political will amongst Member States to reform UN peacekeeping and to strengthen rapid response operations is a major impediment to the UN's capacity to respond rapidly to crises. While addressing political will is one option, it may be more beneficial to build skills and capacities outside the government that would take action when global crises arise, and as such, compensate for delays in political action. In fact, EU studies regarding capacity building in civilian organizations have demonstrated that civilian capabilities are essential where military capabilities are insufficient. Indeed, one way to circumvent a lack of political will is to develop more tools and a greater capacity outside of government. As more tools are created, the lesser governments will be able to stall developments for rapid response.

The UN and EU are the only international organizations with an established mechanism that allows for the mobilization and deployment of a significant operational civilian capability. UN police missions are made up of individual civilian police officers and formed police units contributed by Member states. Their deployment can take between six to nine months following a mission's authorization by the Security Council. The problem with such a timeframe is that it leaves a critical gap at the onset of an operation, when forces are needed to stabilize the situation and maintain security. One way to address this gap is for Member states to develop greater capacity to deploy qualified police personnel, something which several nations, including Canada, have attempted to do.¹⁸ The UN also faces a problem with respect to the quality of its personnel.¹⁹ Selected candidates, most of which are from developing countries, often portray limited training and experience which significantly limit their effectiveness.

¹⁷ United Nations. 2004. "UN Peace Operations 2003: Year in Review." http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/year_review03/Issues_related.htm.

¹⁸ Perito, Robert, Michael Dziedzic, and Beth DeGrasse. 2004. "Building Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability Operations: The Rule of Law Component." *United States Institute of Peace, Special Report No. 118*. <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr118.html>.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

The EU Police Unit has an available force for international service of 5,000 civilian police (1,400 of which are part of a rapid reaction force which can deploy on a 30-day notice), as well as 200 judges, lawyers, and corrections officers (60 of which can deploy on a 30-day notice). The rapid reaction forces are composed of formed (constabulary) units contributed by police organizations of Member states. The Italian Carabinieri is one example.²⁰

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

The increasing focus on humanitarian concerns means that traditional military-based organizations must also work towards achieving humanitarian objectives in peacekeeping missions. Such objectives may in certain respects complicate the international community's ability to appropriately respond to crises, as the integration of humanitarian and civilian considerations into UN peacekeeping missions requires a wide range of skill sets, as well as reliable information through a UN intelligence unit. Yet, it should be recognized that military-civilian integration in field missions and in the sharing of information is already a common feature of UN peacekeeping missions. For example, the military has specific liaisons sitting in civilian units, and intelligence units are present in the field (e.g. the Unified Mission Analysis Centre (UMAC) in Sudan). While civil-military cooperation is already a common feature of many missions, the problem becomes one of insufficient monetary resources. Resistance from certain countries within the UN against the creation of an intelligence unit also continues to hinder progress in that direction.

The increasing focus on humanitarian concerns also requires greater cooperation and coordination between NGOs and governments, as the involvement of NGOs in conflict can lead to complications when their efforts are not sufficiently integrated with government initiatives. Military forces are also working closely with NGOs to create a stable environment in which to assist them in their efforts, and to mitigate casualties amongst local NGOs involved in conflicts. While many efforts exist to strengthen cooperation — in fact, NGOs and peacekeeping missions meet regularly in thematic working groups to discuss how to coordinate better — the concern is that NGOs often resist being physically integrated into UN operations. The integration of humanitarian assistance within military efforts challenges fundamental humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence, which NGOs want to maintain. Still, many participants were confident of the possibility for further cooperation between NGO and government approaches to conflicts, as well as the possibility for further philosophical integration between two. NGOs also have the ability to offer creative solutions outside of more conventional mechanisms.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

A rapid response capacity, as its name suggest, is designed to *respond* rapidly to crises, and to provide a stabilization force immediately after a cease-fire or peace accord. However, as posited in the Responsibility to Protect, possible future roles for a UN rapid response force could include the prevention and halting of genocide, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. According to R2P, this role is part of the responsibility to prevent. A major obstacle to such deployment is the UN's lack of mechanisms and capacity to predict or anticipate crises before they occur.²¹

In addition, the participants expressed concerns with regards to the impact of structural and institutional limitations on the realization of humanitarian goals, such as R2P. More specifically, Col. Hanrahan pointed out that R2P principles have limited impact during crises, since there are no existing processes or structures to incorporate these principles into rapid response systems and decision-making processes. The consequence is that recent resolutions referring to R2P continue to have little real impact on rapid response operations. R2P also requires countries to further develop their rapid reaction capabilities so that they have the capacity to deploy forces when necessary. As the re-establishment of rapid reaction forces on an ad hoc basis is costly, and military budgets are on the decline, the development of such forces is limited.

In light of these limitations, the further development of rapid reaction forces, such as SHIRBRIG, may be useful for speeding up deployment. Still, the availability of forces does not necessarily translate into action if political will does not exist. Thus, the development of political will to respond to crisis situations is at least as important as developing military capabilities.

CANADIAN STRATEGIES FOR RAPID RESPONSE TO CRISES

Canada's experiences in recent peace operations have highlighted the need for, and demonstrated the added value of taking a "whole of government" approach to international missions, in which military and civilian resources work together in a focused and coherent manner. The approach is being used as part of the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and Canada's support for the Africa Union troops in Darfur, Sudan. The approach was also implemented as part of the Canadian support for the elections in Haiti in February 2006. Specifically, the approach requires greater collaboration between the Canadian Forces and other government departments and agencies (including Foreign Affairs Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) to further develop Canada's integrated "3D" approach (defence, diplomacy and development) to conflict and post-conflict situations.

²¹ Rice, Susan. "Collective Response to Crisis: Strengthening UN Peace Operations Capacity." http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/pdf/Rice_paper_collective_response.pdf.

STANDING CONTINGENCY FORCE

Recent developments as part of Canada's desire to better meet the need of responding quickly to international crises include the creation of a Standing Contingency Force, which consists of approximately 1000 soldiers deployable within 7 to 10 days notice. The task force would provide an initial presence on the ground in order to stabilize the situation and/or facilitate the deployment of a larger, follow-on force. However, as one author suggests, it may take one to two years before the task force is available for operations and it is unlikely to stay in the field for up to six months.²² Nevertheless, efforts are being made to test and further develop the idea of a rapid response force. One such effort was undertaken jointly with the U.S. in the fall of 2006. The effort consisted of a seaborne invasion exercise off the coast of the U.S. in order to test the feasibility of the plan to create a rapid response team.²³

DISASTER ASSISTANCE RESPONSE TEAM (DART)

Created in 1996 as part of Canada's response to the genocide in Rwanda, the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) is another unprecedented initiative of the Government of Canada to respond rapidly to natural disaster crises. As former commander of two DART missions, Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Voith described DART's role in providing medical care and potable water, as well as some engineering capabilities, in emergency areas until domestic and humanitarian aid capabilities can be mobilized. Although DART does not operate in nuclear, biological or chemical disasters, does not possess trauma or surgical capabilities, and is limited to a 40 day mandate, Lt.-Col. Voith emphasized that DART is notable amongst rapid response organizations for its mobilization capacity to be first on the scene and provide assistance without overlapping on work by other bodies. DART was deployed twice in the last two years, to Sri Lanka in the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami, and in Pakistan, following the 2005 earthquake. In both operations, DART members provided effective assistance in the form of potable drinking water (producing between 150,000 to 200,000 litres of water per day) and medical treatments until aid organizations had established their capabilities. Both deployments were deemed successful and highlighting the importance of diplomatic relations and the 3D approach in the operations' success.

GLOBAL PEACE AND SECURITY FUND (GPSF)

The Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) is a new mechanism which further enables rapid response by mobilizing funds more quickly than in the past. It is dedicated to providing security assistance to failed and fragile states, post-conflict stabilization and recovery, and capacity building for peace operations primarily in Africa. The GPSF has

²² Armstrong-Whitworth.

²³ Pugliese, David. 2006. "Canadian forces will take part in amphibious exercise off U.S. coast." *The Daily News*. 10 October. <http://www.hfxnews.ca/index.cfm?sid=8684&sc=2>.

received \$500 million over five years which it will allocate between the Stability and Reconstruction Taskforce (START), an inter-departmental advisory board and secretariat situated within Foreign Affairs that will oversee the design of 3D (diplomacy, development, defence) integrated approaches to “failed and fragile states,” and two smaller programmes, the details of which are still unclear.

CANADIAN CIVIL SOCIETY AND INITIATIVES

Civilian expertise is also available through organizations such as CANADEM, which has created a catalogue of civilian experts ready to deploy on short-notice. For example, CANPOL is a national roster of 5000 Canadians with expertise in human rights, peace building, democratization, rule of law, admin-logistics, security, and reconstruction. The roster also comprises 500 police and security sector reform experts that have experience in over 60 countries. Another example is CANADEM’s national Roster of Election Observers for Canada, which identifies candidates for deployment to observer missions. Based on these experiences, participants agreed that more Canadian Centres of excellence should be created that have the capacity to provide solutions in responding to crises.

MULTILATERAL COMMITMENTS

The Government has also pledged its continued partnership with both NATO and the UN. This commitment reflects Canada’s longstanding engagement in both organizations as a means to defend its national interests. As part of this engagement, Canada is pursuing a strong leadership role in Afghanistan under the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission.

Canada has also played a central role in the creation and the establishment of SHIRBRIG. As part of this initiative, Canada assumed the Presidency of SHIRBRIG in 2003 and a Canadian, Brigadier General Gregory Mitchell, took on the position of brigade commander from January 2004 until summer 2006. Owing to its current involvement in NATO and Afghanistan, however, participants did not feel that Canada currently has a vested interest in SHIRBRIG. Participants also mentioned that a general shift away from SHIRBRIG as a rapid reaction tool can be observed by other nations as well, namely the EU, as they focus on other issues. Still, Canada is continuing to support the African Union and ECOWAS in their development of a capacity to prevent, resolve and manage crises, and in particular, efforts towards an AU rapid reaction force.

Participants agreed that Canada should consider paying greater attention to SHIRBRIG so that it remains a valuable tool in dealing with future crises and that Canada should promote military and civilian integration in UN peacekeeping operations. In spite of above developments, however, participants remained unclear as to what the Canadian military’s plan to have a rapid response force capable of intervening in failed or failing states around the world will look like, and how it would fit into other multi-national rapid reaction forces.

OTHER STRATEGIES FOR RAPID RESPONSE TO CRISES: UNEPS

Throughout both public dialogue events, Dr. Langille called for a more serious commitment to collective human security. In doing so, he proposed the establishment of a permanent United Nations Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS), an idea which participants discussed at length. UNEPS it would ensure readily deployable military capacities to handle crises and would be immediately deployable in situations involving armed conflict, genocide, ethnic cleansing and other crises. The body would overcome the tensions between notions of state sovereignty, and the principles of R2P and the right to intervene. An emergency service would also appeal to a broader audience than the idea of a UN standing army, and would expand upon legitimate and reliable emergency services. Furthermore, it would be reliable, cost effective and adaptable to the circumstances of specific emergency situations. As part of this proposition, Dr. Langille also called for greater engagement of civil society to build domestic and global constituencies, and to gradually approach supportive states in order to establish a body at the UN that can effectively respond to crises.

Nevertheless, several participants mentioned that bureaucratic unwillingness on the part of Member states could stymie rapid response efforts even if UNEPS was established. Some participants also questioned how and when relevant parties would agree to use such a force, though others suggested public pressure could provide the impetus for deploying UNEPS when needed. Others mentioned that Member states could support such a body and see it as supplementing their own forces, but only after reaching a critical mass of public pressure for its creation. In this regard, active support from civil society organizations and global cooperation between NGOs are key factors in furthering the cause, in particular through more elaborate research on the structure and functions of the emergency service, and through the dissemination of information and greater public awareness.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: POSSIBILITIES FOR STRENGTHENING RAPID RESPONSE CAPACITY

The 1990s and the 21st century have presented a stark need for greater rapid response to crises. While many challenges remain to enhancing the UN's capacity for rapid response, participants agreed that there are clear possibilities for the development of greater rapid response capacity. Before addressing these possibilities, however it is important to remember, as Mr. Kinloch-Pichat advised the panelists, that humanity has progressed in its response to global crises and will continue to do so. As a result, the international community should consider solutions that can actually work in the present, and not necessarily those that are ideal.

The following developments within the international environment and the UN more specifically, present clear possibilities for strengthening rapid response capacity. They are:

1. The rising influence of many different types of NGOs, regional organizations and other global actors in international affairs. As a cohesive group, they are likely to provide strong impetus for change at the UN.
2. The public's increasing engagement and efforts to garner support for UN reform and influence political will. A more engaged "world public" is necessary to foster changes within the UN and other organizations.
3. The growing expansion of civilian capabilities within rapid responses. Civilian capabilities allow for more integrated approaches to rapid responses.
4. The emergence of new partnerships between the UN and other regional organizations (i.e., NATO, EU, ECOWAS, and AU). These partnerships allow for greater flexibility in peacekeeping operations, and a greater rapid response capacity due to the 'sequencing of operations' between regional and sub-regional organization and the UN.²⁴
5. The increasing support on the part of Member states toward improvements at the UN (such as early engagement for national decision-making and policy improvements), as well as improvements at the national level (such as the establishment of national crisis analysis centre and rapid response technical assessment capacity).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Many themes and directions for future work emerged from the Oct. 19 and 20 events. A significant component of the discussion focused on strengthening the political will of states to efficiently and effectively respond to global crises. Overall, there is a necessity to strengthen political resolve and ensure that there are sufficient military and civilian capabilities to guarantee success in rapid response missions. Several recommendations were also based on the need for greater research into global rapid response initiatives to identify the most effective way to proceed on the issue, both globally and within Canada. Although much work remains to be done, important starting points are identified for resolving the rapid reaction debate and for enhancing the UN and the international community's ability to respond rapidly to crises across the globe.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS DPKO AND SC:

As the opportunities for reforming UN systems and structures, and for fostering support amongst Member states for change are limited, it is necessary to look at other avenues for developing greater rapid response capacity.

²⁴ de Coning, Cedric. 2006. "The Future of Peacekeeping in Africa." *Finnish Institute of International Affairs* (FIIA), Report 14, 41. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?lng=en&size51=10&v33=60072&id=23624>.

1. The UN DPKO should continue to support greater integration within its missions and strengthen the coherence between the military, police and civilian activities. This can be achieved by:
 - a. Promoting the development of civilian expertise within the UN and within individual Member states.
 - b. Continuing to support the creation and expansion of a UN roster of civilian specialists, as well as rosters within Member states.
2. The UN DPKO should devise new approaches to partnerships with regional organizations to enhance their legitimacy, as well as their capacity on the ground. This could be achieved by further exploring, through research and discussion, how different types of response mechanisms and partnerships could complement UN deployments.
3. The UN DPKO should strengthen the capacity, both institutionally and on the ground, of regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa by:
 - a. Forming a cooperation agreement with the AU to enable more focused capacity building efforts and strengthen the latter's sustainability in the field and multidimensional capability.
 - b. Working to transform SHIRBRIG to ensure that it can meet UN requirements, including the ability to deploy under a Chapter VII mandate. This could be achieved by formally amending the MOU establishing the Brigade to allow for Chapter VII deployments, by strengthening the Brigade financially, and by committing a specific number of troops to the Brigade.
 - c. Developing a formal arrangement with SHIRBRIG whereby SHIRBRIG members dedicate a certain number of forces for rapid deployment. These forces could train together once a year, thereby establishing similar rules of engagement and provide for greater effectiveness in operations.
4. The Security Council should consider the authorization of longer deployment mandates (i.e., 12 months) for all missions (including by SHIRBRIG and regional organizations). Longer deployment mandates would allow for greater mission stability and would help in the design and implementation of long-term mission goals. Longer mandates would also increase a mission's sustainability in the field, providing it, in turn, with greater flexibility and credibility on the ground. Nevertheless, longer deployment mandates should not be authorized without the necessary resources to fulfill these mandates.

5. The Security Council should support the strong involvement of emerging powers, such as China and India, in the development of rapid response capabilities. By garnering support from a wider range of states, military forces will be seen as more legitimate and credible when they are actually deployed, thereby increasing the odds of success.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGOS IN CANADA AND INTERNATIONALLY²⁵

To increase the support for rapid response capabilities, it is important to build domestic and global constituencies that influence political figures to take action when crises occur. While public opinion is not always effective in influencing global affairs, at the regional level, transnational public opinion can impact political will to respond to crises through regional organizations. In addition, the public and media should not overlook the fact that UN Member States influence its effectiveness as an organization, as well as its abilities to act when crises arise. In fact, many UN Members are far more supportive of its *inaction* during crises than of the mobilization of its resources.

1. Civil society and NGOs should support existing (as well as the establishment of new) Centres of excellence to provide expertise in a wide range of areas, such as human rights and law-related issues, on an ad-hoc basis. These Centres, for example, could help to further clarify how issues of sovereignty and national interest impede on the development of greater rapid response capabilities, and could contribute to an elaboration of R2P processes and structures, as well as its application on the ground.
2. Civil society and NGOs should encourage public engagement in human rights and international issues as a means of building domestic and global constituencies to influence political figures in taking action when crises occur.
3. Civil society and NGOs should examine current and new avenues for enhancing the search capacity of UN organizations and NGOs for civilian personnel. Doing so could include exploring the availability of catalogues of civilian forces and looking at actions taken by organizations to circumvent the lack of international action.
4. Civil society and NGOs should take a serious look at UNEPS proposal to advance merits of the cause.

²⁵ While these recommendations are targeted primarily at Canadian civil society and NGOs, they can also apply to civil society and NGOs around the world.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT

The Government of Canada's 'whole of government' approach calls for the integration of civilian, military and diplomatic strategies. To achieve greater policy coherence in situation of crises, all departments must work together in a concerted manner under clear and defined mandates. To improve the framework, it is also necessary to encourage cooperation between governments and NGOs to ensure the success of both types of organizations in assisting with crises situations.

1. The Government of Canada should strengthen the political resolve of its departments involved in peacekeeping through the elaboration of clear mandates and objectives with regards to defence, diplomacy and development.
2. The Government of Canada should work towards including NGOs into its 'whole of government' approach in a focused and coherent manner. In doing so, the Government should explore possibilities for future philosophical and practical cooperation, at the same time as ensuring that NGOs maintain their independence and identities.
3. The Government of Canada should ensure that there are sufficient military and civilian capabilities for success in rapid response missions. This could be achieved by cooperating with Canadian NGOs, by supporting existing and new rosters of civilian expertise, and by putting more emphasis on the development of the civilian side of peacekeeping, as opposed to its military component.
4. The Government of Canada should promote greater cooperation with the EU, especially in the areas of civilian capacity building to respond to crises.
5. The Government of Canada should further define existing military and diplomatic structures to incorporate R2P principles into rapid response systems and decision-making processes. This could be achieved in collaboration with research institutes, as well as cooperation with other UN Member states.
6. The Government of Canada should strengthen the capacity, both institutionally and on the ground, of regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa. In particular, Canada should:
 - a. Continue to support African capacity building and the African Union (including African Standby Force).
 - b. Continue to support the ASF. Support for the ASF has concentrated primarily on its military component. Few efforts have been made to develop the civilian or police dimensions of the ASF framework. Doing so would ensure that the "multidimensional nature of contemporary peace operations can be fully integrated into the AU peacekeeping concept."²⁶

7. The Government of Canada should enhance SHIRBRIG's capacity and preparedness in responding to crises. This involves working towards decreasing deployment times and enhancing sustainability in the field.
8. The Government of Canada should enhance its role within SHIRBRIG, both financially and in terms of military and civilian personnel by:
 - a. Supporting the civilianization of organizations such as SHIRBRIG through the inclusion of non-permanent civilian staff.
 - b. Considering contributing a civilian foreign-service officer to SHIRBRIG on a one-time basis, to serve as a Policy and Liaison Officer at its headquarters. The holder of the post, which would rotate among member countries, would be responsible for proposing and planning wider civilian participation in SHIRBRIG's activities, while contributing to other activities.
 - c. Continuing to chair the UN peacekeeping committee and investing money in peacekeeping reform;
 - d. Remaining focused on keeping a leadership role within SHIRBRIG and peacekeeping in general;
 - e. Encouraging broader public awareness of SHIRBRIG and support for its deployment.

²⁶ de Coning, 41.

4

BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITY: INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE STRATEGIES FOR UN PEACEKEEPING

This chapter derives from a United Nations Association in Canada (UNA-Canada) public dialogue, held on October 24th, 2006 in Edmonton, to mark the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping. The event included a public forum and a closed experts' roundtable. Participants of the closed experts' roundtable and panelists at the linked public dialogue event discussed issues related to local capacity building and sustainable strategies in UN peacekeeping. Participants explored the concept of sustainability and capacity building and examined the role of the international community in promoting capacity building. Participants also looked at ways to ensure the success of local capacity building in UN peacekeeping missions in the future. The opinions expressed in this chapter and the recommendations are derived from UNA-Canada's consultation process and are not necessarily the views of the organization.

The closed roundtable featured **Tonia Anselmo**, Rapporteur and Youth Representative-Edmonton, UNA-Canada; **Sandra Bibby**, Coordinator What Kind of World Programme, UNAC-Edmonton Branch; **Donald Bourne**, Logistics Delegate, ICRC Operations Manager for Disaster Response, Red Cross Canada; **Kristine Ennis**, Policy Officer, D Air SP 2-7 Directorate of Air Strategic Plans, 11 NT, Department of National Defence; **Karen Foss**, Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Group, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada; **Dr. Joy Fraser**, Edmonton Branch, UNA-Canada; **Patricia Hartnagel**, Peace activist, Formerly Project Ploughshares — Edmonton; **Tom Keating**, Professor, University of Alberta; **Emily Schroeder**, Project Officer, UNA-Canada; **Kristine St-Pierre**, Consultant for UNA-Canada, Superintendent **John White**, Director, International Peacekeeping Branch, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; and **LCdr Albert Wong**, Public Affairs Officer, DND and former member of the Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan. **Robert O'Brien**, Project Manager, UNA-Canada was the event's moderator.

BACKGROUND: SUSTAINABLE APPROACHES AND UN PEACEKEEPING

One of the key challenges to UN peacekeeping operations is the question of how to measure the success of a mission. Linked to this question are the concepts of sustainability and capacity building; sustainable capacity building strategies are increasingly being recognized as necessary components of successful peace operations.

Throughout the 1990s, some countries hosting peacekeeping operations fell back into conflict once the mission ended. The relapse was attributed to a gap between peacekeeping efforts to increase security and stabilization, and efforts generally more associated with

peacebuilding, such as governance and development. Haiti and Liberia, for example, are two situations where the UN had to launch new peacekeeping missions with wider mandates. More recently in the spring of 2006, violence broke out again in Timor-Leste, one year after the UN peacekeeping mission concluded what seemed to be a successful mandate. The return to violence raises questions as to whether withdrawal was undertaken too early, and whether a follow-on strategy was adequately devised to ensure continuity and sustainability in peace operations.¹

A peacekeeping mission is deemed 'successful' if it fulfills the mandate given to it by the UN Security Council. However, participants at the roundtable noted that the true success of a mission is the ability of a country to resolve its conflicts peacefully, and to work collectively with the international community towards the creation of a stable environment and the promotion of good governance. UN peacekeeping operations, as integrated missions, focus on restoring post-conflict states by helping to reform the security sector, uphold the rule of law, generate respect for human rights, and conduct democratic elections. In fact, these elements have become integral aspects of successful peacekeeping missions.

To prevent relapse of political or ethnic tensions and the reoccurrence of violent conflict, participants discussed the necessity to create conditions that will secure peace, minimize the gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and ensure a successful withdrawal and sustainable exit from a post-conflict state. Effective and sustainable capacity building in UN peacekeeping operations is one way of creating these conditions. 'Capacity building,' however, remains fairly undefined in theory and in practice. In an attempt to refine the concept, participants addressed a number of questions, including: how does capacity building contribute to the sustainability of a peace operation; when should capacity building begin; who should 'build capacity'; and how long should it last? Participants first examined the concept of 'capacity building' as part of a sustainable approach to peacekeeping.

WHAT DO WE MEAN BY 'CAPACITY BUILDING'?

As mentioned above, local capacity building is increasingly being recognized as an important component of a peacekeeping mission, especially considering the integrated and complex nature of contemporary missions. Currently, however, there are no standard operating procedures for capacity building. Broadly defined, effective and sustainable capacity building implies the removal of conflict from society. It also refers to the tools required for a society to resolve conflicts peacefully and to prevent the reoccurrence of conflict once a mission has fulfilled its mandate. Still, there are no institutionalized definitions of what capacity building means in practice and no clear ways of approaching capacity building.

¹ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO). Available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>.

As discussed by the participants to the roundtable, the creation or strengthening of local capacity building as part of UN peacekeeping missions requires the establishment of appropriate mandates and timelines to ensure initiatives are adequate and long-term. The creation or strengthening of local capacity building also requires the development of an operational strategy to assess the needs on the ground and identify local capacities and partnerships. In doing so, participants identified a number of specific approaches to capacity building including strategies for improving coordination among all actors engaged in capacity building, and strategies for reinforcing local partnerships to help in the gradual transfer of knowledge and responsibility from the international community to local structures. More specifically, local capacity building also often incorporates initiatives that promote security and good governance, as well as integrated police and justice systems. With this in mind, participants recognized the importance of local capacity building as multifaceted and context specific.

Participants acknowledged that building peace in a country devastated by war is a long-term process that requires the cooperation between the international community and local institutions. While local capacity structures may already exist on which to build, these often have low capacity, and in many cases, have been completely destroyed by conflict. As a result, participants agreed that building local capacity constitutes an integral component of a sustainable approach to peace operations and that it should concentrate on a gradual transfer of responsibilities to local authorities. In their view, long-term stability will only be achieved once local institutions are able to take on the responsibility for building governance, promoting the rule of law, and strengthening economic and social development.

With the above in mind, participants moved on to examine strategies for improving sustainability in UN peacekeeping, as well as efficacy and sustainability of capacity building initiatives. While these strategies are often similar in post-conflict countries, their exact characteristics are context specific and depend greatly on the conditions and needs on the ground.

STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING SUSTAINABILITY IN UN PEACEKEEPING

Participants examined three strategies for improving sustainability in UN peacekeeping: more inclusive mandates, longer timeframes, and transition planning from peacekeeping to peacebuilding.

MORE INCLUSIVE PEACEKEEPING MANDATES

Participants first discussed the question of mandates and argued that sustainable approaches to capacity building should be based on well-defined mission objectives. This means that when the Security Council accepts to deploy a peacekeeping mission, the mandate should be clear and achievable, and should reflect the situation on the ground.

Participants noted that past missions have tended to view an election or a new government as a benchmark for ending an operation. Most practitioners now recognize that establishing sustainable peace takes longer and that other criteria for evaluating the success of a mission are required. These criteria are reflected in the increasingly complexity of peacekeeping mandates,

which include provisions for police training, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform, as well as capacity building in governance, the rule of law, human rights, and economic and social development.

According to participants, the problem is that peacekeeping mandates are often constrained by arbitrary timelines and require that they be revised once the mission has started. Participants, however, cited the difficulty of altering a mission's mandate mid-operation and called on wider operational mandates as a means to preempt the need to revisit mandates at mid-course. As they observed, nine out of fifteen Security Council members must vote in favour of a change to a mission's mandate before that change can be authorized; in the event that a permanent member votes against the proposal, the mandate cannot be changed.

One participant also mentioned that mandates should be devised in a systematic way, using an organizational approach describing the role of respective players such as the UN, the host government, civil society, NGOs, etc. in capacity development.

LONGER TIMEFRAMES FOR MISSIONS ON THE GROUND

Second, participants discussed the need for longer timeframes in UN peacekeeping missions. In general, the UN Security Council authorizes a peacekeeping mission for a timeframe of six months to one year. While these timeframes may make sense both politically and financially, they are limited in their ability to ensure the sustainability of capacity building strategies in the long-term. While overall missions may typically cover five-year spans, according to Sup. John White, these are still not adequate to absolve problematic issues that are endemic, yet accepted, throughout a particular community or culture (e.g., domestic violence). In his view, the problem comes from the insufficient level of planning within missions, and the fact that withdrawal from a mission is most often determined by the expiration of funds, rather than the conditions on the ground.

In order to achieve stability in post-conflict states, and ensure the long-term effectiveness of capacity building strategies, participants concluded that peacekeeping operations should be mandated for longer periods. Participants agreed that longer timeframes are necessary if initiatives are to make a difference and not fall apart once the international community leaves. Still, participants were also fully aware that the UN seldom has an appetite, or the financial means, to undertake thirty-year missions.

If this is the case, one option could be to create partnerships between UN peacekeeping missions on the ground, NGOs, and third parties (such as government agencies) to ensure that capacity building programmes enjoy some level of continuity. For example, in 2002, the United Kingdom government presented Sierra Leone with a ten year commitment to security sector and governance reforms. The agreement commits the Government of Sierra Leone to reach agreed upon performance benchmarks in exchange for UK support.²

² The agreement also incorporates a long-term guarantee by the UK Government to intervene within 48-72 hours if major tensions were to erupt. Nick Grono, "Improving the International Response to Conflicts in Africa," Speech given at the *World Bank Conference on Strategic Agendas for Development*, Washington D.C., 14 March 2006. Available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4043&l=1>. See also United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Sierra Leone: Making a Difference." Available at: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1063633917725>.

In addition to longer timeframes, Sup. White asserted that exit strategies should be determined by the readiness of the host nation to govern independently and uphold the rule of law. Sup. White recalled instances in Haiti and East Timor where “we left too soon”, where the job was not complete, and where the “honeymoon with the international community wore off.” Karen Foss also remembered the unfortunate occurrence in East Timor when several humanitarian institutions decided to “close up shop.” Foss argued that in order for capacity building strategies to be sustainable, the international community, including UN peacekeeping missions and agencies on the ground, should not withdraw suddenly nor should they withdraw fully. Participants agreed that withdrawal from an international mission when the objectives of the mission—and reasons for entering in the first place—have not been met, may cause speculation about the competency of the international community and the UN to deliver sustainable results. It may also prove more financially costly if the UN is called to return.

TRANSITION PLANNING FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACEBUILDING

Participants also discussed the need to plan for a smooth transition between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and at the same time, strengthen the UN’s capacity to develop peacebuilding strategies. As reported by the Brahimi Report, only an environment in which peace is self-sustaining “offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces,” making peacekeepers and peace-builders “inseparable partners.”³ In other words, while peacekeeping leads the way for a peacebuilding mission, a peacekeeping operation has no exit without an adequate peacebuilding strategy, making the inclusion of a sustainable peacebuilding strategy a necessary component of transition planning and management. In Sierra Leone, for example, the peacekeeping operation, which is now completed, contained peacebuilding strategies that are currently under implementation.⁴ These strategies allowed for continuity between the peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, and contributed to a smooth transition between the two. In this regard, the newly created Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office intends to help fill the void between war and peace by creating institutional and systematic links between peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. While promising, it is still not clear what role it will play and how it will go about doing so.

The transition between peacekeeping and peacebuilding also depends on “a collaborative and inclusive UN system and the effectiveness of other international actors.”⁵ Indeed, these actors, including UN agencies, the World Bank, and various humanitarian and developmental agencies (both governmental and non-governmental), must continue to work long after a peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn. As a result, the cooperation and coordination between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is extremely important, and

³ United Nations “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” (Brahimi Report), 2000. Available at: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/.

⁴ UN DPKO

⁵ Report of the Secretary-General, “No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations,” 2001, para. 21.

must commence during the initial planning and deployment of a peacekeeping mission. The sooner the various actors make efforts to cooperate and work together, the greater the chances are that the peacebuilding process will be carried forward. A carefully planned out transition strategy is also important to ensure that the gains made during a peacekeeping mission are sustained well after the mission has been completed.

Flexibility in a UN peacekeeping mission was also identified as a crucial aspect of a transition plan. Participants discussed various forms of flexibility: flexibility in terms of timing and allowing for long timeframes; flexibility with respect to changing priorities; and flexibility with regards to funding. According to Bob O'Brien, greater flexibility in UN peacekeeping missions is necessary to allow local capacities to develop at their own pace. This will help to avoid sudden increases in insecurity and improve the likelihood that results will be sustainable in the long-term. While agreeing with O'Brien, LCdr Wong commented that a mission's flexibility often depends on its leadership, and as a result, greater flexibility, whether in terms of timing, priorities or funding, does not always constitute a priority.

STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING EFFICACY AND SUSTAINABILITY OF CAPACITY BUILDING INITIATIVES

Sustaining local capacity both during a peacekeeping mission and following its withdrawal requires coordination and cooperation between the post-conflict state, the UN peacekeeping mission on the ground and UN agencies, as well as international, regional and local actors (NGOS, civil society, local communities, etc.). Strategies for improving efficacy and sustainability of capacity building initiatives in UN peacekeeping include greater cooperation between all actors engaged in capacity building and enhanced coordination of their mandates and initiatives, as well as the creation of local partnerships.

COOPERATION AND COORDINATION AMONG INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND LOCAL ACTORS

Many participants viewed coordination among different agencies as vital to sustainable capacity building. According to Donald Bourne, NGOs are key players in UN peacekeeping missions, as they strive to prevent and resolve conflict. Without coordination, however, NGOs working on similar projects often compete with each other. One participant gave the example of groups who enter a conflict zone, without experience working in the area, with money and proposals formulated by their implementing partners. As there are no obligations for these groups to coordinate with each other, each group imposes its project on the community and leaves once their restricted timeframe has expired. NGOs also have no obligation to coordinate with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

⁶ Institute of Public Affairs, "The Trouble with NGOs in Afghanistan." *IPA in the News*, 8 February 2005. Available at: http://www.ipa.org.au/files/news_905.html.

Affairs (OCHA). For example, in Afghanistan, more than 1500 local NGOs are working towards strengthening local capacity building. While these NGOs may at first sight be a sign of increased local capacity, the sheer number of NGOs raises questions of coordination, duplication, funding priorities, and corruption.⁶

Bourne also recalled numerous occasions when UN peacekeepers would enter a conflict site with well-designed projects, but would not stay the course, causing more chaos and confusion than if they had done nothing at all. Bourne gave the specific example of the UN entering a conflict zone with the auspices of running a hospital, at which point the Red Cross would pull out. As the funding dropped, the UN withdrew, leaving the Red Cross to once again “mend the disarray.”

At the opposite end of the spectrum, the UN and the Red Cross became in some situations so closely associated, that rebel groups no longer recognized Red Cross neutrality and purposely limited the distribution of food and other humanitarian aid. Based on his extensive peacekeeping experience, Bourne asserted that coordination is necessary both at higher levels (between UN DPKO and other UN agencies) and on the ground (among NGOs, and between NGOs and the UN peacekeeping mission). Foss also called for mandatory coordination between NGOs and local leaders to prevent well-intentioned groups from addressing what they believe to be the needs of a specific community, without first consulting with that community. In this regard, consultation processes were mentioned as necessary mechanisms for formalizing coordination efforts.

Coordination is also crucial to avoid duplicating efforts and to make the most of the resources available. In many countries, organizations like the Red Cross are conducting capacity building without the presence of UN peacekeeping forces. As a result, it is important that UN DPKO and other UN agencies coordinate with humanitarian organizations in the field in order to take advantage of the expertise and knowledge of these organizations and to ensure that UN peacekeeping missions complement rather than duplicate their work.

CREATION OF LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS

The need for community involvement and the creation of local partnerships in peacekeeping missions is a crucial component of sustainable capacity building approaches. By creating or strengthening local partnerships, international actors contribute to the gradual transfer of knowledge and responsibility from the international community to local establishments. Empowering the local population to self-govern, under the rule of law, is fundamental to sustain capacity over the long-term.

According to LCdr Wong, the role of the international community is to find a means of channeling this capacity in a way that reflects perspectives and needs of the local community and population. On this subject, Sup. White discussed the need to respect indigenous cultures and the notion that western values should not be imposed on these cultures. He noted that many post-conflict states are verbal societies, and suggested working with them on their terms and in their capacity. Following on this argument, Foss mentioned that where existing structures are not strong, local partnerships should be strengthened with what already exists and functions. In East Timor, for example, local capacity is present, but there

are no rewards for using this capacity to its full advantage. In this situation, Foss suggested creating local buy-in and encouraging genuine consultation or dialogue with the local public in order to create an understanding and foster trust. Still, LCdr Wong pointed out that corruption and poverty are usually embedded in post-conflict societies, and as a result, the international community should be careful not to build on existing corruption. Sup. White further recommended that the international community and the UN not assess missions based on western expectations or standards, but instead redirect the focus on the missions' environment and capacity building needs on the ground.

Participants also mentioned the importance for capacity building initiatives to involve all levels of civil society, including grassroots organizations. In doing so, international players must be careful not to diminish grassroots capacity on the ground, but rather support, promote and complement this capacity. As Patricia Hartnagel observed, there is a fine balance between the work of international players and that of grassroots organizations and much needs to be done to ensure the sustainability of grassroots capacity. One example of successful support of grassroots organizations can be seen in Kinshasa, DRC where local NGOs are promoting an inter-cultural model of living together and facilitating the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. This is carried out through a project that consists of neighboring groups called 'Cellules pour la paix' (Peace Cells) formed of people trained to mediate and resolve conflicts. Another example is the UN sponsored "food-for-work" project aimed at building local capacity among local communities in Afghanistan. Since the cultivation of produce is a long-term effort, locals can either be involved in tree farming, planting, or maintaining orchards in exchange for food rations, which often consist of a bag of rice, lentils, cooking oil, and salt.

International NGOs (INGOs) play a crucial role in the development of local capacity building and in strengthening grassroots capacity. INGOs are key actors in the creation of local partnerships, helping to empower community-level establishments and engaging in the transfer of knowledge and training. Their capacity and willingness to remain in the field well after a UN peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission has left also renders their presence essential to achieving sustainable peace. For example, the USAID programme entitled 'Localizing Institutional Capacity in Southern Sudan,' granted Mercy Corps a three-year \$9.6 million grant to prevent and resolve conflict by fostering a healthy and vibrant civil society. The programme works to strengthen the organizational capacity of 56 local non-governmental organizations that address the plight of marginalized populations. Half of these organizations are led by women.⁷

⁷ MercyCorps, "Programme Details: South Sudan," 2006. Available at: <http://www.mercycorps.org/countries/sudan/632>.

CANADA'S EXPERTISE IN LOCAL CAPACITY BUILDING

In discussing Canada's expertise in capacity building, participants referred to the Government of Canada's 'whole of government' approach. Within the context of peacekeeping missions, this approach refers to a multilateral endeavour, amalgamating the efforts of military, police, and civilian institutions to achieve capacity building strategies that meet requirements of defence, diplomacy, and development (also known as '3D' approach). Specifically, the approach requires greater collaboration between the Canadian Forces and other government departments and agencies (including Foreign Affairs Canada, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Department of Justice Canada, and Elections Canada among others) to further develop Canada's integrated approach to conflict and post-conflict situations. While the approach is advantageous in that it presents different, yet coordinated capacity building strategies, it sometimes excludes actors that work outside the government like NGOs and civil society groups.

With the above in mind, Foss affirmed that Canada must continue to work towards bettering its approach to peacekeeping and peace operations, including responding to the need for quick-impact peace dividends, developing strategies for long-term sustainable capacity, and increasing its adaptability to local environments and situations.

LESSONS LEARNED: CANADA'S ROLE IN LOCAL CAPACITY BUILDING INITIATIVES

Participants discussed different local capacity building initiatives undertaken by various departments within the Canadian government including the RCMP, DND, and DFAIT. While CIDA representatives were not able to attend the roundtable, CIDA's contribution to capacity building in post-conflict countries is also part of Canada's 'whole of government' approach and should therefore be acknowledged. All initiatives are linked either explicitly or implicitly to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.

INTERNATIONAL POLICING⁸

Canadian police officers on international missions contribute to capacity building through a number of initiatives. These initiatives, coordinated by the RCMP, include training local police, reforming, professionalizing and democratizing police organizations, strengthening security and reinforcing local authority, and promoting civil-military relations. Canada is the largest contributor of police in Darfur, and also provides the area with logistical support, transportation/jeeps, as well as military and civilian personnel.

⁸ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "International Peacekeeping," 2006. Available at: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/peacekeeping/index_e.htm.

As stated by Sup. White, the police does not work in isolation, but rather in collaboration with other international institutions for an integrated and coordinated approach to conflict resolution. Traditionally, intervention in failed or post-conflict states has largely been militaristic. Although some NGOs may already be present in an area of conflict, such as the Red Cross, the UN has customarily been the designated authority, responsible for securing a particular environment before other actors are able to enter. A secure environment is vital to the performance of the RCMP's International Peacekeeping Branch, since police require freedom of movement in order to undertake their tasks and responsibilities.

One of the first tasks that international police would normally initiate on a mission is to establish and operate training academies in order to ensure an international standard of uniformity amongst all police. Where the international community has authorization to manage institutions and governance of the respective country, there exists opportunity for knowledge sharing, as well as increased commitment to the mission and tenants of the resolution agreement. Complications arise, however, when the country of origin retains primacy over all establishments; cooperation from existing forces is then not guaranteed. In this case, the international team, while still mandated to police, concentrate their efforts on other necessary tasks including coaching, mentoring, and advising. Sup. White insisted that in order to improve local capacity, there must be cooperation between all levels of police. In his view, the best way of promoting daily communication and a habitual transfer of knowledge between international officers and indigenous officers is to co-locate them at all levels and ranks. Sup. White also affirmed that many of the international police that are deployed as part of a UN peacekeeping mission are in need of 're-education' when it comes to the use of firearms, especially in the attainment and maintenance of public order and crowd control. As a result, he stressed the need for greater accountability in the use of guns and called on targeted training of international police forces to help them adhere to international standards for the use of guns and other methods of force.⁹

Sup. White observed that, in the past, measuring the success of a mission was relatively simple, especially where previous policing organizations had not yet been established. Under these circumstances, his team would open training academies, train police, and calculate their effectiveness. Measuring the success of a mission has since become much more complex. In fact, he noted that normal things expected in a democratic society become much more difficult in a failed or post-conflict state. To measure the success of a mission, he asked himself "are we moving ahead?"... "are they still violating human rights?"... "are they arresting people without any evidence?"

One indicator of mission success is less corruption within police and government institutions. He recounted that in many post-conflict countries, the police are often illiterate

⁹ These standards include the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials and the UN Basic Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. See Amnesty International Canada, "Preventing police from misusing their guns," *New Release*, 24 February 2004. Available at: http://www.amnesty.ca/resource_centre/news/view.php?c=Resource%20Centre%20News.

and they operate without a concept of, or mandate to, conduct proper investigations before arresting individuals. The idea of an investigation is often beyond their grasp and, at times, unfair arrests are executed on the command of the government. In order to determine whether or not a local officer should remain an officer, international police forces conduct investigations—known as the process of ‘vetting’—on the conduct and background of the officer in question. According to Sup. White, however, it is often difficult to determine whether or not an officer committed a crime, predominantly since most records were destroyed during the conflict.

The progression of a community’s respect for authority is another indicator of mission success. This is especially important in countries where the indigenous population has suffered gross violations of human rights committed by the state’s former police force. Regaining trust requires time and consistent demonstration by the police that they have changed. Another indicator of mission success is the effective establishment of a fair and just judicial system. However, developing new criminal and judicial codes is a lengthy and challenging process to achieve within the UN’s diminutive timeframes.

STRATEGIC ADVISORY TEAM IN AFGHANISTAN (SAT)¹⁰

The Strategic Advisory Team (SAT) consists of 14 DND personnel (both military and civilian) and one CIDA officer. Under Afghan leadership, team members are embedded in their partner Afghan government ministries and agencies to support the development of the Government’s human capacity through their expertise, training, education, and military strategic planning skills.

As described by LCdr Wong, in 2002, the international community devised the Bonn Process to support Afghanistan in the attainment of a system of governance. An interim government was appointed through a nation-wide consultation, which then progressed to a transitional government. The Bonn Process concluded in 2005 with the election of an inclusive Afghan parliament. The subsequent launch of the Afghanistan Compact in January 2006 signifies the mutual commitment between the UN, the international community, and the Government of Afghanistan. Within this framework, SAT and the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) work in unison to move Afghanistan from a failed to a competent state through three fundamental pillars: the security sector; governance, the rule of law, and human rights; and economic and social development. The development of Afghanistan’s security sector is vital to their longevity as a functioning state. In an effort to acquire an honourable police force and judicial system, with legislation that upholds the rule of law, NATO will provide the majority of security provisions to Afghanistan over the next five years. Enhancing the Afghan National Army is also of primary importance, where

¹⁰ Department of National Defence, “Backgrounder: Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan,” 2006. Available at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1703#argus.

it was mentioned that Canada played a crucial role in ensuring cohesion and uniformity among all ranks by recommending re-integrative training of troops from all countries involved.

Nevertheless, increased threats of insurgency and corruption, and the scarce availability of basic health and medical care impede the successful implementation of capacity building strategies in Afghanistan. LCdr Wong commented on the fact that the income brought into Kabul from the international community creates a false economy. For example, he recalled his driver being paid \$600 per month, while civil servants and teachers earned a mere \$50 per month and doctors, \$100. The lack of income security causes professionals to seek higher paying 'taxi' jobs, and increases the possibility of corruption.

In Afghanistan, Canada has also contributed a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to bequeath further security and capacity building throughout the province of Kandahar.¹¹ The PRT assists the Afghan government in extending their services and authority throughout the country, and provides a secure environment for capacity building efforts, such as combating insurgency, addressing poverty and promoting good governance in the areas of democracy and human rights. Canada's contribution to security reform in Afghanistan is the third largest in the world, with the primary directive to professionalize the police and military. In order to "realize a progressive expansion of Afghan civilian capacity, allowing for gradual transfer of roles and responsibility from the PRT to the Afghan government," the Canadian integrated mission in Kandahar must be long-term. The ultimate objective of the PRT is to contribute to a solid foundation of local capacity building, where Afghans are able to civilly "govern themselves and we [the international community] are able to withdraw successfully."

STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION TASK FORCE (START)¹²

The Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), assesses the extent of crises around the world, and, drawing on expertise from across government and in collaboration with task forces from partner countries, it promotes faster and more coordinated responses from the Government in support of stabilization and reconstruction efforts. As discussed by Foss, START aids local clientele in recovering from a particular conflict, and prevents its recurrence by nurturing the development of local capacity. The task force addresses the underlying factors that contribute to a particular conflict, and advances requests for coordinated government assistance. The task force is also effective in providing support to the UN and other international organizations when responding to crises.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Government of Canada, "International Policy Statement: Diplomacy," 2005. Available at: <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-diplomacy6-en.asp>.

Within the START framework, participants discussed the Canada's engagement to build and strengthen local capacity in Sudan, Haiti, and Afghanistan. In Sudan, Foss reported that following the signing of the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, 14 million dollars have been allocated to START in an effort to ease Sudan's compounding political calamity. This contribution is intended to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, assist Sudan with poverty-reduction, and provide for a plethora of peacebuilding initiatives in the areas of security, governance, and justice, such as community organizations for conflict resolution, programmes to tackle violence against women, and training for security forces.

Foss also explained that in Haiti, Canada is working with the Haitian government to continue efforts toward obtaining the right to education, health, and security, and also in ending the perpetual violence. As challenges persist in the acquisition of a just society, START is committed to justice and security system reform, reform of the Haitian National Police, and social reconciliation, which endeavours to build a foundation for human rights recognition and dialogue amongst the Haitian population.

With regards to Afghanistan, START's commitment is directly linked to Canada's involvement in the PRT in Kandahar (see previous section).

CANADA CORPS¹³

CIDA's Canada Corps initiative mobilizes Canadians to participate in governance initiatives in developing countries. Governance programmes are built around five main areas: democratization; human rights; rule of law; public sector institution and capacity building; and conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and security-sector reform. CIDA's focus on good governance is based on the recognition that improving governance structures is essential for long-term sustainable development. For example, under the Canada Corps Fund, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (based in Montréal, Québec) in cooperation with the Faculty of Law from McGill University and the Centre for International Studies at the Université de Montréal is engaged in implementing a project aimed at strengthening good governance through African mechanisms of human rights protection, namely, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Building local capacity is a long-term process. Peace operations — whether peacekeeping or peacebuilding — should not be considered as an end in themselves, but as a part of a long-term process toward conflict resolution. To ensure the success of local capacity building in the future, it may be advantageous to explore the benefits of combining both a short-

¹³ Government of Canada, "International Policy Statement: Development," 2005. Available at: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/ips-development#62c>. See also Canadian International Development Agency, "Office for Democratic Governance," 2006. Available at: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/NIC-54102116-JUN>.

term and long-term agenda, i.e., combining deadline oriented progress with longer-term objectives. Greater attention should also focus on defining further, and systematizing the integrated nature of peace operations, as well as the transition from peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

Many recommendations for ensuring sustainable approaches in UN peacekeeping emerged from the October 24th event. These are presented below.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL:

1. The UNSC should consider the authorization of more inclusive peacekeeping mandates that incorporate capacity building initiatives at the onset of a peacekeeping mission. Ideally, these mandates should be clear, achievable, and reflect the situation on the ground (i.e., the nature of the fighting, the level of insecurity and impunity, the level of threat to individual civilians, etc.).
2. To facilitate the repartition of objectives among peacekeeping actors, mandates could incorporate a set of overall objectives, as well as more specific objectives for the various actors on the ground (including military, police, and civilian).
3. To the extent possible, the UNSC should consider the authorization of longer timeframes for UN peacekeeping missions. Longer timeframes could help strengthen capacity building initiatives by establishing stronger bonds between various actors and by increasing the credibility and engagement of UN peacekeepers. Appropriate timeframes should be determined on a case-by-case basis, based on a set of predetermined criteria, including the long-term mission objectives, the capacity building requirements for achieving these objectives, the financial resources and troops available, and the potential partnerships.
4. Where longer timeframes are not feasible, the possibility for partnerships between the UN, NGOs and third parties (i.e., governments or government agencies) should be explored. These partnerships could ensure project continuity and would strengthen accountability of local actors in the implementation of projects.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (OCHA):

As the lead agency overseeing humanitarian coordination, OCHA's mandate is to improve coordination among UN agencies, donors and NGOs (international and local). However, due to the extensive number of actors in the field, coordination is often extremely difficult. As a result, OCHA's role is highly important in fostering cooperation and promoting coordination between the various humanitarian actors present in the field. With respect to capacity building, greater cooperation and coordination between humanitarian actors would reduce the risk of duplication among NGOs and would ensure that projects reflect the actual needs of the community or region in which the project will be implemented.

1. OCHA should continue to work towards improving coordination and cooperation between international NGOs and local NGOs working in the field by:
 - a. Encouraging more information collection and exchange by international NGOs.
 - b. Promoting greater dialogue through weekly meetings and discussion groups, and by circulating meeting minutes among the NGO and UN community.
 - c. Informing on NGO activities and location of these activities through monthly reports.
 - d. Conducting inter-agency assessments to develop more coordinated and multi-sectoral responses.
 - e. Support the creation of maps identifying the location of NGO activities.
2. Continue to promote cooperation and coordination between NGOs, UN agencies and local governments through the development of Humanitarian Information Centres where NGOs can register, and where they can indicate, along with UN agencies and other organizations, the location (or planned location) of their activities.
3. OCHA, together with DPKO, should promote greater coordination between NGOs wanting to conduct projects in a post-conflict setting and local communities, leaders, and government by:
 - a. Organizing meetings and promoting greater dialogue between international NGOs and the local government and local communities.
 - b. Encouraging the sharing of good practices and lessons learned among these actors.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS ON THE GROUND:

1. Work towards systematizing the concept of capacity building within peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions and ensure that capacity building is a major component of peacekeeping mandates.
2. UN Peacekeeping missions and other UN agencies involved in UN peacekeeping (e.g., UNHCR) should strengthen coordination with OCHA and with humanitarian organizations and other NGOs engaged in capacity building in post-conflict areas. Greater coordination would help the UN take advantage of the expertise and knowledge of humanitarian organizations and would ensure that UN peacekeeping missions complement rather than duplicate the work of these organizations.
3. In order to determine the capacity building needs of a mission, UN Peacekeeping missions should assess the existing capacity on the ground and identify the gaps. This assessment should be conducted in collaboration with the local government, local NGOs, and civil society. Only once the gaps are identified, can an appropriate capacity building strategy be elaborated.
4. To ensure the smooth transition between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and to

strengthen the UN's capacity to develop peacebuilding strategies, UN Peacekeeping missions should carefully design a transition plan. This plan should:

- a. Support greater cooperation and coordination between peacekeeping and peacebuilding during the initial planning and deployment of a peacekeeping mission.
 - b. Promote efforts on the part of various actors engaged in capacity building to cooperate and work together.
 - c. Incorporate local capacity building initiatives at the onset of a peacekeeping operation.
5. Work towards increasing the flexibility of missions in terms of timing, priorities and funding. Such flexibility implies balancing the need for timely action and the need to proceed slowly in developing local capacity and in fostering local ownership to ensure results are sustainable. Flexibility also refers to a mission's ability to adapt quickly to changing needs on the ground by shifting its priorities and funding requirements to better reflect the new challenges.
 6. UN Peacekeeping missions, in collaboration with the Peacebuilding Commission, should coordinate transition plans from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. The Peacebuilding Commission could be involved from the beginning of a peacekeeping mission by sending an observer to consult and investigate how best to design transition and to ensure that the capacity building initiatives undertaken during a peacekeeping mission are continued as part of the peacebuilding operation.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (INGOS):

1. INGOs engaged in capacity building should make sure to involve all levels of civil society, including grassroots organizations. At the same time, however, international NGOs should be careful not to diminish grassroots capacity on the ground, but to support, promote and complement this capacity.
2. Coordinate with local actors and government in order to ensure that projects undertaken reflect the actual need on the ground and that the work done is not duplicated. This can be accomplished through the elaboration of joint work-plans and regular meetings.
3. Strengthen its relationship with OCHA and other UN agencies in order to develop common approaches to building local capacity.
4. Promote greater disclosure regarding both funding received and planned expenditures.
5. Further increase transparency in their work by providing OCHA with continuous updates and reports.
6. Foster local ownership of local communities by creating or strengthening local

partnerships with peacekeeping missions that contribute to the gradual transfer of knowledge and responsibility from the international community to local establishments.

7. When creating local partnerships where existing structures are not strong, NGOs should build on the existing capacity, and help to identify capacity needs, as well as strategies to build the required skills and capacity.
8. Where possible, a local NGO could take the lead in facilitating the coordination process between INGOs and local communities. This could help INGOs maintain and strengthen their relationship with local NGOs.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS:

1. Work towards improving its approach to peacekeeping and peace operations. In doing so, the various departments of the Government of Canada involved in peacekeeping missions (i.e. DFAIT, CIDA, DND, RCMP, Department of Justice, Elections Canada) could:
 - a. Further develop strategies for long-term sustainable capacity building by conducting pilot case studies and documenting lessons learned.
 - b. Build on the lessons learned from the various actors working in the field such as what works, what does not, and why.
 - c. Increase the adaptability of Canadian (and international) troops, police and civilian workers to the local environment and situation through cultural awareness training, as well as human rights and gender training, and by acquiring tools for problem-solving in rapidly changing environments.
2. The Government of Canada should strengthen cooperation and coordination among Canadian actors deployed in peacekeeping missions, including troops, police, humanitarian workers, NGOs, civilian experts, etc., in order for all actors to know where others are working, as well as the projects and activities each are undertaking. In doing so, the Government could:
 - a. Organize meetings where Canadian actors can share information about their activities and timeframes.

- b. Commit Canadian actors to report on their activities and progress, and to circulate to other actors their findings and recommendations for further actions.
 - c. Build on existing initiatives such as CIDA's development of a database of Canadian organizations — including non-governmental organization, institution, or private sector firm registered or incorporated in Canada — that are working in democratic governance and development, by expanding its functions to include a section on lessons learned and recommendations for future action, and by making the database more accessible to the public.
 - d. Create a complementary database for government actors, describing government initiatives and location in the field that would also be accessible to the public.
 - e. Encourage other countries to develop similar databases detailing the work and location of their national NGOs and governmental agencies.
3. Collaborate with other countries involved in capacity building, like the European Union, to further foster an exchange of knowledge and expertise. One possible avenue for greater cooperation includes the training of peacekeepers and civilian police in cultural awareness, gender issues and human rights protection.

5

SECURITY AND RULE OF LAW: UN PEACEKEEPING IN HAITI

This chapter derives from a United Nations Association in Canada (UNA-Canada) public dialogue, held on November 7th, 2006 in Quebec City, to mark the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping. The event included a public forum and a closed experts' roundtable. Participants in the closed experts' roundtable and panelists at the linked public event discussed the elements of security and rule of law, particularly in the context of the UN peacekeeping mission Haiti (MINUSTAH). The participants explored the strengths and weaknesses of the mission, and examined possible future scenarios. In general, the dialogue underlined the lack of security in Haiti and the weakness of judicial institutions as principal factors preventing the mission from advancing its goals. The opinions expressed in this chapter and the recommendations are derived from UNA-Canada's consultation process and are not necessarily the views of the organization.

The closed roundtable featured **Daniel Atangana**, UNA-Canada Quebec City Branch; Chief Superintendent **Dave Beer**, Director General, International Policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; **Sgt. Gilles Brunet**, International Peacekeeping Operations, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; **Karen Foss**, Foreign Affairs and International Trade; **Vincent Sosthène Fouda**, Sociology Department, Université Laval; **Marlye Gélín-Adams**, Regional Advocacy Advisor for Latin America and the Caribbean, CARE USA; **Major Laurent Giroux**, Canadian Forces; **Dr. Canisius Kamanzi**, Université Laval; **Edouard Onguene**, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, Université Laval; **Diego Osorio**, Foreign Affairs and International Trade; **Major Roger Otis**, Operations Officer, Defence engineering Valcartier, DRDC Valcartier; **Marc Perron**, President, UNA-Canada Quebec City Branch; **Emily Schroeder**, Project Officer for UNA-Canada; **Kristine St-Pierre**, Consultant for UNA-Canada; **Camille Tremblay**, Consultant, World Bank and UNMIK in Kosovo; and **Dr. Gérard Verna**, Université Laval. **Julie Gagné**, Teaching Coordinator, Institut québécois des hautes études internationales (HEI), Université Laval, was the event's moderator.

BACKGROUND ON UN PEACEKEEPING IN HAITI

Reflection on the past role of the UN in Haiti helps to clarify the current discussion on Haiti and MINUSTAH. Haiti is one of few countries where the UN has repeatedly been called upon. In total, four peacekeeping missions were established between 1993 and 2000.¹

¹ United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH): <http://www.minustah.org/>.

- United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) (1993-1996; fully functional by March 1995)
- United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) (1996-1997)
- United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) (1997)
- United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) (1997-2000)

This period was characterized by positive achievements, most notably in the development of a democratic culture and of a multifaceted civil society. However, because of the continuing political crisis and the lack of stability, serious reforms to the judicial and police sectors were never undertaken. Currently, the situation is worse than it was ten years ago, exemplifying the need for the international community to define and commit to long-term objectives in Haiti.

OVERVIEW OF PRESENT MISSION

As of 30 September 2006, the force numbers 6,642 troops and 1,700 police officers. Operating under Chapter VII of the Charter, the force is mandated to:

1. Ensure a secure and stable environment by supporting the Transitional Government and the reform of the Haitian National Police (HNP), by assisting in the implementation of DDR programmes and restoration of the rule of law, and by protecting civilians from imminent physical harm;
2. Support the political process by fostering democratic governance, institutional development, and national reconciliation, as well as supporting efforts at carrying out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections; and
3. Promote the protection of human rights, and monitor and report human rights violations.²

BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Following the ousting of Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February 2004, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1529 authorizing the deployment of a Multinational Interim Force (MIF). Resolution 1542 was subsequently adopted on 30 April 2004, which established the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and requested that authority be transferred from the MIF to the UN peacekeeping mission on 1 June 2004. Since then, the country has been governed by an interim government backed by a peacekeeping force under MINUSTAH.

In February 2006, Haiti held its first elections since Aristide's departure in 2004. While elections had previously been scheduled for 2005, these were postponed four times due to security concerns and logistical difficulties. Many observers viewed the elections as an important step toward a democratic and prosperous Haiti. However, much work remains to be done. Most recently, SC resolution 1702 (15 August 2006) stated that "security, rule of law and institutional reform, national reconciliation, and sustainable economic and social development remain key to the stability of Haiti."

More recently, the latest report by the UN Secretary General on Haiti (document S/2006/592) argues that the country's needs remain extensive and the challenges are immense. According to the report,

*The security situation continues to be worrying and destabilizing, in particular the crime situation in the capital, as the sources of instability still exist and the national security capacity to address them remains inadequate. (...) The institutions of State, including the Haitian National Police, the judicial system and the institutions of Government, require extensive assistance in order to function appropriately at all levels.*³

As part of the report, the SC recommends that MINUSTAH's mandate be extended for at least another 12 months, and required that the Mission's current military strength be augmented by 54 individual police officers for institutional support and 16 seconded corrections officers. In the Secretary General's opinion, 12 months is "the minimum time needed to establish a solid basis for rule-of-law reform and achieve some initial results and progress towards democratic governance."⁴ Such time frame would provide further proof to the Haitian people of the international community's continuing commitment. Despite this recommendation, the SC extended the UN mission in Haiti until 15 February 2007 only, though with the intention of renewing the mission for further periods.

In short, it was noted that within the UN mission, the forces lack experience, communication with the local population and understanding of the local culture. There seems to be a gap between the international community and the local population. This gap is reflected in the local population's perception of the UN forces as "tourists". Armed groups continue to dominate the poor sectors surrounding the capital, and constitute a threat to peace. Violence and insecurity have proven to be harmful to development projects and risky for the Blue Helmets. The efforts towards disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration have so far not produced the expected results, nor have they reached the majority of rural and urban armed groups. Ultimately, the strengthening of the Haitian State is a long-term proposition, requiring a long term commitment by the international community.

FOCUS ON SECURITY AND RULE OF LAW IN HAITI

To begin, participants broached the subject of security in Haiti. Security represents the greatest challenge facing the Haitian government and MINUSTAH.⁵ It should be noted that the term "security" covers several different aspects, which should be dealt with separately. Participants identified several factors of insecurity which not only mire the country in political and institutional insecurity, but help to perpetuate the climate of precariousness. Some of these insecurity factors are listed below:

² International Crisis Group (ICG), "Haiti: Security and the Reintegration of the State," *Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°12*, 30 October 2006.

³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1702 (SC/8811).
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8811.doc.htm>.

⁴ *Ibid.*

- criminality that increases daily
- the unrestricted movement of civilian and military weapons
- street gangs and urban guerrillas
- impunity and lack of judicial structures
- numerous prison escapes after the departure of M. Jean-Bertrand Aristide
- the deportation to Haiti by the United States of criminals of Haitian origin
- the silence of political leaders
- the extreme poverty of the population, illiteracy and ignorance
- the scarcity of business activities
- the high level of unemployment
- the HIV pandemic
- the Catholic Church's refusal to play a mediating role in restructuring civil society
- the devastated natural environment and the limited natural resources

According to Ms Marlye Gélin-Adams, one of the main threats in Haiti is the insecurity created by the criminal gangs that operate in defined areas or “hot zones” of the capital, Port-au-Prince. These armed groups of criminal origin are concentrated mainly in the shanty-towns where they compete amongst themselves for control of the areas and sow terror and desolation in the hearts of the people, notably through many cases of extortion, including kidnappings for ransom. In fact, it has been pointed out that no one is safe from kidnapping. We must also recognize that insecurity in Haiti is caused by various groups operating separately.

In addition to the gang-related insecurity is the insecurity linked to poverty, to the lack of economic and social opportunities and to the degradation of the natural environment. In Haiti, the state of decay of the institutions that should govern every state and nation is just as evident in the small everyday things like food and drinking water, as it is in the State's exercise of its governing functions, which are: keeping the peace, the security of people and property, the functioning of the justice system, the police, schools and hospitals. The absence of institutions inevitably entails erosion of the standard of living, and above all puts the country in a state of insecurity where the law is made and enforced by street gangs. Unemployment seems to be the most worrying thing for Haiti, as the country has never developed a production economy that generates and creates jobs. So the jobless population finds for its sole occupation only violence and everything that comes with it.

⁵ International Crisis Group (ICG), 30 October 2006.

Participants also stressed the impact of this insecurity on international perceptions. Rumours are an enormous problem in Haiti, as each incident is magnified at the political level, creating greater insecurity than what really exists.

Four different themes under the supervision of MINUSTAH are explored below. For each, we describe the progress to date, as well as the ongoing challenges they face in restoring the rule of law.

GANGS AND LOCAL CRIMINALITY

Despite political progress following February 2006's election, armed gangs continue to dominate impoverished areas surrounding the capital city, and pose a threat to peace. Cité du Soleil, Haiti's largest slum, is home to a number of criminal gangs, which largely denounce the UN presence and continue to impede disarmament plans.⁶ According to one source, "The HNP has no permanent presence inside the neighborhoods and only mounts sporadic raids, leaving people feeling trapped in their homes."⁷ The high level of violence and insecurity has proven detrimental for development projects and risky for peacekeepers. In July 2006, three peacekeepers were wounded while on duty, and both sides exchanged fire in a neighboring suburb.⁸

POLICE TRAINING

The UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL) mandate is to assist in the restoration and maintenance of law and order in Haiti. Acting as police technical advisors and as liaison between the Haitian national police and the UN force, CIVPOL provides support to the Haitian National Police in their day-to-day duties, and helps to develop its capacity, train its personnel, and reform the institution itself.⁹

However, rebuilding the police force is proving to be more difficult than had been imagined. In this context, Dr. Gérard Verna mentioned the urgency of ensuring the simultaneous emergence of both the justice system and the police, in order for human rights to be respected. This will also prevent the police from feeling obliged to do the work of the justice system, and above all will help the population find again the calm and the serenity necessary to build a lasting peace.

In addition, the participants from the RCMP and the Canadian Forces stressed the lack of cooperation and of real political will on the part of the Haitian authorities, who in particular prevent accounting for the number of police recruited by the Haitian government whose salaries should be drawn from the budget line. According to one participant, numerous phantoms continue to draw salaries in the public service, which is entirely financed by the

⁶ Delva, Joseph Guylor. 2006. "Haitian gang leaders shelve disarmament plan." *Reuters*, 21 August. <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N21173088.htm>.

⁷ Gantz, Peter H. and Sarah Martin. 2005. "Haiti: UN Civilian Police Require Executive Authority." *Refugees International*. <http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/5383>.

⁸ UN News Centre. 2006. "Three UN Peacekeepers Wounded in Haiti; Mission Beefs Up Street Presence." 14 July. <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=19204&Cr=haiti&Cr1=.el>

international community. More precisely, Superintendent Dave Beer and Sergeant Gilles Brunet state that progress made during the '90s was lost under the regime of President Aristide. They say the current mission is much more complex, and its mandate much more difficult to accomplish than ten years ago. The police corps is corrupt and badly organized, and the reorganization of the police constitutes one of the greatest challenges. Despite a certain amount of progress made in identifying individuals in the HNP (Haitian National Police) who are corrupt, Haiti remains a country where impunity is the rule, and where patronage and the personal enrichment of people in high places are common.

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION IN HAITI

Since being elected in February 2006, President Preval has repeatedly demanded that armed gangs surrender their weapons. While the level of violence dropped sharply following Preval's win, kidnappings and political bloodshed have once again intensified.

Participants wondered if the failure to disarm the ex-criminals at the beginning of MINUSTAH's mandate is in part responsible for the increase in violence by the armed groups. They also wondered if the deterioration in the country's security might have been partially avoided if the disarmament projects had been put in place earlier on.

The setting up of conventional programmes of disarmament, demobilization and re-integration (DDR), even if undertaken at the start of the mission, could not have given more than partial results because those programmes are not well enough adapted to the local conditions found in Haiti. For example, Mr. Vincent Sosthène Fouda noted that the DDR programme in Haiti differs from other programmes undertaken in Africa. Whereas in Africa one finds above all former combatants, the majority of the men and women targeted by the programme in Haiti are criminals. As noted by the UN Security Council, the necessary conditions for setting up conventional DDR programmes are not currently present in Haiti. Indeed, the DDR programme does not seem to be generating the hoped-for results. For one thing, efforts related to the DDR have so far been unsuccessful in reaching a large number of the armed groups, both rural and urban.¹⁰ The DDR programme does not appear to be adapted to the reality on the ground, and is thus not prepared to take in hand the urban and rural guerrillas.

The SC has recognized that the conditions for conventional DDR do not currently exist in Haiti. As a matter of fact, DDR efforts have so far not generated the anticipated results and have failed to reach the majority of rural and urban armed groups.¹¹ Consequently, the Council has called for the development of alternative programmes that would focus greater attention on local conditions and further the goal of DDR.¹² In September 2006, the UN announced the launch of a major campaign to persuade armed groups to disarm. In turn,

⁹ Government of Canada. "Video Interview: Graham Muir, Chief Superintendent in the RCMP and Police commissioner for MINUSTAH." <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/muir-haiti-en.asp>.

¹⁰ Human Rights Watch. 2006. "Haiti: Secure and Credible Elections Crucial for Stability." *Human Rights News*, 6 February. <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/02/06/haiti12611.htm>.

the UN promises them money, food, and job training. Using the media, the UN will air radio and television ads to inform the public about the campaign and to convince groups to willingly give up their weapons.¹³

On this subject, the participants stated that it is necessary to identify the number of military weapons in circulation, to prohibit the civilian population from carrying military weapons, and to regulate and reduce the issuance of the right to carry small-caliber weapons. Participants also said it might be helpful if the negotiations with the gang leaders were less publicized in the media, so as to prevent the propagation of rumours unfavourable to the setting up of the programme. Chief Superintendent Beer also underlined the need to link disarmament and development in order to give the Haitian population reasons to hope.

BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS

Participants then approached the theme of creating links among the different actors present in Haiti, and discussed ways of strengthening these partnerships. The Secretary-General has proposed that nation-building in Haiti is a long-term proposition.¹⁴ It takes time, it is hard, it is difficult and it requires everyone to play his or her part. He discussed the need to work in partnership: the government, the private sector, the civil society. He stated “The law enforcement officers alone cannot do [it]. The most effective police that I have come across around the world have had the support of the population and the civil society. Support your police. Support MINUSTAH.”¹⁵ Yet mechanisms for this partnership remain fragile and under development.

Ms Marlye Gélin-Adams underlined that one of the greatest difficulties in Haiti is the absence of a “contract” between the State and the Nation, between existing institutions and the population. Even though the people have the will to get out of their situation, there is a lack of political will and, above all, a lack of responsibility towards the population. Instead of talking about the selfishness of the Haitian people, as Canada’s Governor General, herself originally from Haiti, noted on her last trip to the island, Ms Gélin-Adams invoked the notion of “institutional selfishness”, that is, a country where there is no social contract to govern the establishment of a sustainable link between the institutions and the population, a contract that ultimately builds a nation-state. Moreover, the relationship between the UN forces and the local population is defined by defiance. As Dr. Verna indicated, MINUSTAH remains a foreign and provisional force, and consequently it is up to the international community to understand the Haitian culture and not to impose a foreign culture.

¹¹ HRW, 2006

¹² United Nations Security Council Resolution 1702 (SC/8811).

¹³ The Associated Press. 2006. “New plan in works to disarm rebel forces in Haiti, UN envoy says.” 4 September. <http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2006/09/04/haiti-un.html>.

¹⁴ Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 3 August 2006 - Remarks by the Secretary-General at a joint press conference with President Rene Preval of the Republic of Haiti, <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=913>

Participants agreed on the fact that it is necessary to have a true partnership that is real and sustainable between the Haitian government and the population. They said it is urgent to establish greater collaboration among the different institutions, the Haitian government and the UN, in order to ensure greater transparency in the management of areas such as justice, police and civil society. These areas are even more important considering that a justice system is practically absent, that the strength of the police force is undefined and that civil society is non-existent. Local and international NGOs also have an important role to play in mediating, creating links and building trust. It is the Haitian people who must learn to persuade their own government and make it responsible, and NGOs have much to contribute to this objective.

Participants also discussed the place of religious institutions in the reconstruction of Haiti. Despite their importance at the level of sensitizing the people—indeed these institutions have proven to be very important, if one considers that 75% of the population is illiterate—there exists a resistance in the Catholic church to becoming openly involved with the UN. Taking into account their importance within Haitian culture, Mr. Fouda said it would be good to explore other possibilities of partnership between MINUSTAH and the Catholic church and the other local and international NGOs.

MINUSTAH'S LIMITED CAPACITY AND REPUTATION

Finally, participants discussed MINUSTAH's capabilities and the way the mission is perceived by Haitians. According to the participants, there is a crisis of trust between MINUSTAH and the Haitian people. The allegations concerning the bad behaviour of officers of the Haitian national police (and of foreign troops) in Haiti, have given rise to serious questions about the legitimacy and credibility of the mission in the eyes of the Haitian population. Specifically, the bad behaviour of officers of the National Police compromises MINUSTAH's links with the local people, and damages the reputation of the UN's peacekeeping forces.¹⁶

Added to this crisis of trust is a problem of image and understanding caused in part by a gap at the level of language. Actually, very few MINUSTAH soldiers can express themselves in French and in English. Moreover, Creole, the language spoken by 99% of Haitians, is almost non-existent among the members of the peacekeeping forces, thus creating an enormous distance between the international community and the local population. Governance-linked strategies also influence the progress of the mission on the ground. The place of Brazil at the head of the command is an example of this. Despite their efforts, the Brazilian force has little experience in peacekeeping. Their lack of expertise and of depth in decision-making is evident in the field, reducing their credibility with the Haitian people and making their tasks more difficult.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Gantz and Martin, 2005.

According to the participants, it is essential to develop mixed patrols, combining foreign troops with those of Haitian origin, in order to recreate some trust between MINUSTAH forces and local populations. To do this, it seems necessary that the international forces deployed in Haiti learn French or Creole so as to be able to communicate more easily with the people. The presence of three translators for a force of 500 police is in all likelihood not enough. For example, Canada, which has many reserve soldiers of Haitian origin in its ranks, chose in their last deployments to create mixed patrols. These have produced many positive results, as local people recognize themselves in the uniforms that people like them are wearing, and thus quickly start to feel trust. Participants also suggested that the Blue Helmets should receive cultural training before being deployed, to enable them to better understand their new environment and the people they will be mixing with.

It would also be advantageous to have UN troops from countries with more experience in peacekeeping, like Canada, side by side with troops with less experience, so as to promote similar or even complementary rules of engagement, with the aim of reinforcing the credibility and capacities of the Blue Helmets in general.

THE CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION IN HAITI

Canada and Haiti are linked not only geographically but also historically and culturally. Mr. Diego Osorio also stressed the presence of a special relationship between Canada and Haiti, which assumes a direct impact between the situation in Haiti and life in Canada. In other words, if insecurity persists in Haiti, there will be a direct impact on the insecurity in large Canadian cities like Montreal, Quebec and Toronto.

Canada's ongoing role in Haiti is multidimensional and reflects a 'whole of government' approach. Canada is playing an important role as part of international efforts to restore security and stability, and to support long-term reform and reconstruction in Haiti. Canada's contribution to MINUSTAH included 550 Canadian troops in the UN mandated MIF that facilitated the transition to MINUSTAH. Canada is contributing to Haiti's reconstruction efforts by working in close cooperation with the Haitian Government, MINUSTAH, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the international community in Haiti. At present, Haiti is the leading beneficiary of Canada's development assistance in the Americas. The Government disbursed more than \$180 million between 2004 and 2006, and recently announced another \$15 million to help strengthen democratic institutions.

In particular:

- Canada contributed to the electoral process and international observation efforts. Elections Canada was chair of a group of seven countries that monitored the election and helped build the electoral apparatus every step of the way.
- Canadian police personnel (including 100 civilian police and 25 experts on police services) are contributing their training and expertise to reforming the Haitian National Police.

- Other efforts seek to ensure economic recovery — through electric power, rapid job creation, environmental protection — and access to basic services including water and sanitation, health and nutrition, and education.

The RCMP and Canadian Forces participants noted that the UN troops have a different style of operating from Canadians. For example, the troops currently deployed use tactics like checkpoints. This tactic results in creating distance between the UN force and the population, and reinforces the distrust towards the Blue Helmets and the HNP on the one hand and the local people on the other. Major Roger Otis stressed that Canadian troops reach out to the people, talk with them and establish links of trust. In fact, the Canadian Forces, which, as noted above, include many soldiers who speak French and a number of others of Haitian origin, are one of the only forces able to communicate with the Haitian population. In the opinion of the participants, the Canadian government has the responsibility to do more in Haiti and to get significantly involved at different levels (for example, through the Blue Helmets, with the diaspora, with specific projects centred on various themes such as corruption, etc.) All in all, the participants concluded that Canada must be more active in Haiti.

CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

MINUSTAH currently finds itself challenged by various factors. As mentioned above, armed groups continue to spread terror and to threaten peace efforts, the police system is limited in its capacity to carry out its daily duties, and concrete DDR efforts have yet to materialize.

Three additional needs were identified:

1. **Job creation:** It is necessary to promote and develop long-term job creation programmes. As Dr. Verna noted, job creation will not only allow a revival of hope among the population, but will also contribute to the DDR programmes by giving the ex-criminals the possibility of working. Job creation is necessary to ensure that ex-criminals as well as youth do not turn towards weapons, banditry and violence.
2. **Involvement of the diaspora.** It is necessary to invite the Haitian diaspora to really get involved in the reconstruction of the country. As Camille Tremblay noted, the money that Haitians send home from abroad only serves at the level of managing daily needs, hence the necessity of a real involvement in sustainable development projects.
3. **Media participation.** The media should play a greater role in raising the awareness of the population. According to Mr. Tremblay, the media experiment worked to call the people to participate in the elections. This experience is worth renewing through the planning and creation of radio programmes broadcast at peak listening hours.

Participants also pointed the finger at the difficulty of holding to a long-term calendar of operations and of accomplishing anything concrete in the period of time allotted to the troops in the field, that is, six months. The reality of six-month mandates ends up contradicting the statements of the Secretary-General who said in August 2006 that “the reconstruction of Haiti must be done on a long-term basis.”¹⁷

“Long-term”, however, is not synonymous with an accumulation of short-term missions. This dysfunctionality affects the achievement of the objectives set by the UN, and weakens the mandate that it has given MINUSTAH. The reconstruction of Haiti takes time; it is difficult and everyone must play a role. The capacity of the UN to follow through with its mission in Haiti will thus depend on the long-term commitment of the donors to fulfill their promises.

In regard to the upcoming municipal and local elections, Major Otis stated that they are extremely important, for they will enable Haiti to build a basis for future elections and to balance power between the central government and the regions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As noted at the start of this chapter, Haiti is one of the few countries where UN forces have been called in several times. Indeed, Haiti is perpetually in a state of starting over. There is no national vision for Haiti’s development. The institutions that exist are phantom institutions. The security issues are complex, and as several participants emphasized, security also involves development projects and the struggle against poverty. However, it must be recognized to what degree development in Haiti depends on security. All in all, strengthening the Haitian State is a long-term proposition that requires the sustained commitment of the UN and of the international community.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MINUSTAH, IN COLLABORATION WITH THE HAITIAN GOVERNMENT AND DONORS:

MINUSTAH, in collaboration with the international community and donors, must ensure that short-term projects are linked to longer-term ones. In order to do this, the UN’s Peacekeeping Operations Department as well as the Security Council should consider giving MINUSTAH a longer mandate that goes farther than the current six months. It is also recommended that the international community and donor countries make commitments for a period of at least ten years.¹⁸

¹⁷ Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 3 August 2006 - Remarks by the Secretary-General at a joint press conference with President Rene Preval of the Republic of Haiti, <http://www.un.org/apps/sg/offthecuff.asp?nid=913>

MINUSTAH, in collaboration with the Haitian government and donors, should:

1. Pursue programmes of reform of the HNP and of the judicial system in order to ensure the proper parallel functioning of the judicial and police systems.
2. Strengthen the cooperation between MINUSTAH forces and the members of the HNP, with the help of promotional campaigns to recruit troops of Haitian origin and individuals who speak French or Creole. It would also be advantageous to invite greater participation on the part of countries with a large Haitian diaspora, notably Canada and the United States.
3. Reinforce the capacities of radio and television stations to broadcast messages, with the goal of laying the basis for national dialogue. This can be done with funding help, and in collaboration with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society.
4. Seek to promote the people's economic and social well-being so as to allow them to regain trust in their government and its institutions. In order to do this, MINUSTAH should invite the commitment of local and international NGOs so as to facilitate community dialogue and build trust. MINUSTAH should also involve more members of the diaspora in the creation of development strategies for Haiti.
5. Promote an anti-violence component in government projects. This component should:
 - a. Aim to identify the number of military weapons in circulation.
 - b. Prohibit the carrying of military weapons by the civilian population.
 - c. Regulate and reduce the issuance of the right to carry small caliber weapons.
6. Ensure linkages between disarmament and development programmes. It is imperative that the problem of security receive particular attention if the situation is to improve. On the other hand, this attention must not be given to the detriment of other development sectors. Programmes aimed at DDR should be implemented at the same time as the fight against poverty.
7. In regard to security programmes, MINUSTAH, the HNP and the Haitian government should make sure that the negotiations with gang chiefs are less publicized in the media, in order to avoid the propagation of rumours that prejudice the setting up of DDR programmes. MINUSTAH and the HNP should also target the "hot zones" of Port-au-Prince and work to penetrate them.

¹⁸ See ICG 2006.

8. In regard to development programmes, MINUSTAH, in collaboration with the Haitian government and donors, should:¹⁹
- a. Put in place long-term job creation programmes.
 - b. Strengthen local institutions, recognizing their autonomy and their cultural specificities.
 - c. Promote and fund a system of universal primary and secondary education as well as development of rural regions and urban infrastructure.
 - d. Put in place education and economic opportunity programmes addressed particularly to women and girls.
 - e. Put in place projects aimed at environmental rehabilitation and encouraging reforestation.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA:

Canada's determination to commit itself to stay in Haiti for a prolonged period, and to try to convince other countries of what it is trying to accomplish in collaboration with others, will take time and cost a lot.²⁰ Nonetheless, it is important for Canada to stay and to maintain these efforts in Haiti in order to ensure that the achievements are sustainable.

The Canadian government should:

1. Seek to re-establish investor trust and encourage investments in Haiti.
2. Work with the Haitian government to develop and put into effect anti-corruption projects.
3. Consider a greater commitment in Haiti. For example:
 - a. Canada could provide more Blue Helmets and/or police personnel.
 - b. Canada could promote the involvement of the diaspora at various levels (in development projects, in the police, within the Canadian armed forces, through funding of certain specific projects, etc.)
 - c. Canada could invite the commitment of NGOs to developing specific projects centered on different themes such as women, education, the justice system, health, environment, etc.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

²⁰ Government of Canada. Video Interview: Jean-Louis Roy, President of Rights and Democracy. <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/roy-hait-en.asp>.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY AND LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL NGOS:

1. NGOs and civil society should promote good governance and aim at strengthening local capacities. They also have a role to play in regard to the promotion of the national dialogue, that is, the “buy-in” and participation of the population in the national decision-making process.
2. NGOs and civil society should intensify the information campaign for reducing violence. To do this, they should promote the anti-weapons campaign and the abolition of the right to carry arms. NGOs and civil society should also strongly consider playing a mediator role between the local population and the Haitian government.

6

HUMAN SECURITY AND UN PEACEKEEPING

This chapter derives from a United Nations Association in Canada public dialogue event to mark the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping on January 23rd, 2007 in Winnipeg, which included a public forum and a closed experts' roundtable. Participants of the closed experts' roundtable and panelists at the linked public dialogue event discussed issues related to human security in UN peacekeeping. Participants explored the concept of human security, both in theoretical and practical terms, and examined the role of the international community in promoting human security. Participants also discussed the application of human security in UN peacekeeping and looked at ways of improving human security in field operations. The opinions expressed in this chapter and the recommendations are derived from UNA-Canada's consultation process and are not necessarily the views of the organization.

The closed roundtable featured **Samantha Arnold**, Assistant Professor of Global Politics/IR, University of Winnipeg; **Lloyd Axworthy**, President of the University of Winnipeg and former Canadian Foreign Minister; **Kris Brekman**, Board of UNA-Canada's Winnipeg Branch; **Jim Fergusson**, Director of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba; **Ted Itani**, Consultant with the Canadian International Development Agency; **Pierre Kyer**, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; **Robert O'Brien**, Project Manager at UNA-Canada; **Mary Scott**, UNIFEM; **Lasha Tchantouridze**, Research Associate with the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Winnipeg; and **Mya Wheeler**, Project Peacemakers. **Shannon Sampert**, Politics Department, University of Winnipeg acted as moderator for the event.

BACKGROUND: HUMAN SECURITY AND UN PEACEKEEPING ¹

One of the main challenges that a UN peacekeeping mission must face when deploying to a post-conflict area is the question of security. Security can be defined in different ways and can incorporate a wide range of threats. Contrary to the concept of national security, the concept of 'human security' is a relatively new one. Indeed, the international community has long been preoccupied with questions of human safety and of protection of individuals; however, it was not until the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report that the concept was formally conceptualized. Human security issues have also been a part of international and regional peace initiatives for decades, but as a concept, human security was until recently

¹ In this chapter, the term 'peacekeeping' refers to operations authorized by the United Nations (under Chapters 6, 7 and 8) to monitor cease-fires and/or support the implementation of peace agreements, and to initiate peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities.

² Axworthy, Lloyd. 1997. "Canada and Human Security: The Need for Leadership." *International Journal* 52 (2): 183–196.

virtually unknown to peacekeeping and peace operations more generally. Today, the nature of contemporary wars has propelled these issues to the forefront of the international agenda and human security initiatives now constitute an extremely important component of both peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions.

Canada, for its part, has long been a leader in the promotion and development of human security. As Canada's primary advocate of the approach, former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy not only brought attention to human security issues, but strengthened Canada's position as a leader on the issue. Throughout his mandate, Canada stood at the forefront of the international campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines and helped to create the International Criminal Court.²

Roundtable participants generally recognized that there has been an increased emphasis on human security, however important differences emerged from the discussion, particularly with respect to the definition and the theoretical implications of human security. A common concern among some participants was the "fuzziness" and lack of coherent understanding surrounding the definition of human security, which, they suggested has done little to aid in operationalizing the concept. In this regard, one participant stressed the importance of developing a coherent framework for understanding what is meant by human security and to ensure that we are operating within the same set of assumptions. Other participants, however, did not feel the need to dwell on the exact definition of the framework, and pointed instead to the need to focus on the implications of human security in practice. Overall, participants felt the need to further explore how human security and peacekeeping interact on the ground, as doing so will effectively help in the elaboration of more focused policy recommendations.

WHAT DO WE MEAN BY 'HUMAN SECURITY'?

Until the early 1990s, security was most often thought of in the context of national or state security. The concept of national security has for primary goal to maintain the territorial integrity of the state and to ensure the protection of its citizens from external threats. While citizens are a primary object of concern, the concept falls short of addressing the role of states in threatening the lives of their own citizens. As a result, the focus on national security often occurs at the expense of individual security, as the state may be a primary source of threat to people's security (through corrupt police and justice systems, presence of criminal gangs, lack of human rights and limited rule of law, etc.).³

In 1994, the UNDP Human Development Report (HDR) broadened the concept of security by formally introducing the concept of human security.⁴ By contrast to national security, HS implies "putting people first." Its primary goal is the protection of individuals from all

³ Krause, Keith. 2004. "Is Human Security More Than Just a Good Idea?" *In Promoting Security: But How and For Whom?*, brief 30, eds. Michael Brzoska and Peter J. Croll. Bonn Center for International Conversion (BICC), 43-46. Mack, Andrew. 2004. "The Concept of Human Security." *In Promoting Security: But How and For Whom?*, 47-50.

⁴ United Nations Development programme. 1994. *Human Development Report*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁵ Krause, 44.

threats, including those posed by the state itself, and as such, uses a bottom-up approach to the understanding of threats.⁵ While national security looks at the relationship among states, human security looks at the relationship between the state and its citizens. Broadly defined, a human security approach is one which takes a human focus and looks at specific issues in terms of their human impact.

While most authors contend that human and national security concepts are complimentary and reinforcing, this balance, as Axworthy suggested, is not devoid of contradictions. Referring to the Canadian policy experience, Axworthy explained that the shift from state security to human security developed in part, from the risks associated with international drug trafficking. As Canada realized it was not in a position to protect its citizens globally, the focus on physical borders diminished and individual protection gained precedence. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent recognition in academic and policy circles of the failure of state sovereignty and of the state-centric model of security and order, also provided a space for discussions of individual security regardless of nationality. A clearer definition of human security subsequently emerged from the landmines campaign in the late 1990s, portraying the need for a human-focused approach centered not on states, but on the protection of people. This shift further exposed the need to develop a capacity to address human security concerns, particularly in the form of international standards and actions. To date, the evolution of the human security concept can be seen from several international developments:

- human security norms have moved into state law such as the International Criminal Court statutes;
- the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine has been endorsed on a wider scale by the UN General Assembly, and more impressively by Heads of State at the 2005 World Summit.
- peacekeepers are taking on greater humanitarian roles;
- and the protection of civilians is now a major aspect of peacekeeping mandates.

As the concept of human security is gaining in importance at both the international and national levels, participants were divided on whether human security constituted a paradigm shift. One participant in particular disagreed with the idea, calling it a misuse of the term, and suggested rather that there should be a balance between the state security and human security. Similarly, Fergusson insisted that states continue to be the main focus in the provision of security and as such, he did not believe in the existence of tensions between state security and human security. Even in the case of state failure, he argued, state and individual security remains linked. In his view, the more pertinent question refers to the

prioritization between human security and capacity building. In addressing this issue, he suggested focusing our attention on the role of the international community in developing a clear set of priorities without imposing western values.

LINKAGES BETWEEN HUMAN SECURITY AND UN PEACEKEEPING

The link between peacekeeping and human security is created by the focus of peacekeeping initiatives and programmes on strengthening the physical security of individuals. While the long-term goal of peacekeeping and peacebuilding is to create economic and social opportunities for individuals and guarantee a higher quality of life, their initial focus is on ensuring the physical protection and security of individuals. In essence, the importance of a human security approach to UN peacekeeping lies in its focus on the human impact of conflict. These conflicts are increasingly complex and are characterized, among other things, by the proliferation and overwhelming use of small arms and land-mines, causing thousands of deaths and injuries to combatants and civilians alike; a surge in the use of child soldiers; the use of sexual violence and rape as a strategy for war; a rise in the number of internally displaced persons and refugees; and an escalation of human rights violations. Civilians are also believed to make up 80 to 85% of the victims. Consequently, there are a number of areas where peacekeeping as well as peacebuilding have a clear link to human security.⁶ These include:

- Clearing of anti-personnel land-mines;
- Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants;
- DDR of child soldiers;
- Promoting the rule of law (ending of impunity) and the ICC;
- Supporting security sector reforms (SSR);
- Reforming the police and justice systems;
- Working towards good governance.

Human security is especially relevant to peace operations when considering the fact that increasingly, peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions require the linking of security and development initiatives. In theory, development was for a long time viewed as a necessary precondition for achieving security. In practice, however, development and security issues are often intertwined and cannot be separated. Experience in the field has also demonstrated that development is often difficult to achieve without first establishing some initial level of security.⁷

⁶ Krause 45.

⁷ Krause 45.

IN THEORY: APPLYING HUMAN SECURITY TO UN PEACEKEEPING CONTEXT

While the concept of human security has gained prominence since its introduction in 1994, it has faced a number of challenges, which are a cause for debate. Three challenges are looked at here: the applicability of human security (the broad vs. narrow debate); the relationship between human security and state sovereignty; and the link between human security and the protection of civilians.

APPLICABILITY OF HUMAN SECURITY

A first challenge has to do with how broad the concept of human security should be. There is a divergence among both academic and policy circles, as to what exactly constitutes human security and how it should be applied. In general, most definitions can be divided into two categories: broad and narrow.⁸ The two visions can also be summarized by the expressions “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear,” respectively. The UNDP HDR report defined human security as the “safety from chronic threats and protection from sudden hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life,” and identified seven categories of threats: poverty, hunger, disease, pollution and environmental degradation, violence, cultural and political repression. While the UNDP’s reference to human security was welcomed by the international community, many have criticized the concept’s scope as too vast, arguing that it does not lend itself to focused policy analyses.⁹ In response to the broad vision of human security, a more focused vision was developed. Under this vision, human security is described as “removing the use of, or threat of, force and violence from people’s everyday lives.”¹⁰ This vision covers violent threats to individuals including war, genocide and terrorism. The argument follows that threats within this definition are often identifiable, they affect individuals directly (direct cause and effect), and their removal immediately enhances security. This removal, in turn, incorporates human security initiatives targeted at specific aspects of security such as those described above in the context of peacekeeping (child soldiers, land mines, DDR, SSR, etc.).

The above divergence between a broad vs. narrow definition of human security was reflected among the participants to the roundtable. While there is no question that all threats evoked in the UNDP report can be devastating to individuals, some participants, including Arnold and Fergusson, favored a limited definition of human security, making note that an expansive concept may not be useful for policy recommendations. More specifically, Arnold said she would not include human rights per se in the definition and would opt for a separation between security and development. Fergusson’s concern focused on the practical implications of an expansive concept of human security. Itani, on the other hand, argued against limiting the template for human security, as it suggests a certain rigidity that may

⁸ See Owen, Taylor. 2004. “Human Security – Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition.” *Security Dialogue* 35 (3): 373-387.

⁹ See Paris, Roland. 2001. “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” *International Security* 26 (2): 87-102; Krause 2004; and Mack 2004. The Report of the Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, was equally broad in its definition of human security.

¹⁰ Krause, 44.

not permit the inclusion of important human disasters. Other participants, including Mary Scott and Mya Wheeler, appeared to prefer a broader understanding of human security and expressed disappointment in Canada's shift from a "freedom from want" to a "freedom from fear" approach to human security. Accordingly, while Canada's conception of human security had been similar to the UNDP definition, in recent years, its position on human security has shifted to a focus on physical (or practical) violence. In their view, such an approach is unsustainable because it focuses on addressing immediate threats without taking into consideration longer term development issues. In response, Axworthy explained that Canada's decision to focus on the "freedom from threat" approach was a calculated choice determined by the availability of resources at hand and an assessment of the pressing needs on the ground.

HUMAN SECURITY AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

A second challenge refers to the extent to which human security concerns will dictate the role of the international community in taking action in situations of crises and override the state sovereignty principle. In particular, some developing countries have expressed the concern that human security principles could be used as an intervention tool, whereby Western states increasingly disregard state sovereignty. This idea is closely related to that of the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine, which confers upon the international community the responsibility to protect citizens against large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing, when a state fails to do so.¹¹ R2P can be seen as one specific aspect of a human security approach, as its focus is on the initial intervention phase. On the other hand, the focus of human security is broader because it encompasses further elements of the conflict cycle including humanitarian assistance and post-conflict peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

As pointed out by Axworthy, the ICISS report incorporates discussions on early warnings, international monitoring, diplomatic efforts, issues concerning state sovereignty as well as tests and thresholds for intervention (both military and non-military). Nevertheless, the concept of R2P remains a new idea that is in its preliminary stages of implementation, as in the case of Darfur. Indeed, the case of Darfur is significant, as it presented a first test case for R2P. The application of the R2P doctrine, however, has proven extremely difficult, mostly due to political constraints and limited political will on behalf of the international community. In realizing the shortcomings of the doctrine, the concern now, in Axworthy's view, is filling in the missing operational elements, such as the rules of engagement, and learning from the experience in Darfur. As a result, most participants felt the need for a concerted effort at making R2P more useful and practical in the future.

¹¹ Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). 2001. *The Responsibility to Protect*. Ottawa: IDRC.

HUMAN SECURITY AND THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

Last April 2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1674 on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, in which it reaffirmed that, where appropriate, peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions must ensure the protection of civilians from imminent threat of physical danger.¹² With this resolution, it is clear that the UN recognizes the need to focus on individuals and to put people at the center of peacekeeping initiatives. In this regard, the protection of civilians is a clear way of translating a human security approach into practice. The inclusion of the protection of civilians in peacekeeping mandates requires clear rules of engagement for peacekeepers and a robust mandate that allows for the use of force. In addition, as the protection of civilians may also entail riskier situations, states are increasingly confronted with the moral dilemma of whether to participate or not in more robust peacekeeping.

IN PRACTICE: INCORPORATING HUMAN SECURITY APPROACHES INTO UN PEACEKEEPING

Following a discussion of the theoretical challenges to the concept of human security, participants identified several elements that could strengthen the human security dimension of peacekeeping activities. Some examples include incorporating a gender perspective in NGO, government and peacekeeping activities, as well as ensuring policy coordination for peace operations at all levels. In addition, participants explored the role and challenges faced by NGOs, civil society and the general public in strengthening the applicability of the human security concept to peacekeeping.

INCORPORATE GENDER PERSPECTIVES IN PEACEKEEPING PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

Participants agreed that there is a need to incorporate gender-based considerations as an essential part of human security initiatives. According to Axworthy, gender issues require greater international focus and explicit efforts must be taken to increase accountability for their integration. In his view, this could be done through a broad set of rules that could potentially include international sanctions. Moreover, Itani suggested that many conflict situations occur in patriarchal societies and as such, women need to be engaged in the conflict resolution process in a culturally sensitive manner. The integration of gender issues and the engagement of women, however, may prove difficult, especially when gender considerations are perceived as secondary to initial efforts for guaranteeing security and providing relief. In such circumstances, Itani advocates for a gender-based approach to humanitarian aid that recognizes the benefits from the participation of women in conflict resolution and developing human capital.

¹² Security Council Resolution 1674 (April 2006):

<http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06712-ij-resolution1674.pdf>. The need to address the realities faced by civilians in armed conflict was first recognized by the adoption of Resolution 1265 (1999) and Resolution 1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

NEED FOR GREATER POLICY COORDINATION

Participants discussed the issue of coordination both from a policy perspective at the government level and from a field perspective. With respect to the implementation efforts to promote human security in Canada, participants explored ways of strengthening policy level coordination among the main departments involved in peace operations, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) and the Department of National Defence (DND). Axworthy began the discussion by arguing that despite Canada's push for the "3D" approach (incorporating diplomacy, defence and development), a lack of coordination among CIDA, DFAIT and DND continues to result in the weak implementation of human security initiatives. While many would argue that the 3D concept has come a long way and has attained some level of success, in Axworthy's opinion, the concept has not yet been successfully developed as a tool that Canada can offer. Moreover, the increasing involvement of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in peacekeeping missions was described as adding another layer to the complexity of coordination efforts.

On the issue of NGO coordination, several participants expressed concerns with the perceived lack of policy coordination at the national and governmental level. Drawing on his experience working in Pakistan in the aftermath of the earthquake, Itani noted that while the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was extremely successful in coordinating UN agencies and international and local NGOs, it was limited in its outreach. For example, there was reluctance on the part of the Pakistan Government to integrate gender during the early stages of humanitarian assistance and to acknowledge the presence of HIV/Aids and homosexuality. In strengthening coordination, Itani believes it would have been useful to establish a forum for NGOs to discuss with the Pakistan Government the concept of human security from the point of view of beneficiary and service providers. Such a forum could have helped to integrate gender perspectives and other issues of relevance such as HIV/Aids, and could have addressed the need for more collaboration and trust between NGOs, national government and donors. As Itani explained, part of the problem is the difficulty that NGOs face in attracting funds for long-term capacity building projects, as opposed to short-term relief efforts. He also commented on the loss of professionalism suffered by NGOs; in other words, while some NGOs were competent and helpful, others were not, which reduced trust on the part of Pakistan's communities. To address this problem, Itani suggested that organizations like the Red Cross and other INGOs should build the capacity of local NGOs by helping them to professionalize.

Kyer also discussed difficulties of policy coordination in the field, which he observed through his experience training a specialized police unit in Kinshasa. Kyer noted that difficulties arise as different organizations draw on and operate from different philosophical perspectives and mandates. For example, while he was involved in the training of police in Kinshasa, others, namely France and Angola, were conducting training in other parts of the country. Their practices, however, differed widely from one another, making coordination between the various units almost impossible. In his view, ensuring coordination between different agencies involved in the training of police forces is a recurrent and important concern, suggesting that the UN needs to look more closely at overall strategies and

emphasize the need for coordination at the start of peacekeeping missions. He also stated that the UN, together with the European Union (who is conducting a police mission in the DRC), are beginning to look at an overall strategy to unify their views and ensure efforts are sustainable. Other attempts at coordination include building bridges with other units and establishing greater contact. Brekman added that better coordination efforts could potentially cut back on the duplication of projects and prevent the current random and ad hoc nature of responses to crises.

ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOS) IN PROMOTING HUMAN SECURITY

A major part of the discussion focused on the role of NGOs in promoting a human security approach and, in particular, the obstacles they face in doing so. One of the reasons the Red Cross and other international organizations have adopted a human security focus is because of the changing nature of casualties, which are increasingly civilians rather than military. As Itani suggested, this change in the nature of victims is reflected in the current priorities of the organization which include among other things, missing people, the proliferation of small arms and explosive remnants of war, women as well as children in conflict, and the politicization of humanitarian aid.

Some participants noted, however, that the increasing focus on human security potentially contributed to a blurring of lines of assistance between military, humanitarian and development actors, as organizations traditionally focused on state security begin to adopt a human security approach. Participants argued that there is a dichotomy between the military providing humanitarian assistance, and military support. Itani also argued that the militarization of aid has further reduced the image of NGOs as impartial and has contributed to a sense of mistrust with national governments. However, he also noted that a relative level of security must be in place before any delivery of aid can take place, and that beneficiaries do not differentiate between which actors that deliver the food or water. For example, following the earthquake in Pakistan, the military was the first ones on the scene with a mandate to save lives (e.g., protecting civilians from banditry). Canada's Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) was also among the first at the scene, delivering water in a cost effective way.

The increasing focus on humanitarian concerns has also complicated Canada's ability to appropriately respond to crises, as traditional military-based organizations must also work towards achieving both security and humanitarian objectives in peacekeeping missions. Itani framed these complications in terms of their effect on NGOs, noting that they now struggle to appear and maintain their impartiality. In fact, Itani argued that the 3D concept obscures the lines between political/military intervention and development, which weakens the position and impartiality of NGOs and contributes to the closing of the humanitarian space in which NGOs can work. Furthermore, he suggested that military based organizations working in a humanitarian context does a disservice to development as they use development as a justification for political and military interventions. As a result, participants stressed the importance of clarifying the roles of the various actors involved in conflict response and humanitarian assistance.

ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN PROMOTING HUMAN SECURITY

In recent years, several human security initiatives have been developed by civil society. While there is still a divergence amongst initiatives as to the definition of the concept, they have contributed immensely to the promotion of policy-relevant research on issues of human security. Some examples of Canadian initiatives are:

1. Canadian Consortium on Human Security (CCHS)¹³
 - The CCHS is an academic-based network that promotes policy-relevant research on human security and seeks to strengthen analyses and discussions of issues related to human security in Canada and internationally. The CCHS publishes the *Human Security Bulletin*, an online bulletin that incorporates human security research being undertaken in Canada and around the world.
2. Human Security Centre¹⁴
 - The Liu Institute for Global Studies' Human Security Centre strives to "make human security-related research more accessible to the policy and research communities, the media, educators and the interested public." The Center publishes the annual *Human Security Report*, the Human Security Gateway, an online database of security resources, and two online bulletins, *Human Security News* and *Human Security Research*.

ROLE OF DOMESTIC PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PROMOTING HUMAN SECURITY

Encouraging the Canadian government to efficiently and effectively respond to global crises was a substantial component of the discussion. The participants widely agreed on the importance of encouraging public engagement and discussion on human security. Participants also pointed to the role the media has played in both engaging the public in debate, as well as in providing both accurate and inaccurate pictures of peacekeeping. Fergusson suggested that efforts should be made to educate the public on the role that the Canadian Forces, the RCMP and peacekeepers have played in human security issues.

LESSONS LEARNED: CANADA AS A LEADER ON HUMAN SECURITY DIALOGUE

As pointed out earlier in the chapter, the Canadian government has long been interested in the question of human security. Canada, through its numerous initiatives and programmes, has been a leader in the promotion and development of the concept. For example, Canada was at the forefront of several human security initiatives including the global campaign to

¹³ Canadian Consortium on Human Security. 2006. <http://www.humansecurity.info/>.

¹⁴ Human Security Centre. 2005. <http://www.humansecuritycentre.org>

¹⁵ Human Security Network. 2006. <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/>.

ban anti-personal mines, the creation of the ICC, and the ICISS report on the Responsibility to Protect. Canada, along with Norway and Switzerland, also established the Human Security Network in 1999, through which like-minded states strengthened interest and commitment to human security, and contributed to its advancement by identifying concrete areas for collective action.¹⁵ Today, Canada's leadership remains strong, though within Canadian government policy circles, human security now refers to the "freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, safety and lives."¹⁶

Canada's Human Security programme (located within DFAIT) is a "proactive mechanism to advance the human security component of Canadian foreign policy."¹⁷ It is policy-driven and project-based in that it funds and implements specific projects and activities. In doing so, the Government hopes to advance its human security policy component, as well as strengthen and further promote Canada's human security agenda. Through the programme, DFAIT supports a number of initiatives that strives to engage the Canadian public by encouraging discussion and research on human security-related issues. These include the Peacebuilding and Human Security Dialogue, the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, and the Canadian Consortium on Human Security.¹⁸

The Government's human security agenda constitutes of five overarching themes: protection of civilians, peace operations, governance and accountability, public safety, and conflict prevention. Of greatest relevance to UN peacekeeping is the programme's focus on the protection of civilians and peace operations. Echoing the UN's focus on the protection of civilians, DFAIT seeks to address the insecurity that war-affected populations face by improving legal and physical protection of civilians. As part of its focus on peace operations, DFAIT seeks to "enhance international understanding of, and capacity to manage integrated, multidisciplinary peace operations through policy development and advocacy." In addition, DFAIT supports Canada's engagement in current complex peace operations by funding such initiatives as CANADEM's Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights, a national roster of more than 3,000 Canadian civilian experts ready to deploy on short notice.

In light of these initiatives, several participants questioned the government's ability to effectively focus on both military intervention and development. Brekman, for example, noted a significant shift under the current Canadian government toward military intervention and combat to the detriment of development. Axworthy echoed these concerns suggesting that there is a real push for military intervention that, despite rhetoric, has little to do with development. Axworthy also noted that there has been a failure to integrate the different elements, as defence continues to act independently and is focused on combat rather than development or diplomacy. In his opinion, Darfur is a R2P exercise, while Canada's operation in Afghanistan is not. O'Brien, on the other hand, took a slightly different approach by

¹⁶ Dorn, Walter. 2001. "Human Security: An Overview." Paper prepared for the *Pearson Peacekeeping Centre*. In May 2005, the government of Canada's International Policy Statement called on the promotion of human security as one of four main priorities to help build a more secure world. Human security remains a priority of the current government, especially in the areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

¹⁷ Foreign Affairs Canada. 2007. "Human Security." <http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/humansecurity-en.asp>.

suggesting that the shift towards military intervention and increased funding for the military occurred in response to the recognition that the military was ill-equipped to address human security concerns through logistical or other supports. Essentially, with an ill-equipped military involved in military and humanitarian operations, the government was putting people in harms way, thereby negating fundamental tenants of human security.

On a final note, and in response to the previous concerns, Axworthy affirmed that Canada should be developing niche areas, such as military strengths (e.g., logistics and communication), proper policing areas, development agency and the understanding of the use of force. The academic community in Canada, for its part, could contribute more to the development of the peacebuilding concept and to the debate on how to meld blue and white helmets into an integrated force. In his view, Canada has an interesting history that should be built upon.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is clear from the above that since 1994, the concept of human security has not only gained prominence, but also greater acceptance within both academic and policy circles. The discussions also confirmed the concept's continued relevance within academic and policy circles and its sustained influence on policy actions. While the roundtable discussion indicated that there is still a lack of consensus surrounding the concept's definition, many participants believed it would be more useful to concentrate on defining the practical implications of human security and on identifying more ways to incorporate a human security approach into policy actions.

In this respect, Axworthy shared an experience in which an academic suggested that while human security may work in practice, it may not work in theory. While some may not agree with this statement, it raises an important point: the relevance of human security is directly related to the level and strength of its application in practice. In other words, while understanding the theoretical underpinnings of a human security approach is important, the priority must remain on the latter's practical implications and policy relevance. In fact, it is often said that the best way to learn is from practice, but doing so also involves understanding how to learn from practice. In the end, one should be reminded that in order to strengthen human security, not only do we need to address the threats, but we need to address society's ability to respond to them.¹⁹ As Scott acknowledged, addressing human security concerns will require not less than a global effort.

Many recommendations for incorporating human security approaches in UN peacekeeping emerged from the January 23rd event. These are presented on the following pages.

¹⁸ See Foreign Affairs Canada. 2007. "Canadian Partnerships."
<http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/library/canadianpartnerships-en.asp>.

¹⁹ Hampson, Osler in Owen 376.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UN DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO)

1. DPKO should explore the possibility of training peacekeepers on humanitarian and human rights law or training them as human rights monitors. This training could be done through the various peacekeeping training facilities including the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC).
2. DPKO should continue to promote and support efforts at incorporating gender-based considerations as part of their human security initiatives. Such efforts include deploying gender advisors at the outset of a peacekeeping mission to ensure gender perspectives are incorporated in a mission's programmes as these are developed.
3. DPKO and OCHA, in continuing their efforts at ensuring coordination both at the policy level and in the field, should look more closely at elaborating overall strategies that emphasize the need for coordination at the start of aid delivery and peacekeeping missions. Better coordination efforts could potentially cut back on the duplication of projects and prevent the current random and ad hoc nature of responses to crises.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS ON THE GROUND

1. UN peacekeeping missions, in collaboration with OCHA, could hold working groups on different themes related to human security where NGOs could discuss with governments human security needs from the point of view of beneficiary and service providers. The working groups could help in integrating gender perspectives in human security initiatives and would enhance collaboration and trust between NGOs and the national government of the country in which they are operating.
2. UN peacekeeping missions should enhance prioritization between human security and capacity building by developing, in consultation with NGOs (international and local), the national government and local civil society, a clear set of priorities for moving forward based on an assessment of the needs on the ground.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT

1. The Government of Canada should strengthen coordination among Canadian actors deployed in peacekeeping missions, including troops, police, humanitarian workers, NGOs, civilian experts, etc., in order for all actors to know where others are working, as well as the projects and activities each are undertaking.
2. The Government of Canada should continue to work towards enhancing its approach to human security. In doing so, the Government should:
 - a. Continue to support the various department initiatives related to human security, including academic research on the practical application of a human security approach as well as the practical implementation of R2P.
 - b. Continue to promote awareness of human security issues in Canada and abroad, through various international forums and networks.
3. The Government of Canada, and the various departments involved in peacekeeping missions (i.e. DFAIT, CIDA, DND, RCMP, Department of Justice, Elections Canada) should allocate more resources to the development, recruitment and human security training of Canadian military, police and civilian personnel that plan to deploy as part of a UN peacekeeping mission.
4. The Government of Canada should develop niche areas that could be offered to different peacekeeping mission. These could include: military strengths such as logistics and communication, proper policing areas, training for peacekeepers, etc.
5. The Government of Canada and its various departments involved in peacekeeping missions should incorporate more cultural specific training for personnel planning to deploy.
6. The Government of Canada and its various departments involved in peacekeeping missions should promote policy coordination among each other, as well as with other groups doing similar work in the field.
7. The Government of Canada should also conduct a study on the consequences in the field of a 3D approach. In particular, the study should address the concern that military, humanitarian and development roles and mandates are being blurred, and should look at the potential dangers that such an approach causes for NGOs and development itself.

8. The Government of Canada, and in particular the various departments involved in peacekeeping activities should continue to fund specific civil society and academic programmes geared toward taking a human security focus in peacekeeping operations. These include, but are not limited to, the CPCC, the CCHS, the Humans Security Gateway, and the Human Security Centre.
9. The Government of Canada should consider investing more in professionalizing the capacity of Canadian NGOs working in Canada and in the field.
10. The Government of Canada should promote and support efforts to educate the public on the role that Canadian peacekeepers (military, police and civilian) have played in human security issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (INGOS):²⁰

1. INGOs should conduct awareness campaigns directed at Western societies to mobilize more resources in crisis and post-conflict situations — not just for relief work — to ensure the sustainability of human security initiatives in the field.
2. INGOs should help build the capacity of local NGOs on the ground by assisting them in the professionalization of their organisation.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGOS:

1. Civil society, NGOs, and the academic community should continue to explore the concept of human security, in both theory and practice, and to contribute research to the development of a human security approach in UN peacekeeping and peace operations in general.
2. Civil society, NGOs, and the academic community, should multiply its efforts at promoting policy-relevant research on human security issues as part of peacekeeping operations, but also as part of an integrated and sustainable peacebuilding policy.
3. Civil society, NGOs, and the academic community should conduct research on the cost-benefit analysis of the politicization of aid, as a means of understanding its consequences in the field. Doing so would help practitioners to respond more effectively to future crises.

²⁰ While these recommendations are targeted primarily at INGOs, they can also apply to civil society and NGOs in Canada and around the world.

7

WOMEN'S ISSUES IN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING

This chapter derives from a United Nations Association in Canada (UNA-Canada) public dialogue, held on February 26th, 2007, in Vancouver, to mark the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping. The event included a public forum and a closed experts' roundtable. Participants of the closed experts' roundtable and panelists at the linked public dialogue event discussed a gendered perspective on Canada's commitment to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Among the themes explored were the various roles of women in post-conflict societies and the importance of bringing a gendered approach to the institution of peacekeeping. Participants also examined ways to better institutionalize gender considerations. The opinions expressed in this chapter and the recommendations are derived from UNA-Canada's consultation process and are not necessarily the views of the organization. In addition, the recommendations do not represent agreement by consensus among the participants, and may not include all views outside of this limited consultation process.

The closed roundtable featured **Lubna Abalderhamn**, National Congress of Black Women Foundation; **Dr. Mary-Wynne Ashford**, Department of Education, University of Victoria; **Katharina Coleman**, Professor, University of British Columbia; **Angela Contreras-Chavez**, Doctoral Candidate—War Crimes and ICC, Simon Fraser University; **Constable Michel Drayton**, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; **Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims**, Professor, St. Paul's University, Ottawa; **Alroy Foneseca**, Policy Analyst, Department of National Defence; **Patsy George**, President, UNA-Canada Vancouver Branch; **Rosanna Hille**, Partner, Hille-Magassa & Associates, **Susila Dharma** International; **Senator Mobina Jaffer**, Government of Canada; **Nisaa Jetha**, Intern, Senator Jaffer's Office, **Sarah Kambites**, programme Manager, UNA-Canada; **Stacey Makortoff**, Academic Programme Coordinator, EFP-International (Canada); **Moussa Magassa**, Programme Coordinator and Partner, Immigrant Services Society of BC, and Hille-Magassa & Associates; **Lisa Mighton**, Rapporteur and Local Liaison, UNA-Canada; **Lauryn Oates**, Independent Consultant, International Human Rights, Development, and Gender Equality; **Corwin Odland**, Communications Officer, National Defence Public Affairs Office Pacific; **Julia Payson**, Volunteer, International Humanitarian NGO; **Emily Schroeder**, UNA-Canada; **Claire Trevena**, MLA, North Island; and **Captain Zsuzsanna I. Toth**, Canadian Forces. **Kathryn Gretsinger**, Journalist and Radio broadcaster, moderated the event.

BACKGROUND: WOMEN'S ISSUES AND UN PEACE OPERATIONS¹

Global attention on gender considerations in peace and security contexts has come a long way in the last fifteen years.² In the early 1990s, it was quickly realized that contemporary armed conflicts increasingly targeted civilian populations. Women and girls, in particular, were found to endure unimaginable suffering during armed conflict. As a result, in 1995 “women and armed conflict” was identified as one of the critical areas of concern at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, prompting the adoption of gender-sensitive language within the field of conflict. In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1325 on “women, peace and security” to address the impact of war on women and to underline the importance of their participation in all facets of UN peace operations. The resolution also recognized the contribution of local women to decision-making in conflict prevention and their proactive role in building local capacity as part of peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. That same year, the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court also recognized rape and other sexual violence occurring within the context of war, as crimes against humanity.

Reflecting on the above developments, in 2002, Secretary General Kofi Annan stated in his report on women, peace and security that:

We can no longer afford to minimize or ignore the contributions of women and girls to all stages of conflict resolution, peacemaking, peace-building, peacekeeping and reconstruction processes. Sustainable peace will not be achieved without the full and equal participation of women and men.

Indeed, women are involved in all facets of conflict. It is with these words that we first set out to define and understand the gender dimension of conflict.

UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER DIMENSION OF CONFLICT

Men, women, boys, and girls experience conflict differently, and therefore they have distinct needs in the post-conflict phase. Yet programmes are often ‘gender blind,’ meaning that they do not take into account the different experiences of women and men. This results in the development and implementation of narrow policies. Contrary to common belief, women are both victims of, and participants in armed conflict. They are also players in the post-conflict phase, acting as agents of change. As a result, it is essential to understand the gender dimension of conflict, if peacekeeping and peacebuilding are to succeed in the long-term.³

¹ In this chapter, the term ‘peacekeeping’ refers to operations authorized by the United Nations (under Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of the UN Charter) to monitor cease-fires and/or support the implementation of peace agreements, and to initiate peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities.

² Gender refers to the differing roles, and social relationship among, men, women, boys, and girls. These roles are shaped by social, cultural, economic, and political conditions, as well as expectations and obligations within society, which in turn influence how each group is affected by armed conflict. See Birgitte Sorensen, *Women post-conflict reconstruction: Issues and sources*, The War-Torn Societies Project, Paper no. 3 (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1998).

As victims, women are particularly vulnerable to threats of violence. For example, sexual and gender-based violence (i.e., the issue of rape as a weapon of war) is still a major problem in armed conflict, as demonstrated by the thousands of children born out of rape and the growing risk to women of acquiring HIV/AIDS in conflict settings.

Women actively participate in armed conflict. For example, women are believed to make up one-third of FARC members in Colombia and up to 30% of the fighting force in El Salvador; in addition, about 12% of the RUF in Sierra Leone were women. When returning to civilian life, female combatants face particular challenges and are often stigmatized by their communities.

Women also play a crucial role as actors for change. According to the 2004 Report of the Secretary General on women, peace and security, “Women can call attention to tensions before they erupt in open hostilities by collecting and analysing early warning information on potential armed conflict. Women play a critical role in building the capacity of communities to prevent new or recurrent violence. Women’s organizations can often make contact with parties to conflict and interface with Governments and the United Nations.”⁴ Women can also help children affected by conflict to reintegrate into civilian life. The role of women is even greater when they are involved during the early stages of a peacekeeping mission. Yet, women are often marginalized from mission planning, peace negotiations, and implementation of peace processes.

Gender must be recognized as a vital component of plans and programmes to avoid, mitigate and resolve conflict situations, and to build sustainable peace. Doing so involves mainstreaming gender⁵ perspectives in all aspects of UN peace operations to ensure these operations are relevant to all stakeholders involved, responsive to their needs, and effective in the promotion of equality.

INSTITUTIONALIZING THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS

Participants of the roundtable first explored ways to better institutionalize gender in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. It was recognized that these are two different kinds of missions, however, often the same issues related to gender apply. Katharina Coleman emphasized the importance of institutionalizing gender as a routine process if it is to be considered in the early stages of mission planning; otherwise, she notes, it will be forgotten. When a peace operation is being launched, it is already too late to be thinking about gender. This comment provided a useful starting point for participants’ discussion.

³ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), “Gender and UN Peacekeeping Operations,” October 2005. Available at: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>.

⁴ Report of the Secretary General on Peace, women and peace and security, 2004. Available at: <http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/1325/SGReportWPS2004.pdf>.

GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

At the beginning of 2006, women constituted approximately 1% of military personnel and 4% of police personnel in UN peacekeeping missions.⁶ Women also account for 30% of the international civilian staff and 28% of the nationally recruited civilian staff.⁷ While women are said to be underrepresented at all levels of UN peace support operations, participation is nonetheless increasing. In fact, the UN has recently deployed the first all-female UN peacekeeping force, comprised of 105 Indian policewomen, to Liberia.⁸ This deployment sends a strong message: women can bring unique benefits to conflict zones.

Research shows that women peacekeepers can play a key role in field missions. According to UNIFEM's 2000 Independent Experts Assessment on Women, War and Peace, the presence of women in peace operations (including female police, interpreters, and specialists) makes a positive difference. According to the report, the presence of women:

- Improves access and support for local women;
- Facilitates communication with victims of assault, sexual abuse, violence, etc.;
- Can provide a greater sense of security to local populations (women and children);
- Helps create a safer environment for women in which they are not afraid to talk;
- Makes male peacekeepers more reflective and responsible;
- Broadens the repertoire of skills and styles available within a mission;
- Can help to reduce conflict and confrontation.

In light of this information, several participants noted the need to put more focus on ways to improve gender considerations in policy planning. Women need to be brought into the planning process and need to be part of creating solutions.

Angela Contreras-Chavez observed that current mission planning is largely conducted by men. Men also make up the large part of the peacekeepers. Greater female participation at all stages of peacekeeping, from planning to monitoring to evaluation and closing of peacekeeping operations was discussed. It was recognized that it is not sufficient to consult with “experts in gender” before implementing a peacekeeping operation; the voices and recommendations of women need to be incorporated during meetings of stakeholders, meetings between Peacekeeping forces and representatives of development agencies. Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims stressed that women should themselves understand gender issues if their presence at the table is to be meaningful.

⁵ Gender mainstreaming refers to “the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.” See the Economic and Social Council agreed conclusions 1997/2 on mainstreaming the gender perspective into all policies and programmes in the United Nations system, A/52/3, 18 September 1997.

Referring to his experience in Côte d'Ivoire with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Constable Michel Drayton talked about a conference they organized on the promotion of gender and human rights. Out of nine Canadian police officers present, there were three women, one of whom was in charge of the UN police detachment. Constable Drayton observed that the presence of women made a positive difference for the local community, and earned a lot of respect for the UN.

Contreras-Chavez also argued that there is not enough knowledge sharing and knowledge management among peace operations. In her view, more 'lessons learned' are necessary, more questioning of why things happen again and again, and more humility to allow openness to change. Lessons learned regarding the involvement of women in peace processes are also important to give future missions a basis on which to build. Canadian development agencies such as Inter-Pares and Equi-terre and Oxfam Canada have a long standing reputation for working in partnership with local communities. Contreras-Chavez argued for more funding for development agencies, which over the decades have acquired a great deal of knowledge regarding the structural roots of violence and conflict in regions where Canada sends peacekeeping forces. With the increasing threat to the personal safety and life of peacekeeping personnel, the current federal government is considering a shift in policy by eliminating key development agencies (eg. CIDA), while increasing the funding for more Canadian military presence overseas. She suggested that this move might be counterproductive in the long run by disempowering the women's movement that Canadian development agencies have been trying to support. To these comments, Senator Mobina Jaffer noted that the UN has manuals and plans establishing how to gender mainstream peacekeeping missions. What is missing, however, are the resources to proceed with the implementation of these plans.

Moussa Magassa, for his part, noted that in looking at issues of gender, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the 'civilian peacekeeping movement' should not be overlooked. He explained that the concept of peacekeeping in general has shifted in that there are now more alternatives. Military alone is not enough; civilian efforts have to be included, as women are crucial players in these efforts. Magassa proposed looking into the possibilities for deploying nonviolent civilian peacekeeping missions where women could do more.

INCREASING PARTICIPATION AND INVOLVEMENT OF LOCAL POPULATIONS

The participants discussed the importance of working with and strengthening local community groups. This implies empowerment through and within their own community. As Magassa noted, the objective should be to listen and work with local women, as opposed to taking them out of their community to train and build capacity.

⁶ See "Press Conference By Peacekeeping Gender Advisor," United Nations, 29 March 2006. http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2006/060329_Lamptey.doc.htm

⁷ DPKO Factsheet, September 2006, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf

⁸ "First all-women peacekeeping unit at work in war-torn Liberia," *Ekklesia News Briefing*, 29 January 2007. Available at: http://www.ekkleisia.co.uk/content/news_syndication/article_070129women.shtml.

Farhoumand-Sims stressed the importance of remembering that the local community has skills and knowledge that need to be drawn on. In her view, it is extremely important not to assume that capacity and agency are absent. Locals know what is culturally appropriate, they know the area, and they know what needs to be done to strengthen their community. It is thus important that local NGOs, when partnering with local communities, value local staff. On this issue, participants viewed the current system as valuing international staff over local staff and stressed the importance of hiring more local workers so that communities have a greater stake in development projects, increasing their chance of success.

By ignoring their expertise, the international community begins from scratch every time there is a conflict situation instead of benefiting from the knowledge of the partners that are already there. By the time a mission is on site, the local people with indigenous knowledge have too often become displaced, and their experience and expertise has been lost. Missions need to work for greater continuity and community development.

Contreras-Chavez highlighted this issue further, stating that too often we ignore the local people who have the best concept of the structural violence that is occurring. She spoke about the need to guarantee the knowledge and experience of local and international development agencies to be incorporated at the design-stage of peacekeeping operations. “Lessons learned” were mentioned as part of a methodology to reach a sustainable peace where the structural causes of violence are acknowledged and addressed so that when (or if) the peacekeeping operations are completed, the post-violence society is equipped to retake all the development programmes that a civil war or armed conflict may have interrupted or sabotaged.

Lubna Abalderhamn, herself a Sudanese refugee and now a leader in Vancouver’s refugee community, noted that civilians in post-conflict societies are often removed from peace policy and peace agendas. As a result, she believes training local women would be beneficial in order to familiarize them with the policy discussions that will likely impact their future. Abalderhamn noted that this training could be done through poetry, or storytelling, or other forms of entertainment education.

On a positive note, Captain Toth observed that in her experience as a peacekeeper in Sudan, engagement of local populations is happening. She also noted that Canadian Forces see their role more as background facilitators in that they believe that the local people already have the solutions.

PRIORITIZING CONSULTATION AND COMMUNICATION

The issue of consultation was raised numerous times by participants. According to Farhoumand-Sims, experts often enter a community with decisions made about how something needs to be done, rather than consulting with the locals about what they actually need. In her view, consultation with communities is essential in order to develop projects that are appropriate to the local context and that will ensure success. Communities also need to champion the projects to ensure a sense of ownership over these projects.

With that come questions about engaging local communities where communication networks are poor. How do we communicate effectively with women on the ground to make them a part of the peacebuilding agenda? How does information typically travel in a particular community? Oates suggested that involving local populations necessitates the use of creative strategies. For example, she mentioned that in certain communities, consultation may involve going from door to door handing out flyers with text and pictures, while in other communities it may involve identifying local stakeholders and addressing the community through them. Where literacy is particularly low, the dissemination of messages through the use of pictures may be the most effective. What is important is that consultation occurs with both men and women nationals, and that the means of consultation and information dissemination are appropriate for the local context. There was also a discussion regarding hiring local women in the field as part of the United Nations mission, to ensure that there is local expertise informing planning and implementation.

The group also discussed the challenges of working with local groups, especially in contexts where the international community could be viewed as favoring one side. For example, Coleman questioned the emphasis put on the need to engage the local populations. In certain situations where a society is divided, it becomes difficult to manage the need to engage locals on the one hand, and the need to address and ensure impartiality and neutrality. She noted that there have been some horrendous experiences where impartiality was lost because an organization accepted too much advice from a certain section of locals or particular societal groups. Engaging the population is much more challenging in situations with societal or ethnic warfare. One way to offset this is to engage in projects with all of the different communities and groups.

INVOLVING MEN IN WOMEN'S ISSUES

It was generally agreed by the participants that finding ways to involve men in championing women's rights is critical for gender equality to truly begin to happen. Stacey Makortoff pointed out that training to women-only groups in an attempt to empower them may instead feed the culture of gender exclusion and create more conflict. Including gender issues in peacebuilding means that partnerships between men and women must be created right from the beginning, otherwise the inclusion of 'gender' cannot concretely happen. Farhoumand-Sims added that the most successful empowerment of women occurs when men are also championing women's rights, and men and women are working side by side in partnership to address concerns within their communities. Making a reference to her fundamental belief as a Bahá'í, she remarked that 'unless men and women are equal, you will never have peace.'

WORKING WITH THE DIASPORA

Participants were unanimous in their recognition of the role that Canada's extensive number of immigrants can play in the planning and training for peace operations. The various groups within Canada are part of the country's vast global expertise which is still an underutilized resource. There is a need to make better use of the local diaspora community in Canada.

Their involvement is crucial if Canada is to create policies and train for peacekeeping in a way that is appropriate to the local context of a country. Diaspora communities know the local language, the customs, and most are enthusiastic about being involved.

Constable Drayton mentioned that the RCMP already makes use of this expertise by conducting trainings led by the Canadian diaspora. For example, some of the training he received was conducted by members of the Côte d'Ivoire diaspora living in Ottawa.

While agreeing on the role of the diaspora, Senator Jaffer discussed the need to go beyond just talking to the diaspora groups and to actually hire them to go overseas. For example, she argued that there is frustration among the Sudanese diaspora in Canada, because they are often expected to go for free to help their native country, while a Canadian-born will be hired and paid for the same deployment. There seems to be an assumption that people in the diaspora will donate their time and expertise. Senator Jaffer was clear that we should not expect this to be the case. In failing to utilize the diaspora communities, policy-makers are passing up the opportunity to tap into the wealth of information and expertise that exists right here in our own country.

REMAINING CHALLENGES FOR GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEBUILDING

FACILITATING THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS

Coleman pointed out that individuals choose to go on peacekeeping missions. As a result, in order to make it more accessible for women to deploy as part of peacekeeping missions, she suggested conducting a survey of women soldiers, police officers, and civilians, asking them about the conditions under which they would consider deploying, and the different factors that would affect their decision (child care, shorter contracts, all-female units, etc.). CANADEM has in fact conducted such survey.

In 2001, as part of the Canadian Committee on Women, Peace and Security Sub-Committee on Capacity Building, CANADEM volunteered to draft a discussion paper on Canada's domestic capacity and perceived barriers to the advancement of women in international peace support operations.⁹ While the report noted that more women are serving in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, more work is needed to enhance their presence both at UN headquarters and in the field.

⁹ CANADEM, "The Advancement of Women in International Peace Support Missions: A Draft Discussion Paper on Canadian Domestic Capacity and Perceived Barriers" (Ottawa: CANADEM, 2001).

Examples of UN or mission-based barriers included:

- Sexism and nepotism in UN hiring processes;
- Limited opportunities for advancement to higher ranks;¹⁰
- Sexual harassment by superiors, colleagues and local authorities;
- Cultural barriers, as evidenced by the cultural attitudes toward women outside Europe and North America;
- Discrimination regarding women's dependency status, as women are often discouraged from bringing their families;
- Urgency and length of required commitment.

Examples of Canadian-based barriers included:

- Biased recruitment process;
- Family commitments, precluding greater participation of women during certain stages in their lives;
- Lack of information on international opportunities;
- Lack of international experience and training;
- General lack of coordination and support of Canadian civilians by the Canadian Government.

While the report targeted civilian women actors, the barriers identified are widely representative of the barriers faced by women soldiers and police officers. Captain Toth mentioned, however, that the Canadian Forces is making adjustments to better encourage women's involvement. For example it is already possible to lessen the time of one's tour of duty.

Coleman further mentioned that it would be useful to analyze the various campaigns for recruiting potential women civilian peacekeepers and ensure that these campaigns not only reflect women's needs, but also making it clear that women have an important role to play as part of the organization.

OVERCOMING SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE (SEA) IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS

Women are also a principal victim of the growing problem of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) in peacekeeping missions. Widespread allegations of SEA have not only generated negative publicity for UN peacekeepers, but have also undermined UN peacekeeping

¹⁰ For example, since the beginning of the 1990s, 5 women have been appointed as Head of mission or Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG). At present, however, there are no women appointed as SRSGs and 2 women appointed as Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (DSRSG). A number of women are also currently serving in other high-level UN appointments related to peace and security.

mandates and compromised the reputation and objectives of peacekeeping missions. Despite this negative impact, much work is being done to rebuild trust in UN peacekeeping and the UN in general. For example, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has identified the eradication of sexual exploitation and abuse as one of its main priorities and has adopted a comprehensive strategy — including a zero-tolerance policy regarding crimes committed by peacekeepers — to eliminate SEA in peacekeeping missions. DPKO efforts to combat SEA include raising awareness at headquarters and within missions, improving training of peacekeepers, strengthening discipline of personnel accused of misconduct, and ensuring accountability for their actions. While progress has been made in addressing the problem in its aftermath, there is still a lack of enforcement mechanisms to prevent SEA from happening in the first place.

IMPROVING GENDER TRAINING

In May 2006, the Human Security Programme at Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) funded a study to assess the extent to which gender training is integrated in the preparation of Canadian personnel preparing for deployment in peace operations.¹¹ Overall, the study highlighted the need to include specific gender awareness components to the training received by military and police personnel, as well as the use of case studies that emphasize the concrete applications of gender in field missions. With regards to civilian training, the study noted the lack of “overall vision of what civilian training for a [peace operation] should look like” and concluded that “there is simply no standardized curriculum within which to integrate a gender module.”¹²

These findings were despite the fact that in 2002, Canada jointly developed a Gender Training Initiative (GTI) with the United Kingdom. This training initiative provides training material for a three-day course on gender perspectives in peace support operations for both military and civilian personnel and was used by the UN to develop its own training modules for peacekeepers.¹³ The tool, however, is said to have limited application due in part to an inadequate focus on practical ways of integrating gender. Gender training is also not mandatory. As a result, it is unclear who currently uses the tool.

On this basis, participants addressed the need for more gender-specific peacekeeping training both for pre-deployment and within missions. Most participants agreed on the lack of gender training for Canada’s international security forces. Constable Drayton, on the other hand, specified that he had received, along with his colleagues, one week of intensive training in Ottawa pre-mission, ‘a lot of it on gender’. Senator Jaffer also noted that the UN has a useful training manual on gender, although she was told that they are lacking the resources to implement it.

¹¹ Ann Howarth-Wiles, “Gender Training provided in Canada for Personnel involved in Peace Support Operations: Moving Forward” (Ottawa: DFAIT, May 2006).

¹² *Ibid.*, 2.

¹³ See Gender & Peacekeeping Online Training Course, 2002. Available at: <http://www.genderandpeacekeeping.org/>.

It was also questioned whether peacekeepers are taught peace building strategies or about concepts of Peacebuilding (how to work with the civilian population to achieve local solutions for peace). It was agreed that these concepts are not commonly understood or agreed to, and therefore they are not part of any existing orientation or training provided before deployment. This is despite the documented research that effective Peacebuilding strategies must include gender perspectives.

Internationally, Contreras-Chavez believes that there should be more gender training of peacekeepers in their home countries by local women. Training of peacekeepers should begin at home, instead of in international training Centres and at mission location. For example, she talked about a group of ex-military soldiers from a developing country that were sent as peacekeepers in Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In her opinion, because sexism was so ingrained among these groups, it is not surprising that there are issues of sexual abuse by peacekeepers on foreign missions.

Captain Toth also spoke about the huge impact that the cultural background of the diverse peacekeepers has on relations with the locals. For some peacekeepers, the locals were barbarians and nothing could be done to change their minds. For others who actively engaged with local people, their experience was different. Moreover, it should be recognized that gender training is often not culturally relevant for different countries. As a result, a priority of gender trainers should be to adapt gender training to reflect the customs, norms and values inherent in the country where a peacekeeping mission is due to deploy.

STRENGTHENING CULTURAL SENSITIVITY WITHOUT PERPETRATING OPPRESSION

Several participants advocated for a greater willingness on the part of Canada to push against claims of culture when it is being used to prevent justice, especially of women.

Senator Jaffer raised the possibility of reinforcing institutions that are repressive in an attempt to be respectful of cultural diversity. As she explained, the desire to be culturally sensitive leads one to believe that culture is static and unchanging, but it is actually dynamic. She favored a more vigorous approach to issues of gender equality, defaulting less to saying 'that's their culture, let's back off', and being more willing to ask if certain practices are harmful and disempowering for women. If so, it is important that Canada addresses these concerns through a human rights lens and defines such activities as unacceptable. In her opinion, actors working side-by-side with women in the field have a responsibility to attempt to change culture, or at least not reinforce it in cases where it is disempowering for women. In the same way, Sarah Kambites cautioned against focusing too much on cultural norms and traditions, especially when they are designed to hold women back and prevent them from voicing their opinions and concerns.

Farhoumand-Sims further explained that culture is often the problem, and religion may be given as an excuse for why a certain culture cannot be changed. She also noted that certain international institutions are part of the problem; by respecting a local culture that denies the inclusion of women, they get in the way of women's increased involvement in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. She warned, however, that as an outsider, voicing these

concerns can be problematic. In her view, international institutions must work together with local women, allowing them to be the voice of criticism and speak to the origin of these systems of oppression (one example is women in Afghanistan discussing their rights in Islam).

ADDRESSING MILITARIZATION OF AID & GENDER DYNAMICS

Participants also discussed the challenges surrounding the militarization of aid and its impact on gender dynamics. The discussion focused on the changing role of the military with regards to humanitarian assistance. As Farhoumand-Sims described, traditionally, the role of the military was viewed as creating a secure environment, in turn allowing humanitarian agencies to go in and do their work. Soldiers currently also build wells, schools and deliver food aid, creating what is often referred to as the ‘blurring of lines’ between the military and humanitarian assistance. She noted that when soldiers deliver aid, they compromise the security of aid workers by undermining the already tenuous neutral space that aid workers operate in. This makes international and local aid workers more vulnerable to attack by those who suspect them to be part of the military, or even as locals who have collaborated with foreign forces. She further mentioned that when aid is delivered by soldiers, it is much less likely to reach women and children than when it is delivered by aid workers. In her opinion, it is impossible to engage in peacebuilding when there is a blurring of the lines between humanitarianism and militarism. The militarization of aid, she concluded, is not in the interest of any of the groups involved.

Senator Jaffer concurred suggesting that instead of trying to get the military to do everything from diplomacy to police training to aid delivery, Canadians from diverse sectors should be included in the provision of other skills.

Farhoumand-Sims further noted that militaries bring with them a culture of peacekeeping and women, and this includes an increase in prostitution, human trafficking and a rise in violence. It is difficult to have them tasked with somehow preventing these crimes, when the military may be part of the problem.

IMPROVING AGENCY COMMITMENT TO WOMEN-SPECIFIC PROGRAMMES IN KEY PARTNER COUNTRIES

Participants elaborated on the situation in Afghanistan, focusing particularly on the situation for women. Farhoumand-Sims, discussing her recent trip to the region, found that the situation for women had not greatly improved since the beginning of the international community’s involvement in Afghanistan. The maternal mortality rate remains very high with Afghanistan, as it has the second highest rate of mortality in the world, while the literacy rate remains low. She noted that the international community is spending ten times more on the military than it is spending on development. To make matters worse, continued war has fostered a culture of violence that has resulted in increasing violence against women. Not enough attention is being paid to the critical role that women play. ‘Without women,’ she insisted, ‘we cannot have sustainable peace.’

Having just returned from six years in Afghanistan, Lauryn Oates further cited the acute

differences in available resources for women living in Afghanistan compared to Canada. By contrast to the resources found in Canada, Afghanistan has no rape hotlines, few hospitals, and both hospitals and the police are not trained in dealing with rape cases. Only a handful of resources exist in the entire country for women who have been raped.

Several participants observed that very little of CIDA funding is currently earmarked for women's capacity-building. As a result, participants advocated for allotting more of CIDA's aid specifically for women-specific programmes and local initiatives that work on engaging men in gender equality issues. Participants also argued that more money needs to go to skills building and training for women who are widows, to improve the education sector and school enrollment, to protect schools from violence, as well as to fund educational entertainment projects and creative strategies aimed at reducing domestic violence and early enforced marriage. Farhoumand-Sims also emphasized addressing the underlying issues in Afghan society, including poverty and illiteracy. There is a need to deepen our understanding of the root causes of the conflict and avoid falsely categorizing sections of society as homogenous.

While discussions on this issue focused primarily on Afghanistan, CIDA's role in committing to women-specific programmes should also be extended to all key partners as identified in the organization's engagement strategy.

SUPPORTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325

IMPROVING GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN FIELD MISSIONS

To improve mainstreaming of gender perspectives in field missions, the UN has recently introduced gender advisors to the DPKO headquarters and field missions to support the implementation of SC Resolution 1325. Their role is to provide practical guidance and innovative strategies for addressing the specific needs of women and men in every aspect of UN operations (including DDR, police, military, mine action, elections, human rights and the rule of law). Ten peacekeeping missions currently have a full-time gender advisor.¹⁴

BRINGING WOMEN TO THE NEGOTIATION TABLE

Senator Jaffer noted that Resolution 1325 recognized that it is women who are most affected in conflict, and that women must be included at the peace table. Women affected by war must have a say as to what types of programmes will be put in place post-conflict and as part of the peace deal. Senator Jaffer also cautioned against peacekeeping and peacebuilding materials and training that portray women only as victims of violence, as women can also be part of the solution to violence. Portraying their roles with greater diversity makes it easier to argue for the inclusion of women as active participants at the negotiating table when peace

¹⁴ UN DPKO, "Gender and UN Peacekeeping Operations."

policy is made. As an example, she discussed the importance of, and success in bringing Sudanese women to the negotiating table during the most recent round of negotiations in Darfur. While many of the men involved in the negotiations were in exile, the women were from the camps. Their presence brought a much more community-oriented solution, and ensured that the reality on the ground was taken into account.

A benefit of including women in policy creation is that, at the end of the process, they share the same knowledge as men, and can consequently be considered as equal partners in the implementation of peace agreements. Too often, women are not brought into policy creation. The attitude is one of ‘we’ll start this programme and then begin to include women.’ Peace negotiators are also at fault, stating that they will include and involve women once the agreement is signed. In reality, it is difficult to make any substantive change when women are brought in after the elements of the agreement have already been decided upon. As Senator Jaffer argued, more women need to be involved, both within the United Nations where decisions are made, and at the table when peace agreements are being negotiated. It is also important that women be given delegate status when they do come to the table, and that they be provided with adequate financial support to make their attendance possible.

It is important to remember, however, that women are not a single unified group; they emulate the same class, ethnic, and social divisions that society at large has. Consequently, not all women share the same views, and opinions of the specific needs of women in a particular situation will differ. In talking about Afghanistan, Farhoumand-Sims relayed the importance of increasing efforts to address women in Afghanistan, but also the need to target different groups of women (urban/rural, class, clan) with policies that reflect their particular situations.

RAISING AWARENESS IN CANADA

The point was raised that little is being done in Canada to raise awareness about and enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1325. Senator Jaffer also suggested that the disbanding of the Resolution 1325 committee was one of the repercussions of the Canadian government’s cuts to women’s funding. Created by the Government, the Canadian Committee on Women, Peace and Security was comprised of government officials, parliamentarians, and civil society representatives. Their primary focus was on advocacy, capacity building, gender training, and the protection of the rights of women and girls. In 2005, they held their Third Annual Symposium, the aim of which was to discuss the Government of Canada’s initiative to develop a National Action Plan regarding the implementation of Resolution 1325 in Canada.¹⁵

Oates noted that in her work with local nonprofit organisations in Canada, and community-

¹⁵ DFAIT, “Women, Peace and Security,” 2006. Available at:
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/human-rights/women_peace-en.asp.

building in British Columbia, people are not aware of Resolution 1325 and of its implications for women. She viewed this as a failure of Canadian society to communicate and raise awareness on the issue. Still, the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC) was praised for its work in distributing flyers on Resolution 1325 to girls and prompting them to think about the implications of this resolution on their lives.¹⁶ This flyer has since been translated into Daru and Pashtu, and is being used in Afghanistan.

Patsy George noted that a high-level panel on UN reform has recommended to the Secretary-General that the UN create its first full-fledged agency for women. She urged governments to make that happen, and called on them to make Resolution 1325 and the resolutions from the Beijing conference the priorities for this agency. She urged Canada to devote resources to such an initiative and push for female Canadian experts to be part of it.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The above clearly demonstrates the efforts and improvements that have been made to integrate a gender perspective in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. Among the achievements is the landmark adoption of SC Resolution 1325, which “[marked] the culmination of years of intensive work on behalf of NGOs, governments and UN Agencies.”¹⁷ Still, much work remains to be done. For example, many stakeholders are still in the process of understanding the implications of Resolution 1325 and are attempting to devise appropriate policies that reflect their commitment. In addition, the concepts of ‘gender’ and ‘gender mainstreaming’ are still foreign to many organizations and countries, requiring greater outreach and awareness building on the part of the UN and Member States such as Canada.

Many themes and directions for future work emerged from the February 26th event. These are presented below.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO):

1. Institutionalize a gendered perspective at the UN level by:
 - a. Pushing for greater participation of women within all aspects of DPKO activities. More specifically, DPKO should encourage consultation with UNIFEM counterparts on mission planning.
 - b. Allocating specific resources to put into action the numerous reports, studies and plans on how to increase women’s involvement in peace processes and on ways to improve gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. This could be achieved in collaboration with UNIFEM.

¹⁶ The CPCC Gender and Peacebuilding Working Group is committed to translating international commitments on gender equality and peacebuilding into concrete actions on the ground and to promoting the contribution and active participation of women in human security and peacebuilding activities. To achieve these goals, the GPWG uses several avenues, including public awareness campaigns, building political support, engaging in a dialogue with politicians and government officials, and publishing reports and research on issues related to gender and peacebuilding. See Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC), Gender and Peacebuilding Working Group. Available at: http://www.peacebuild.ca/upload/fact_sheet.pdf

¹⁷ DFAIT, “Women, Peace and Security.”

2. Create systems that encourage greater female involvement in policy planning of peace operations and planning of missions. This could be achieved by:
 - a. Ensuring, to the extent possible, that there are an equal number of women planning missions at the UN level.
 - b. Demanding that women have equal representation at the table when peace negotiations are occurring.
 - c. Ensuring that women are awarded delegate status and provided with the necessary resources enabling them to come as equals in international forums.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS ON THE GROUND:

1. Ensure that peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions work closely with local communities by:
 - a. Encouraging partnerships with local NGOs and allowing local NGOs to take the lead. This will ensure local ownership of projects.
 - b. Supporting the hiring of local staff in the development and implementation of projects. DPKO should also encourage international organizations to do the same.
 - c. Ensuring that local community leaders (women and men) are involved in the day-to-day planning of missions on the ground. They are best able to point out those who are the key stakeholders in their societies. Women leaders will also help in identifying the specific needs of women in a particular region.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS:

1. Increase the number of Canadian females that are deployed as part of peace operations. This can best be achieved by addressing women's concerns and barriers to deployment (such as those identified in the CANADEM poll). Polls should be conducted of Canadian Forces and RCMP women to identify whether the same barriers apply to them, and if not, to specifically address those barriers. Recruitment efforts should make it clear to Canadian women that they have an important role to play in peace operations.
2. Increase gender training for Canada's international security forces by having female trainers and experienced women peacekeepers give courses on gender and the protection of women and children. Women from diaspora communities in Canada should provide pre-deployment information on local culture and customs.

3. Include Canadian diaspora in the dialogue on Canadian peace operations, and draw upon their understanding of local culture and customs, as well as language.
 - a. Use diaspora to provide cultural, language, and gender training to civilians and military personnel before they are deployed.
 - b. Hire the diaspora to represent Canada and to be involved in the work developing their native countries.
4. Support greater Canadian involvement with gender mainstreaming of UN peacekeeping missions.
5. Provide a peacekeeping orientation / training programme in Canada pre-deployment for all peacekeepers (military and civilian) that includes approaches and techniques for Peacebuilding and intercultural communications and relations.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGOS:

1. Raise awareness about United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 among Canadian citizens and its implications for Canadian women.
2. Engage in the development of the international initiative to establish a standing “peace army”, ready to respond to requests to provide nonviolent international presence where that will help reduce violence and allow local people striving to achieve peace and justice to continue their important work. This movement is made up largely of women.
3. Build transnational networks to build capacity of women for peacebuilding.

8

UN PEACEKEEPING AND CHILDREN AFFECTED BY CONFLICT

This chapter derives from a United Nations Association in Canada (UNA-Canada's) public dialogue, held on March 6th, 2007 in Toronto, to mark the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping. The event included a public forum and a closed experts' roundtable. Participants of the closed experts' roundtable and panelists at the linked public dialogue event discussed issues related to Children Affected by War and UN Peacekeeping, in particular the implications of the Paris Principles. Panelists at the public forum composed of young adults who lived through war when they were young children, provided insights from their experience and encouraged the public to become engaged in this issue. Participants at the experts' roundtable looked at ways of improving programmes to address children affected by conflict in field operations. The opinions expressed in this chapter and the recommendations derived from UNA-Canada's consultative process are not necessarily the views of UNA-Canada or of organizations represented at the event, but of individual participants.

The closed roundtable featured **Jennifer Adams**, Plan Canada; **Svetlana Ageeva**, Red Cross Canada; **Imran Ahmad**, Office of Senator Roméo Dallaire; **Sara Austin**, World Vision Canada; **Linda Dale**, Children/Youth as Peacebuilders; **Myriam Denov**, McGill University; **Kristine Ennis**, Department of National Defence; **Chol Kelei**, Youth Representative, Winnipeg; **Philip Lancaster**, Consultant, Victoria, BC; **Guillaume Landry**, International Bureau for Children's Rights; **Marlen Mondaca**, Save the Children Canada; **Jean-François Morel**, Department of National Defence; Youth Representative, Toronto; **Rachel Schmidt**, MA Candidate, NPSIA, Carleton University; **Emily Schroeder**, UNA-Canada; **Julie Stevens**, UNICEF Canada; **Emmanuelle Tremblay**, Canadian International Development Agency; **Carrie Vandewint**, World Vision Canada; and **Kimmi Weeks**, Youth Representative, Youth Action International. **Kathy Vandergrift**, Forum on Children and Armed Conflict, Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, acted as moderator for the event.

BACKGROUND: CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT AND UN PEACEKEEPING

The plight of children affected by armed conflict is a key concern for contemporary UN peacekeeping missions. The total number of child soldiers¹ in the world is estimated to be around 300,000, with more than 120,000 in Africa alone.² Girls account for approximately

¹ 'Child soldier' refers to "any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and for forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms." (Cape Town Principles 1997).

40% of the global figure.³ What is most disturbing about these figures is the fact that many of these children have never known anything but war; for them, peace remains a distant and unknown concept. As these children constitute the future of many war-ravaged countries, the importance of addressing their specific needs and ensuring their full (re-) integration within society is ever more pressing.

In some post-conflict contexts, UN peacekeeping is particularly crucial in addressing the issue of children and armed conflict (CAC). Peacekeepers are asked to perform a multitude of tasks, including forestalling conflicts, encouraging peace settlements, carrying out disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) programmes, providing security to the population, training and leading local de-mining teams, protecting humanitarian aid convoys, and performing civil functions. Children in armed conflict add a specific and challenging dimension to the responsibilities of peacekeepers. Despite growing attention, the role of peacekeepers in addressing the specific needs of CAC remains unclear. There is limited literature dealing exclusively with CAC and peacekeeping. While several SC Resolutions on the protection of children in armed conflict refer to UN peacekeeping missions, more needs to be done to define the roles of military and civilian peacekeepers in addressing the multiple challenges posed by child protection. The same can be said for peacebuilding.

DEVELOPMENT OF NORMS ON CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT

In 1996, Graça Machel, recipient of the Nansen Medal given by UNHCR for her *outstanding service to the cause of refugees*, mobilized global attention on The Impacts of Armed Conflict on Children, a ground breaking UN report. Since that time there have been some improvements in mechanisms to protect the rights of children threatened by armed conflict, but millions of children still remain vulnerable. In recognition of the growing problem of child soldiers, a symposium was organized in Cape Town, South Africa in April 1997, by the NGO working group on the Convention of the Rights of the Child and UNICEF.⁴ The symposium set out to develop concrete strategies to prevent the recruitment of children in armed forces, and to strengthen the processes of demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers. The “Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa,” or the Cape Town Principles, have become a leading document informing the development of international norms and legislation, and defining changes in policy at all levels.

² University of Alberta, “Children and War: Impact, Protection and Rehabilitation,” Report from Phase II Workshop held at the USC Gould School of Law, University of Southern California, 14-15 January 2006. Available at: <http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/childrenandwar/>. Other sources report that more than 500,000 children have been recruited and that 300,000 are actively fighting. See IRINnews.org, IRIN Web Special on child soldiers, 2007. Available at: <http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/childsoldiers/print/intro.asp>.

³ University of Alberta, “Children and War: Impact, Protection and Rehabilitation.”

⁴ UNICEF, *Cape Town Principles and Best Practices*, Cape Town, South Africa, 27-30 April 1997. Available at: [http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles\(1\).pdf](http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf). See also the Paris Guidelines.

In 2000, the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict came into effect, establishing a minimum age of 18 years for forced recruitment into armed forces. Meanwhile, the Security Council adopted several strong resolutions to protect children, specifically naming six egregious violations of the rights of children that it deemed threats to international peace and security. Governments who sign on to the Optional Protocol can still recruit 16 and 17 year olds who volunteer — as long as those young people do not take part in frontline combat; rebel groups MUST adhere to the minimum of 18 if the state has signed on (i.e. there is no assumption that rebel groups will keep young people off the frontlines, should young people volunteer to join). States that are not party to the Optional Protocol are still held to the international legal minimum age of 15 for recruitment.

In 2005, the Security Council passed Resolution 1612⁵, which moved from policy to practice through the establishment of a system for monitoring and reporting on CAC-related issues, the use of action plans to end the use of child soldiers, and the creation of a Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict to follow up on specific situations. The six violations articulated in Resolution 1612 (going beyond child soldier issues) are: (i) the killing and maiming of children; (ii) recruiting and using child soldiers; (iii) attacks against schools and hospitals; (iv) rape and other grave sexual violations against children; (v) abduction of children; and (vi) denial of humanitarian aid access to children.

In February 2007, 60 countries endorsed The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups.⁶ Beginning in 2005, UNICEF initiated a review of the Cape Town Principles in order to better reflect the knowledge acquired and lessons learned since 1997, and to incorporate new legislative developments. The review process culminated in the development of two documents — “The Paris Commitments to Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed Groups” (the Paris Commitments), and “The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups” (the Paris Principles). Participants at the March 6th roundtable discussed the latter document, as it offers a more detailed guidance and standardized approach for all practitioners on the ground, including peacekeepers. Accordingly, it is important that it be understood how the guidelines apply to peacekeeping, and the approach of peacekeepers, military and civilian, in the field.

A number of priorities have been identified within the Principles as having the greatest potential influence or implication for UN peacekeeping. These are:

⁵ Other key CAC documents include UN SC resolutions on children in armed conflict 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000), 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), 1539 (2004), 1612 (2005), the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules, 1985), African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the child (1990), the Rome Statute (resolution ICC-ASP/2/Res.3, 2003), the CRC (1989), Optional protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict (2000), 1977 Optional protocols to the Geneva conventions and ILO convention 182 (2000).

1. Preventing the forced recruitment of children below 18 years of age at all times, irrespective of a peace agreement, and establishing mechanisms to ensure age is respected. However, as mentioned above, a minimum legal age of 18 only applies where the Optional Protocol has been ratified; where it has not been ratified, the minimum legal age remains 15. There is no legal commitment to end voluntary recruitment below age 18 as states who have not ratified the Optional Protocol to the CRC are not legally compelled to do so.
2. Seeking the release of children at all times, irrespective of a peace agreement.
3. Promoting efforts to monitor and report on violations of children's rights.
4. Combating impunity by investigating and prosecuting those who are recruiting children or other war crimes against children. Issues of concern are other crimes, such as rape of girls. This is also supported by the citation of the six egregious children's rights violations in 1612.
5. Supporting implementation of targeted measures such as a ban on arms.
6. Longer-term support for effective DDR programmes for youth, with an emphasis on the reintegration part.
7. Supporting and promoting the voluntary involvement of children in truth-seeking and reconciliation processes.

Translating these new norms and principles for child protection into practical actions in the context of armed conflict remains a challenge. For example, states that have not signed the Optional Protocol use the age of 15 as their minimum legal age for voluntary recruitment with armed forces/groups, while those that have signed use 18. This has clear implications for peacekeepers, as they must respect local laws. Compliance by states with the above commitments remains a challenge, however there are measures that can be taken for violations of Security Council Resolutions, which is what some parts of civil society have been advocating, including political, economic and punitive sanctions. In addition to sanctions against states, child soldier recruiters can also be individually held accountable under the Rome Statute/ICC.

CANADIAN ENGAGEMENT AND INITIATIVES

Canada has been a leader in the support and promotion for the protection of the rights of CAC and has actively engaged in diplomacy on CAC issues at the UN. Canada was the first country to sign and ratify the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In 2000, Canada hosted the International Conference on War-Affected Children in Winnipeg. More recently, Canada hosted a workshop at the UN in July 2006, which focused

⁶ UNICEF, *The Paris Principles. Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups*, 2007. Available at: <http://www.unicef.org/media/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf>.

on the implementation in practice of Resolution 1612 to protect the rights of children affected by armed conflict. The following month, the Government of Canada supported a workshop in Winnipeg on Preventing the Use of Child Soldiers. This workshop was organized by The Child Soldier Initiative composed of the University of Winnipeg, UNICEF Canada, Search for Common Ground, USAID, and the Office of Lt. General (Ret) Roméo Dallaire. Canada also supported the Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, one of the first monitoring initiatives, and presently chairs Friends of CAC, a group of countries helping to maintain the importance of this issue at the forefront of the political agenda.

The issue of CAC was one of the Government's priorities under DFAIT's human security agenda, and is in direct line with its engagement on the protection of civilians threatened by conflict.⁷ Canada's interest on CAC is also part of its focus, through CIDA, on governance and capacity building for government and civil society.⁸ Within these purviews, Canada has made implementation of Resolution 1612 its priority.

LESSONS LEARNED: LISTENING TO VOICES OF EXPERIENCE

Linked to the roundtable discussion was a public forum on Children and Armed Conflict held in the evening of March 6th 2007. Increased awareness about the impacts of war, presented by three young adults, turned into a lively engagement. The discussion fostered a deeper understanding of the causes and impacts of the armed conflicts that threaten young people and ways that everyone can contribute to prevent similar experiences for other children.

CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT

Kathy Vandergrift, moderator, introduced the subject by giving an overview of the global movement on CAC. Canada, the first country to sign the Optional Protocol, now focuses on implementation of measures to prevent recruitment and other violations of the rights of children. In particular, implementation of Security Council Resolution 1612 is a priority. Canadian civil society organizations work through the Forum on Children and Armed Conflict to engage the government in dialogue on specific situations and issues. The Forum on CAC also focuses on improving programming in the many places where Canadian agencies work with children in zones of conflict.

KIMMI WEEKS

Kimmi Weeks, from Liberia, has been an advocate for child rights for 12 years. He was exiled from Liberia as a result of his advocacy to stop the conscription of children in the Liberian army. Kimmi reflected on his childhood during the war in Liberia. He remembers

⁷ Foreign Affairs Canada, "Canada's Human Security programme," 2006. Available at: <http://www.humansecurity.gc.ca/menu-en.asp>.

⁸ CIDA, "Children's Rights and Protection," 2006. Available at: <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/acdicida.nsf/En/JUD-12115346-RJE>.

the sight of children holding guns, beating and killing adults. Most child soldiers in Liberia were conscripted, given makeshift training, and forced onto the frontlines. Conditions were harsh. Girls were used as sex slaves. After the war Liberia faced the enormous challenge of rebuilding society and reintegrating thousands of children who had experienced war much of their lives.

Kimmi highlighted the importance of providing alternatives for young people, in the context of poverty. Ending the use of child soldiers, for him, is part of the larger goal of ending global poverty. In particular, he noted that young people, who were disarmed when the war ended, were then forgotten. Peace had returned, but not for them. Without real opportunities, the risk is that young people will go back to a life of conflict.

Kimmi spoke about the importance of youth participation. Youth make up over half of the population in many conflict countries. “What can we do with the power of numbers?” In North America, where he now works, the government also responds to public outcry. The challenge, Kimmi says, is getting the masses involved. Youth Action International, the organization Kimmi works with now, engages youth in awareness raising and letter-writing through local chapters and school organizations.

CHOL KELEI

Chol Kelei is originally from Southern Sudan. He currently undertakes advocacy and awareness for children affected by armed conflict in Winnipeg area schools. One of his goals is to return to Sudan and help people rebuild that country. Chol focused on the need to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between north and south Sudan. Chol shared glimpses into the past suffering of his family that now motivates him to work for peace. He was 8 years old when he left home without his family, one of the lost boys and girls of Sudan. He made his way to Ethiopia, where he was faced with wild animals such as hyenas and lions. According to him, more than a thousand unaccompanied children died on the way to Ethiopia. Rebels would sometimes recruit them into their armies, or shoot them down. There was no media presence to expose the atrocities, and no help on the way. Eventually he left Ethiopia and made his way to Uganda to make his refugee claim, and then eventually to Kenya in search of better education opportunities..

He believes it is important for the international community to get involved in situations beyond where they may have “interests.” Canada, he argues, should focus more efforts in South Sudan, including the reintegration of children into the communities, to avoid the return to violence as a way of live or criminal activity, such as banditry. “The ballot,” said Chol “can be our bullet to make changes in the world.” He challenged Canadian citizens to pressure their government to get involved in places where children are threatened by war, such as Darfur. Chol spoke about the notion of Responsibility of Protect, a concept that Canada promoted at the United Nations. If countries are unable or unwilling to protect people, then the international community has an obligation to help. “If Canadians are serious about the notion of Responsibility to Protect,” said Chol, “then we need to take action in Darfur.”

YOUTH REPRESENTATIVE FROM IRAN

A youth who grew up in Iran during the Iran-Iraq war is a political refugee now living in Canada. The youth recalled the trauma of being forced to stay in prison with the youth's mother as a 2 year old, when the youth's parents were arrested because of their political views. The youth spent a year and a half in jail. At the age of 5 bombardments forced children to go into shelters in the school, an experience shared by other persons in the audience.

The youth changed the participants to think about the impacts of the militarization of youth that results when children as young as 10 are trained in weapons and taught to be suicide bombers. In particular, the use of religion to engage youth in war is something that needs to change. Telling children that they will gain access to the gates of paradise by killing non-believers is a misuse of religion that the youth argues needs to be challenged. A focus on youth is essential for peace in places like Iran, where up to 70% of the population is young.

The wide-ranging discussion confirmed a core motivation behind the Children and Armed Conflict movement. If we take seriously the impact of armed conflict on children, it motivates us to work together to prevent the recurrence of the kind of situations described by the youth guests at this forum.

PARIS PRINCIPLES: THE "WHAT" DOCUMENT FOR PROGRAMMING

The background of the three youth's experiences as well as the discussion around existing norms on children and armed conflict served as a useful starting point for the roundtable participants to discuss the Paris Principles, recently endorsed by Canada. The challenge of how to turn this document into applicable action on the ground was explored. Emmanuelle Tremblay, Child Rights Officer, CIDA, discussed her participation in the process along with DFAIT officer for Children and Armed Conflict, Katrina Burgess.

In February, foreign ministers and officials from over 60 countries endorsed The Paris Commitments to Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed Groups. The first two commitments are:

1. To spare no effort to end the unlawful recruitment and use of children by armed forces or groups in all regions of the world, i.e. through the ratification and implementations of all relevant international instruments and through international cooperation.
2. To make every effort to uphold and apply the Paris Principles, wherever possible in our political, diplomatic, humanitarian, technical assistance, and funding roles and consistent with our international obligations.

The Paris Principles constitute a revision of the earlier Cape Town Principles. Discussion at the roundtable focused on the new principles and their implications for both NGOs and peacekeepers. Of particular interest is the fact that officials from several countries with child soldiers attended the meeting and were actively engaged by others to end the practice.

Canada endorsed the Paris Principles, with a delegation led by the Executive Vice-President of CIDA, Diane Vincent. CIDA is committed to remaining engaged in the field of children and armed conflict. The child protection group in CIDA's Policy Branch works with officers in the geographic division to address CAC issues in specific countries and as well as supporting UNICEF-led monitoring initiatives through CIDA's multilateral branch.

The roundtable first explored questions about the new Paris Principles. These principles, based on growing experience in this field, address some of the gaps in the earlier Cape Town Principles. Girls in armed conflict, for example, receive more attention, and the reintegration process, one of the challenges in the field, is more fully addressed. The importance of longer-term programming for effective assistance was highlighted at the Paris meeting, partly due to a strong message from Ishmael Beah, who has written a book on his experiences as a child soldier in Sierra Leone.

The Paris Principles complement previous CAC policies, such as Security Council Resolution 1612 and the monitoring mechanisms, as well as other CAC protection measures mentioned above. These are principles that address the substance of programming, i.e., the “what” of programming in this field. As Guillaume Landry pointed out from his extensive experience in West Africa on children and armed conflict issues, they are not operational guidelines, leaving the “how” to various actors, and they are vague on the “who” should be responsible for implementation. This policy is not a legal agreement, but it will be used to shape programmes by donor agencies who committed to it. CIDA considers it a working document that will be refined and developed as it is applied.

Areas of concern about the substance of the policy included the limited participation of youth in its development, the generality and vagueness of some elements, and the challenge of translating principles into operational reality. In general, however, there was agreement among roundtable participants that this document is an improvement of the Cape Town Principles and does reflect the “state of the art” in this field.

On a conceptual level, there was no group consensus concerning the way child rights are incorporated into the Paris Principles. The notion of absolute and relative rights was brought up by consultant Phil Lancaster. While some participants appreciate the attempt to base all aspects of the Paris Principles in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, others thought the references to child rights in general are too broad, and that there needs to be further clarity about who can actually uphold children's rights in the context of armed conflict. It was argued that limiting references to more specific rights, with parallel obligations on specific actors, would be more practical. Particularly for military actors, who are accustomed to military doctrines, more prescriptive and specific directions might have a greater chance of effective implementation. Conversely, other members of the roundtable argued that each conflict is rooted in various causes and is fuelled by a range of socio-economic and political factors—as that is the case, each situation will require that different rights are promoted by different actors, using various organizational capacities. It was noted that, even in the context of anarchy, there are local people who share concerns about child protection and can be supported to take responsibility. The link between rights and responsibilities is an area for further discussion.

IN PRACTICE: APPLICABILITY OF THE PARIS PRINCIPLES FOR WORK ON THE GROUND

The above guidelines are reflected in various developments that have occurred in the past several years, some of which involve peacekeeping more directly. In cases where the guidelines do not define a role for peacekeeping, we elaborate on what such role could be.

PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN IN CONFLICT ZONES

Discussion turned to ways that the Paris Principles could be used to advance the goal of protecting the rights of children in conflict zones.

- **Advocacy:** The fact that 60 countries made commitments to the agreement in Paris is worth prompt follow-up to advocate for actions. In Canada, Kathy Vandergrift noted that the Forum on CAC will engage with our political leaders on the next steps towards the implementation of this commitment. In conflict countries, the Principles could be the basis of advocacy for attention to specific elements, e.g. inclusion of CAC in peace processes.
- **Policy and Strategy Development:** Carrie Vandewint, who just returned from working in Southern Sudan, suggested that the Paris Principles provide a framework or starting point for countries faced with developing national strategies or action plans, such as a post-conflict situation. This is a significant advance; previously, there were not frameworks that could guide the development of plans and the process took a long time. Delays have negative impacts for children. This could speed up the development of national strategies, within which individual actors operate.
- **Youth Empowerment:** Youth need to know their rights and what commitments their governments have made to them. Kimmi Weeks, for example, recounted how becoming aware of children's rights empowered him to become a youth leader. Youth friendly versions of the Optional Protocol, Security Council Resolution 1612, and the Paris Principles were named by roundtable participants as high priorities. A youth representative reminded the participants that for closed societies, like Iran, diaspora and youth outside the country with connections inside the country can be vehicles to help inform and empower young people, if they are given the tools to do so. The importance of coherence and co-ordination between different awareness-raising initiatives on international norms in local contexts was highlighted.
- **Training:** Trainings and associated materials, based on the principles, would be useful for several different constituencies, such as agency field staff in affected countries, indigenous child protection networks, donor agency programme officers, military and humanitarian personnel, and diplomatic and legal advisors in foreign affairs.
- **Programme Design, Implementation, and Evaluation:** Operational tools and specific methodologies are needed to apply the Principles, to ensure: (i) a level of similarity/parity between all trainings; (ii) a level of monitoring and evaluation

to ensure that the trainings are useful and effective and current, and (iii) a means of collecting best practices. There is a need for more operational tools, to help Programme designers and frontline staff to translate these principles into specific Programme activities.

- **Best Practices:** Collecting and disseminating best practices based on the Principles was identified, by Julie Stevens, as a way to bridge the gap between practice and the realities of the policy environment. Collecting best practices also allows us to incorporate the most effective tools into our own toolboxes, thereby providing children who have been affected by conflict with the most comprehensive assistance possible.
- **Awareness:** At the political and diplomatic level, the Paris principles can help raise awareness of the plight of children affected by conflict. More popular awareness raising tools, based on the principles, could help at the community level in conflict countries and to build public support for donor investments in Canada. They could help to address the high level of scepticism about the effectiveness of work in this field.
- **Accountability:** While the Paris Principles are not legally binding, they could be a useful tool in helping strengthen the accountability of States that are parties to the CRC and the Optional Protocol on CAC. For instance, Sara Austin suggested that the Committee on the Rights of the Child could request that States that have endorsed the Principles should report on their progress in implementing the Paris Principles when they prepare their periodic reports on the CRC and OP. Similarly, non-governmental organizations can reference the Paris Principles in their alternative periodic reports, and in their advocacy efforts once the Committee issues their Concluding Observations.

REINTEGRATION

Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration and Rehabilitation programmes (DDRR) have put more emphasis on the two D's than on the Rs. Lessons learned have demonstrated that the reintegration and rehabilitation components are the most important for stopping the cycle of abuse of children.

Best practices in reintegration are reflected in the Paris Principles, but there are still major issues related to the implementation; for example, there is a general consensus that cash payments to youth who leave fighting forces are not usually effective. The challenges of finding alternative livelihoods and dealing with the psycho-social impacts of armed conflict require longer-term approaches with full community participation. At the same time, Phil Lancaster pointed out that community consultation in some programmes, e.g. World Bank programmes in the DRC and Burundi resulted in unacceptable delays before children received any benefits from the programme. Community consultations are crucial in ensuring that the community is actually being benefited by interventions, rather than having 'goods' imposed on them; participation is a key step in implementing a human rights approach. Timely interventions and responses, that assist children leaving forces,

is a priority. Others countered that the problem is not community engagement, but the bureaucratic structures and processes forced on local leaders by the World Bank.

Programming that is based on the resilience of children and builds on skills they acquired while engaged in armed forces, shows potential to be more effective than reinforcing the negative impacts of engagement with forces. At the same time, others pointed out that false expectations regarding the ease of a former child soldier's reintegration to community life can result in ignoring current problems that can re-surface later, when there are no programmes to deal with them.

The importance of building the capacity of local child protection networks was repeated throughout the roundtable. Peacekeepers and international agencies should see themselves as technical advisors rather than programme deliverers, supporting local skills and building local capacity. Local leaders will be there for the long-term; this is the only effective way to bridge the gap between emergency response and long-term sustainability.

The shortage of resources for long-term reintegration is another challenge. Most donor agencies pull-out of post-conflict programming within a few years, often terminating programmes when the youth are still vulnerable to re-recruitment or to other problems, such as being trafficked, criminal activity, etc.

MILITARY – CIVILIAN ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS

Children's needs have traditionally been seen within the scope of humanitarian agencies; protection and security issues, particularly in relation to child soldiers, also put children on the security agenda. With their inclusion on security agendas, come questions about the role of peacekeepers and military actors in child protection during conflict. Is it appropriate, for example, for peacekeepers, to participate in the reporting and follow-up on human rights violations? With the new focus on integrated missions, how can the roles of military and civilian actors complement each other? Is there a concern about blurring the lines between military and civilian roles? The discussion resulted in several points of consensus and areas for further clarification.

The trend toward including specific language about the protection of children in the mandates for peacekeeping missions was affirmed by the roundtable participants as a step in the right direction. When child protection is incorporated in the peacekeeping mandate itself, then resources and attention are directed towards children. This is in addition to the appointment of child protection advisors, which was started a few years ago. A particular challenge for peacekeeping missions is the fact that staff rotate every six months, making continuity a challenge.

There was also agreement that peacekeepers should play an active role in the monitoring and reporting mechanisms established under Resolution 1612. Under 1612(5), UNICEF monitors and documents human rights violations; while peacekeepers are highlighted in section 15 – UN agencies (including UNICEF) are asked to cooperate with peacekeepers and UN country teams when appropriate, on the implementation of 1612. Collating and analyzing the information gathered was identified as an area for further attention; it may be

a role where military expertise in strategic analysis proves valuable. This is often a weak spot in the process, and without it, the data does not lead to effective action.

More importantly, Chol Kelei highlighted that there is a need for clarification of roles and responsibilities in general, and within each specific mission. Participants shared experiences in peacekeeping missions where lack of clarity about roles resulted in unacceptable delays or ineffective response. DDR, for example, is a civilian led process, but the military is an integral part of it. This can lead to conflicting agendas, unless there is early agreement and clear roles.

The Paris Principles section 6.16 identifies UNICEF and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General-Children and Armed Conflict (SRSG-CAAC) as the lead monitoring and reporting bodies; in addition, UNICEF is identified as the the lead agency, while the Head of Mission is the coordinating body .

The Paris Principles do not address roles and responsibilities. While some saw that as a weakness, others observed that different agencies have capacity in particular situations, so it is best to leave those decisions to each mission. As a result, however, much depends on the experience and personality of the head of each mission, leading to a wide range of practice in relation to child protection. Early and clear identification of roles and responsibilities was seen as a central key to effective protection for children.

Training of peacekeepers remains an issue. Contributing troops are trained in their home country, and there was general agreement that this is unlikely to change. The result is a wide variety of training within a particular mission. One suggestion was that training on protection of children and other civilians be reinforced in the field, to ensure a common level of understanding among all members of a mission. Child protection competes with many other priorities for training; it should be given special emphasis, with particular attention to the role of peacekeepers in preventing child abuse through reporting and appropriate response when they encounter it and through example in their own practice.

The importance of building local expertise was highlighted. Peacekeepers can play an important role as technical advisors to local child protection authorities, such as local community leaders, local police, etc.

Discussions of the abuse of children by peacekeepers resulted in a strong consensus that there should never be impunity for peacekeepers who engage in child abuse, such as the sexual exploitation of girls. It is not enough to send them back to their home country where they escape being held accountable for their actions. Local communities interpret that as not taking the abuse of their children seriously by the international community. The UN, through DPKO, must develop appropriate mechanisms for punishment that reinforce accountability to the affected persons, within the framework of respect for the ultimate control of troop-contributing countries over their own forces.

Further attention is also needed to address the blurring of the lines by peacekeeping forces between civilian and military activities. An experience was shared from Côte d'Ivoire, where peacekeepers were actively involved in humanitarian activities, such as building schools one day, and then the next day; however, when violence erupted again, the peacekeepers retreated

to barracks and recommenced their patrolling in full arms, thereby sending confusing signals to youth and politicizing the humanitarian work. This can result in increased risk to the aid workers and youth involved, as communities are unsure of their roles, or their adherence to the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. Careful distinctions and clarity between civilian and military roles is needed to prevent increased risk for local youth and humanitarian workers, who rely on their neutrality for security.

The question of what are a peacekeeper's role in addressing children and armed conflict was also raised in relation to the mixed role played by Canadian forces in Afghanistan, where attacks on schools have doubled in the last year. A "Do No Harm" assessment is needed to ensure that forces are not increasing the risk for children through hearts and minds activities on local schools sites.

In general, greater focus on child protection by peacekeeping missions was endorsed by roundtable participants. While the Paris Principles outline what is needed, integrated missions need to quickly and clearly assign roles and responsibilities for developing operational plans and consistently implementing them.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As mentioned in the introduction, the role of UN peacekeeping missions in addressing the specific needs of CAC remains unclear. The above demonstrates that more needs to be done to define the exact roles of military and civilian peacekeepers in addressing the multiple challenges associated with CAC. While the Paris Principles are a step in that direction, the role of peacekeepers in addressing the specific needs of CAC still appears limited. More work remains to be done to understand how these guidelines can apply to UN peacekeeping (and peacebuilding) in practice, and how in turn, peacekeepers can play a greater role with respect to the protection of children involved in conflict on the ground.

Many suggestions for addressing children and armed conflict emerged from the March 6th event. Not all recommendations below were endorsed by all participants, nor was there consensus on all recommendations. Participants also discussed a number of steps that will be pursued by the Forum on Children and Armed Conflict in its ongoing dialogue with government officials. The below recommendations came out of the discussions held during the roundtable:

RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNMENTS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

1. Youth-friendly versions of the Optional Protocol, Resolution 1612, and the Paris Principles should be developed, including active participation of youth in the process. This is also needed in local languages where recruitment of child soldiers is a threat to young people.
2. Easy-to-use, condensed versions of the Paris Principles should be developed for field staff and local communities, to help develop a broad base of awareness. The collation and dissemination of good practices based on the principles should also be explored to help bridge the gap between principles and operational realities.
3. The Committee on the Rights of the Child should request that States that have endorsed the Paris Principles should include progress reports on the implementation of the Principles within their periodic reports on the CRC and the Optional Protocol on CAC. Civil Society Organizations should also report on this within their alternative reports.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UN DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO):

1. Disseminate guidelines and DPKO lessons learned on protection of youth during conflict and rehabilitation of youth after conflict. The community and the youth themselves need to be involved in developing community-based programmes that assist both child soldiers and other youth to create new opportunities and social relationships.
2. Reporting and response mechanisms, established under Resolution 1612, should include peacekeepers where appropriate, with particular attention to collating and analyzing data collected for early, preventive responses.
3. Appropriate international mechanisms to hold peacekeepers accountable for abuses of children should be mainstreamed throughout all peacekeeping missions, such as through Codes of Conduct with clear punitive measures.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION ON THE GROUND:

1. Clarity of roles and responsibilities should be established at the beginning of each peacekeeping mission to ensure that child protection receives due attention. Where there is not a peacekeeping mission, clarity of roles and responsibilities within the UN country team is needed, including strong links with local child protection networks.
2. Children and youth in conflict zones need to be provided with assistance as soon as possible after a peace agreement has been signed. In addition, the Paris Principles advocate for assistance to child soldiers regardless of the signing of a peace accord — DDDR should be ongoing process (i.e. during and after peace agreements). Longer-term programmes are needed, including a focus on alternative livelihoods so youth can sustain themselves; some will become leaders in rebuilding their countries.
3. Clear programmes for psycho-social healing through community should be explored for youth in areas of conflict.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS:

1. Training initiatives, based on the Paris Principles, should be developed for different user-groups, including military, donor agency staff, diplomats, and field staff. Consideration should be given to reinforce child protection training done in contributing countries when forces are integrated into one mission, and regularly thereafter because of the six-month rotations. A training strategy for all contributing countries to peacekeeping forces might be facilitated through the Friends of Children and Armed Conflict Group within the UN.
2. Given the importance of an early start on reintegration, a contingency fund should be established at UNICEF for immediate use after a peace process is signed, to prevent the long delays that now occur before youth receive assistance. Contributions to this fund could include voluntary contributions by countries, as well as through UN regular resources, etc.
3. To encourage implementation, states that are party to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children and Armed Conflict could be asked to include regular reports on how they applied the Paris Principles. This process would also allow youth and NGOs to comment on their government's implementation of the Paris Principles.
4. Canada should take a lead in developing an appropriate international means to hold peacekeepers accountable for abuses of children, including some form of accountability to the affected community. Being sent home is not adequate.

5. Clear programmes for psycho-social healing through community should be explored for refugee youth. One element of the Optional Protocol signed by Canada is provision of assistance to children who come to Canada after being abused in armed conflict.
6. Child rights education should be integrated into school curricula in countries where child recruitment is rampant to raise awareness of recruitment dangers and serve as a prevention measure.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOS):

1. A joint letter from Canadian civil society will be prepared to express support for Canada signing the Paris Principles and encourage the government to implement it through more specific programme and budget allocations, within CIDA and/or START at DFAIT.
2. Integrate the Paris Principles into monitoring and reporting on States Parties' progress in implementing the CRC and the Optional Protocol on CAC, including in NGOs alternative reports and in advocacy efforts to follow up the Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (INGOS):⁹

1. Capacity building of local, indigenous child protection networks should be a high priority in each country strategy, along with longer-term funding for reintegration plans. This would transform short-term emergency response initiatives into sustainable social support systems for youth.
2. Foster connections between youth in Canada and youth in these countries to inform youth of their basic rights, foster greater religious tolerance, and destroy some of the myths that entrap youth in a militarized culture.

⁹ While these recommendations are targeted primarily at INGOs, they can also apply to civil society and NGOs in Canada and around the world.

9

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN STRENGTHENING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT NETWORKS

This chapter derives from a United Nations Association in Canada (UNA-Canada) roundtable, held on March 12th, 2007 in Ottawa, to mark the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping. The event was a closed experts' roundtable. Participants of the closed experts' roundtable discussed Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the role of Canadian civil society. Lessons from other existing networks on R2P (such as the UN-focused network in New York) were discussed. Participants considered Canadian civil society efforts to solidify the normative understanding of R2P through awareness-raising, campaigning and research initiatives, with the objective of helping to propel Canada as an international leader on R2P. With this goal in mind, the prospect of forming a concerted R2P network in Canada was discussed. This roundtable was linked to the Ottawa Conference held November 23, 2006, which was a public dialogue on Responsibility to Protect and Darfur, featuring Jan Pronk, former Special Representative to the Secretary-General for the United Nations in Sudan, Wendy Gilmour, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and Carolyn McAskie, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support. The opinions expressed in this chapter and the recommendations are derived from UNA-Canada's consultation process and are not necessarily the views of the organization. In addition, the recommendations do not represent agreement by consensus among the participants, and may not include all views outside of this limited consultation process.

The closed roundtable featured **Nicole Deller**, World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy (via telephone); **Dr. Don Hubert**, Human Security Policy Division, Foreign Affairs and International Trade; **Bill Janzen**, Mennonite Central Committee; **Peter Jones**, Senior Fellow, Queen's Centre for International Relations; **Paul Larose-Edwards**, Executive Director, CANADEM; **Dr. Richard Price**, Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia; **Shane Roberts**, Board Member of UNA-Canada; **Natalie Senst**, Director Internal Communications, STAND Canada; **Sara Siebert**, IHL Awareness Committee, Canadian Red Cross, Ottawa Branch; **Susan Thomson, PhD** candidate at Dalhousie and Fellow, Canadian Consortium on Human Security & Int'l Development Research Centre, 2006-07; **Kathy Vandergrift**, Children and Armed Conflict Forum, Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee; **Kathryn White**, Executive Director, UNA-Canada; and **Yasemin Ugursal**, Gender and Peacebuilding Working Group, Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee. **Emily Schroeder**, UNA-Canada, was the event's moderator.

This chapter in particular was largely drawn from a paper written by Maria Banda, Oxford PhD candidate and researcher entitled “The Responsibility to Protect: Moving the Agenda Forward.” Whereas the other chapters in this report look closely at the intersection of various stakeholders related to peacekeeping, this chapter focuses primarily on the role of civil society in moving the R2P agenda forward. The operational challenges related to R2P and UN peacekeeping were not discussed at length in this roundtable, however this topic is covered extensively in Maria Banda’s paper, available on the UNA-Canada website.

BACKGROUND: RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND THE CRISIS OF PROTECTION

R2P is the present-day response to a problem every bit as big, and urgent, as peacekeeping was 50 years ago. The debate over R2P “is not some abstract, academic exercise of hypothetical simulations,” Lloyd Axworthy observed to a university audience, “this is real, because the issue of intervention — of how, when and who goes in to influence the affairs of another state — is probably the most critical and difficult conundrum...in this new century of ours.”¹ We are now facing a surging demand for peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peace-building missions, yet our collective record on intervention is far from encouraging. “Concerted, coherent, and systematic international action,” coupled with “positive political engagement” by parties to a conflict, has achieved “significant progress” in many regions.² “The world is, indeed, a safer place for most of us,” the UN Security Council (UNSC) was told in a briefing, “but it is still a death trap for too many defenceless civilians.”³ The ongoing violence in Afghanistan, the DRC, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, and elsewhere serves as a poignant reminder that our current international protection regime is still too weak and too limited to provide security for all. The UN has too often failed “to act quickly and effectively,”⁴ while coalition and regional initiatives (which have emerged as a possible alternative to UN-led — and, even, UN-authorized — operations) have caused serious concerns about their capacity, accountability, and legitimacy to intervene. The global war on terrorism has further “complicated efforts to harmonize and rationalize action for human security,” with many nations less willing to send armed forces into a sovereign country.⁵

R2P: NORMATIVE, LEGAL, AND OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

The emergence of the protection regime is wrapped up with the challenges, failures, and lessons of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s — such as Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999) which helped set in motion a reform of the UN’s intervention framework, launched the broader “protection of civilians” (POC) agenda, and ultimately facilitated the endorsement of R2P. The basic tenets of what we now understand as “R2P” were developed in stages, starting with the UNSC, whose three thematic resolutions on the POC in armed

¹ Lloyd Axworthy, *Navigating a New World: Canada’s Global Future* (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2003), 45.

² Statement by Jan Egeland, the former UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, to the UNSC (28 June 2006).

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Patricia Taft and Jason Ladnier, *Building the Capacity to Protect: The Role of Civil Society* (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, July 2005), 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 3.

conflict confirmed that the meaning of “threats to international peace and security” had already been sufficiently redefined by the UNSC in practice to include violence against civilians.⁶ The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) — an independent body set up by the Canadian government to build the foundations of a new consensus on humanitarian intervention — articulated a threefold concept of R2P.⁷ The immediate impact of the ICISS Report was muted in an environment dominated by 9/11, but lobbying by R2P advocates, ongoing practice of protection by the UNSC and regional bodies, as well two important endorsements by the High-Level Panel⁸ and the Secretary-General⁹ significantly improved R2P’s prospects. The 2005 World Summit (WS) provided the decisive endorsement. Intense negotiations in the 59th General Assembly brought out the old arguments against intervention from a handful of states, but also revealed considerable cross-regional support for the norm of protection. While the adoption of R2P in the WS Declaration was a triumph for the human rights community, ongoing disagreements about the meaning of the R2P paragraphs underline a continued need to advocate, refine, and implement the norm that will truly meet the objective of protection.

The protection of civilians has become a standard feature of peacekeeping since 1999, but the UNSC has never provided an interpretation of these terms for the troops in the field. The outcome has been confusion about the scope of protection, unclear lines of responsibility between the various actors in the field, and, in some case, a failure to protect. Including R2P in the mission mandate cannot protect civilians if the force in the field does not understand the mandate — or does not implement it. It is clear that evolving the R2P agenda will have clear implications for the development of future UN Peacekeeping.

A Short R2P Timeline	
11/2001	POC is identified as a “humanitarian imperative” by the Secretary-General’s report on Africa ¹⁰
1999-2000	POC is institutionalized in a UNSC presidential statement and in two resolutions on POC: SCR 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000)
11/2001	ICISS releases its report entitled <i>The Responsibility to Protect</i>
12/2004	UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP) endorses “the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect.”
03/2005	The UNSG reaffirms the Panel’s endorsement in his framing document for the “Millennium+5” Summit, <i>In Larger Freedom</i>
09/2005	UN World Summit Declaration embraces R2P
04/2006	SCR 1674 (2006) on POC reaffirms the World Summit commitment to R2P

⁶ SCR 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), and 1674 (2006). The Council also approved six statements on POC and passed related resolutions on Women and Children and Armed Conflict, Peace and Security, and Conflict Prevention. The UNGA Millennium Declaration recognized POC (A/RES/55/2). Between 1999 and 2007, the UNSC included the POC provision in the mandates of all UN-led (or UN-delegated) peacekeeping missions.

⁷ The Canadian government was responding to a challenge by the then UNSG, Kofi Annan, to reconcile sovereignty and protection: “[If] humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica — to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?” (A/54/2000, 48).

CANADIAN CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT ON R2P

Since the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 released the report *Responsibility to Protect*, some Canadian NGOs have explored the implications of this doctrine for policy, advocacy, programmes, projects and research. Momentum has been building since the United Nations World Summit (WS) in 2005 where R2P was adopted in the WS declaration. The UNA-Canada roundtable built on several other meetings of civil society to advance the R2P agenda.

In December 2005, the Conflict Prevention Working Group and the Peace Operations Working Group of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPEC) sponsored an NGO-Government Dialogue to address “Next Steps to Advance the Responsibility to Protect.”¹² It was suggested at that meeting that R2P advocates continue to build a normative consensus around R2P, as well as elaborate an operational basis to implement R2P principles.

In terms of norm-building, incremental steps were thought to be useful, such as the incorporation of R2P language in United Nations (UN) resolutions. In terms of operationalization, the discussion explored the work of the Stimson Centre work on R2P and military doctrine, training and mission preparation. In terms of campaigning, the meeting emphasized the R2P tool kit, which is a guide to understand R2P and to raise awareness, produced by the World Federalist Movement (WFM), and includes education tools, a brochure about the 2005 World Summit, ideas for how civil society can participate, frequently asked questions about R2P, a summary of the ICISS report and selected articles on R2P.

At the March 12th meeting, some members of Canadian civil society discussed their work towards solidifying a normative understanding of R2P domestically through awareness-raising, campaigning and research initiatives with the objective of helping propel Canada as an international leader on R2P. Others discussed how there has been a step away from some R2P work as a result of possible contradictions with conflict prevention and anti-militarization positions.

CANADIAN GOVERNMENT WORK ON R2P: A BRIEFING

Don Hubert from Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada gave a briefing of DFAIT’s current approach to the R2P agenda. Changing positions on R2P in global policy development is a slow and uneven process. Most successes are driven by specific and focused actions. As a follow-up on the 2005 United Nations World Summit and April 2006 Security Council Resolution on Protection of Civilians, DFAIT is pursuing three main tracks:

⁸ The 16-member Panel was established by the UNSG to help the UN develop a new consensus on collective security. The Panel also sought to operationalize the norm by recommending criteria on the use of force and asking the P5 to refrain from exercising their veto power.

⁹ “I believe we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it” (emphasis in the original) (A/59/565).

¹⁰ See Report of the Secretary-General on Causes of Conflicts and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa of 13 April 1998 (S/1998/318-A/52/871).

1. STRENGTHENING THE NORMATIVE AGENDA

DFAIT's strategy is to work with countries that are committed to R2P and not necessarily pursue those that are opposed. The main focus is currently on Africa where R2P principles are already part of law, which provide a platform. It is hard to dismiss when African countries themselves say that there are limits to sovereignty. The region is also likely to need protection the most. The intent is to assist Ghana through formal diplomatic means to formulate a normative statement on R2P leading into the African Union (AU) Summit.

Diplomatic efforts also continue in Europe, where there is willingness to support multinational forces to intervene in a crisis. The best kind of intervention would be short, sharp military operations of about 6 months with about 5,000 troops followed by more general peacekeeping operations. This would involve few countries but they need to be well resourced.

Diplomatic efforts are complemented by research at the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa and the Institute of Public Policy Research in London, as well as collaboration with civil society.

2. FIELD-LEVEL MONITORING AND TARGETED ACTION

Some normative, legal and institutional mechanisms have been put in place. The challenge now is to monitor, report and enforce. Darfur may loom large, but the key is to persist and focus on some early successes, such as coercive protection in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The focus is on institutional capacity and the office of Juan Mendez, the United Nation's special advisor on the prevention of genocide. To compliment the efforts of the UN, it is advisable to have an independent voice on R2P, one that does not have to make political considerations and can be effective and clearly targeted.

3. MILITARY OPERATIONAL PREPAREDNESS

Somewhere between multinational forces and robust peacekeeping is a role for military intervention. This may be a controversial idea, but large-scale atrocities against civilian populations take time to organize. The model for military operations in these situations would be a short, hard hit that stops the killing and makes way for a multi-dimensional peace-support operation.

¹¹ S/PRST/1999/6.

¹² See report at <http://www.peacebuild.ca/working/powg/R2Pnextsteps.pdf>.

These kinds of missions require rigorous preparation and training of the military, which is desirable for two reasons: if troops are sent, they will be able to do a good job; and if political leaders believe that their troops have planned and trained for these kinds of missions, they are more likely to send them.

Following Mr. Hubert's presentation, participants discussed some of the points raised. Regarding the best return on civil society's investments, there was no agreement on whether the focus should be on "allies" vs. "opponents" of R2P. Mr. Hubert suggested that it may be best to reach out to countries that are still on the fence. Regarding the military operational preparedness, there is no agreement on the best approach to this issue in terms of civil society advocacy, as it is still unclear what the implications of an "R2P military intervention" would look like. Some members of civil society are cautious not to allow R2P to be used as an excuse by some countries for interventions that are not, in fact, what R2P was originally conceived to address.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM A UN-FOCUSED R2P NETWORK IN NEW YORK

Nicole Deller of WFM addressed the group via telephone from New York. She shared lessons learned from coordinating a civil society network on R2P in New York as well as regionally and internationally.

A network around R2P coalesced at the UN World Summit in September 2005, with many human rights and social movement groups joining in, both from the North and the South. The momentum had been building since the prevention of armed conflict conference at the UN in July 2005 where R2P became one of the agenda items and was incorporated into the platform on conflict prevention as a result of a strong civil society presence in favor of R2P, led by WFM.

She commented that since that time, most governments have been unsure what the next steps for R2P agenda should be, now that it has been signed into an affirmation. And even though there is significant unity among NGOs to support R2P, or at least not to come out against it, WFM has recognized that more awareness-raising is required.

The primary goal has remained branding: for those who do not know R2P well, it still represents the codification of a use of force doctrine, instead of a spectrum of activity with the use of force as a last resort. The emphasis is on government responsibility with the understanding that sovereignty has to yield at a high threshold of crimes.

She pointed out that awareness-raising to build public support for R2P needs to clarify that R2P does not constitute the unilateral use of force, but rather is a framework for the UN and particularly regional organizations to respond more effectively in prevention and early reaction of atrocities against civilian populations. As part of awareness-raising, WFM explains how to create advocacy campaigns at conferences all over the world, at workshops, and during presentations and consultations.

A separate awareness-raising initiative that is led by a few New York groups¹³ is more about reaching out to civil society NGOs on how they can take R2P forward in their own campaigns. The focus is on operational issues and how to ensure that the UN incorporates and implements R2P.

The New York group has been meeting fairly regularly since mid-2006. The group's first main initiative is to advocate on the UN Security Council resolution on the protection of civilians. The second focus is to develop a business model for a comprehensive R2P campaign directed at the UN. And the third, most recent development is to establish NGO recommendations or a request for greater consultation on the possibility that the UN Secretary General may change the office of the special advisor on the prevention of genocide, a position now held by Juan Mendez, to special advisor on R2P.

CANADIAN CIVIL SOCIETY: IS A COMMON POSITION ON R2P POSSIBLE?

Following the discussion with Ms. Deller, the possibility of Canadian civil society negotiating a common position on R2P was discussed. It was expressed that drafting common language may be too difficult at this stage, as there are too many disagreements. It was thought that it may be best to coordinate around talking points and for an organization to take the lead to play a convener role to develop common messages and advocacy norms.

It was recognized that the danger of attempting to wage a narrow campaign is that attention can be shifted away from other things. NGOs are learning that political choices to include/exclude certain issues in an agenda can lead to unintended consequences (i.e., Human Security campaigns focused less on development and poverty, and more on security implications). Yet, it was acknowledged that the existence of well-organized domestic groups linking up with transnational activities is indispensable (i.e., the landmine campaign), implying that an R2P network needs to establish strong links with like-minded domestic civil society organizations. The question is: are civil society actors willing to form strategic alliances with other groups who would promote robust military postures? This presents a dilemma: if Canada does not have the military capacity to carry out R2P interventions, the norm will not be taken particularly seriously by other governments. This is an issue that Canadian civil society is still working through, and therefore it was thought unwise to force the negotiation of a common position at this stage. While Canadian civil society sees the value to come together around R2P, more discussion is required.

¹³ The core of this group of NGOs in New York are WFM, Human Rights Watch, International Crisis Group and Amnesty International.

POTENTIAL DOMESTIC & INTERNATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR MOVING THE R2P AGENDA FORWARD

To realize the promise of protection, Maria Banda's paper identifies the need for an R2P programme domestically and an R2P regime internationally. Since the international responsibility to protect rests not only with state governments, but also with civil society and international organizations, she suggests that taking R2P forward will require the establishment of an informal transnational network.

DEVELOPING AN R2P PROGRAMME AT HOME

Governments could make R2P a fundamental part of their foreign policy agenda, while acknowledging its inherent costs and risks.

a. *Locate/Allocate institutional responsibility for R2P in the national system*

Governments could identify the relevant departments and allocate individual tasks for the articulation, coordination, and implementation of the R2P programme. High-level support from the Executive branch is particularly important in the early stages of advocacy, as is securing a sustainable source of funding from the Legislative branch. The important thing to remember is that the basic structure is already in place: the R2P process can build on, and can feed off of the earlier projects on human security.

b. *Expand the domestic support-base for R2P*

It is equally important to get the public message right. Public endorsements of R2P by politicians, civil servants, and parliamentarians are a good way to increase the principle's visibility. Throughout this process, governments should engage civil society and support the work of think-tanks, research institutes, and NGOs working on R2P-related areas.¹⁴ It was mentioned by some participants that sometimes governments use the R2P incorrectly, to justify actions such as Afghanistan and Iraq. It was suggested that civil society should respond to these incorrect statements that will only confuse progress on R2P advocacy.

c. *Secure support for R2P in practice*

Getting the public to accept R2P as a principle is one thing; garnering its support for an actual intervention is quite another. Governments should understand the reservations of any opposing groups and address their concerns with arguments in favour of early prevention, reaction to violence, and post-conflict rebuilding. But they should also recognize — and capitalize on — the strength and the resonance of R2P with the general public. Opinion polls show that R2P policies are well-received in the West and in Africa, even at the height of the war on terror and Iraq. This is a highly significant finding, which should be brought to the policymakers' attention.

¹⁴ E.g. The Fund for Peace (FfP), the Stimson Centre, or the Responsibility to Protect-Engaging Civil Society project (R2P-CS), among others.

However, the level of public interest in humanitarian crises is still too low to affect a government's policy choices. The media has a role to play in this regard, as popular attitudes toward intervention are influenced by awareness of a given crisis through media exposure and education.

ADVANCING THE R2P AGENDA AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL

Ms. Banda's paper also discussed how a parallel project in the international arena will require the same kind of political mobilization, consensus-building, and campaigning as the R2P programme at home:

STRENGTHENING A NETWORK ON R2P, BEYOND CIVIL SOCIETY

1. *Build an R2P network*

The overarching structures of the protection regime should be laid down through *interstate* cooperation, starting within the UN, but also in consultation with other relevant stakeholders.

- **Governments:** Those states with the reputation or credibility as good international citizens have a particular responsibility to promote R2P. Canada, the main sponsor of the norm, should continue spearheading R2P-initiatives and engaging other likeminded governments and partners.
- **Institutions:** The UN is the main institutional agent with the capacity and the authority to oversee the construction of the R2P regime, but other intergovernmental bodies should also be engaged.
- **International Figures:** The new UNSG should be urged to continue his predecessor's efforts on R2P. A number of other individuals — advocates of human security, political leaders, Nobel Laureates, etc. — would be an asset to the growing R2P coalition.
- **Civil Society:** Civil society is central to sustaining the R2P agenda from advocacy through to implementation. Civil society groups should use the Summit R2P commitment to hold governments accountable for their actions in Darfur and beyond.

2. *Defuse the opposition*

The opposition to R2P can be neither coerced nor wished away; but, it can be engaged, gradually persuaded, and eventually socialized into the protection regime. The opposition, though vocal and tenacious, is remarkably small, while its arguments are less about R2P than other grievances, such as the war in Iraq or neo-colonialism.

¹⁵ NGOs, including Human Rights Watch (HRW), the ICG, Refugees International, and Oxfam, now regularly cite R2P.

¹⁶ The UK House of Commons International Development Committee, for instance, condemned inaction in Darfur and urged the UK government and the international community to exercise their "responsibility to protect." See Darfur, Sudan: The responsibility to protect (2005). A US congressional task force on UN reform, co-chaired by Newt Gingrich and George Mitchell, endorsed R2P and urged the US administration to adopt — and apply — the doctrine (See the Task Force Report, "American Interests and UN Reform").

LAY DOWN THE REGIME FOUNDATIONS

The success of the R2P agenda will depend on more than the civil society how much progress we are able to make in four interrelated areas — norm-setting, institutionalization, codification, and practice on the ground:

1. *Norm-setting*

“R2P” should become a part of the *international vocabulary* and the *international agenda*. This includes bilateral contacts among governments; multilateral forums (e.g. the G8, G20, or APEC); as well as regional or international organizations (e.g. ECOWAS, OSCE, or NATO). Within the UN, the UNGA and the UNSC are two key arenas to mainstream R2P. The international civil society, especially the human rights community, has done much to raise the profile of R2P by accepting — and advocating — both the R2P concept and terminology.¹⁵ The norm has also attracted the attention of some national legislatures.¹⁶ All of these actors should aim to make R2P a standard referent point in their statements and country reports.

2. *Institutionalizing R2P*

It is essential to make further progress on POC at the UN, starting with the Secretariat. The new UNSG should place R2P at the center of his mission and agenda and ensure that his Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG) is given sufficient political support and resources to carry out their mandate. The language of R2P should be also incorporated into all UNSC thematic and country resolutions. The Council could set up its consultative or monitoring committee on R2P, as it has done with children in armed conflict. The 15 members of the UNSC have a clear duty to keep implementing POC and R2P — in line with their past decisions and the WS Declaration. But other UN member-states are also responsible for bringing situations to the Council’s attention.¹⁷ R2P’s backers must lead by example: i.e. they must find the political will, and the resources, to implement their share of the humanitarian agenda.

Since the concept of R2P spans four pillars of the UN’s operations — humanitarian, human rights, security, and development — a number of other technical agencies are entrusted with furthering R2P’s objectives.¹⁸ All of these institutions should integrate the relevant dimensions of R2P into their mission statements and operations. There is significant scope for inter-agency cooperation to oversee the application of R2P, possibly through a “Working-” or “Advisory Group on R2P”¹⁹ But it is important to remember that having a home-base is not enough in itself: institutionalization has to be accompanied by parallel efforts in the realm of advocacy and implementation.

¹⁷ They can promote the cause of protection by backing the efforts to have the principle of R2P endorsed within the UNSC; encouraging the Council presidency to hold open debates on topics relating to R2P in which they can participate; and, submitting policy proposals with actionable recommendations whose contents should be made public and shared with such UN watchdogs as the Security Council Report.

3. *Codifying R2P*

R2P's status under international law must be strengthened and clarified. R2P is already grounded in a large and growing body of international law, which has been significantly enhanced since 1999, namely with the 2005 WS Declaration and the Council's three POC resolutions.²⁰ The most recent POC resolution, SCR 1674 (2006), sought to update the international POC framework to better reflect the new challenges of protection and enhance the UN's capacity to respond. SCR 1674 also contains an explicit reference to R2P. While this is a significant achievement, the norm will gain credibility and long-term legal significance only if the Council's pronouncements are implemented in practice. At this stage, however, "serious gaps remain in the implementation of the legal framework," including prevention, protection, humanitarian access, and impunity.²¹

4. *Practice*

The last, and indispensable, element in the regime construction is consistent practice on the ground. We consider in some detail R2P's operational dimensions and challenges in the next section.

These four areas serve as talking points from which to build on and develop advocacy strategies on R2P among Canadian civil society. The questions regarding "how" to move these issues forward and through which mechanisms are still under discussion. To date, there is no clear R2P "movement" taking place in Canada.

As Richard Price noted, coalitions need common positions and this will see groups split at various times. If no core group exists before the common position, it will emerge naturally afterwards. The humanitarian community is deeply divided on R2P, because it cannot advocate war. Civil society actors therefore have tough choices to make in terms of how to move forward on the R2P agenda.

¹⁸ Namely, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA); Department of Political Affairs (DPA); the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The newly established Human Rights Council (HRC) and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) represent another venue to embed R2P.

¹⁹ The Group could act as the primary point of dissemination of information on R2P; liaison with government, regional groups, and humanitarian NGOs; and, depository of best practices/lessons learned.

SUGGESTIONS FOR POTENTIAL COALITION BUILDING ON R2P IN THE CURRENT CLIMATE

Building on Ms. Banda's paper, several suggestions were raised by the participants at the March 12th event on ways forward for Canadian civil society on R2P in the current political climate. These are presented below:

INFORMATION SHARING

1. The R2P agenda can be pursued without pushing for a common position that may see some organizations walk away. A few times a year, civil society can meet to brief each other on conceptual frameworks and activities related to R2P;
2. It is useful for civil society to regularly convene with Foreign Affairs to share information on activities. In addition, discussions could take place regarding ways in which civil society and DFAIT can support each other's efforts in a complementary fashion, despite the fact that there may be issues of disagreement. The more these issues are discussed, the clearer it will become as to how to approach them in a sensitive and effective manner.

COALITION BUILDING AND DEFINING THE AGENDA

1. A narrow definition of R2P would be useful in order to distinguish it from human security in general. While a broad definition would get more support, it would fail to force us to focus on sharply defined questions. Civil society may be able to raise awareness with a "popular" simple broad definition of R2P, and how it is different from general human security and protection of civilians.
2. Clear language on R2P within civil society would be useful, and caution should be heeded that a broad definition may achieve more buy-in and that specific language constitutes a long-term agenda.

²⁰ The WS was a formative moment for R2P: even though the Declaration is non-binding, it has the potential to develop into a rule of customary international law, which is binding on states — as several landmark UNGA resolutions have in the past.

²¹ See Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict (S/2005/740) and UK statement to the UNSC in S/PV/5319r.1 (9 Dec 2005).

10

FUTURE CHALLENGES OF UN PEACEKEEPING

This chapter derives from a United Nations Association in Canada (UNA-Canada) public dialogue, held on February 6th, 2007 in Victoria, to mark the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping. The event included a public forum and a closed experts' roundtable. Participants of the closed experts' roundtable and panelists at the linked public dialogue event discussed the changing nature of UN peace operations. In doing so, participants examined new challenges to UN peacekeeping and identified opportunities for strengthening UN peace operations in the future. The opinions expressed in this chapter and the recommendations are derived from UNA-Canada's consultation process and are not necessarily the views of the organization. In addition, the recommendations do not represent agreement by consensus among the participants, and may not include all views outside of this limited consultation process.

The closed roundtable featured **Michael Bloomfield**, Rapporteur, University of Victoria; **Dr. Jim Boutilier**, Special Advisor (Policy), Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAF), Department of National Defence; **Ray Crabbe**, Fellow with the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI); **Dr. Greg Cran**, Director of the School of Peace and Conflict Management at Royal Roads University; **Derek Fraser**, President of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA); **Peter Gantz**, Peacebuilding Programme Officer with Refugees International; **Jeremy Kinsman**, Canadian Ambassador to the European Union from 2002-2006; **Pierre Kyer**, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; and **Will Matthews**, Manager, Resilient Communities Disaster Preparedness, Red Cross; and **Emily Schroeder**, Project Officer, UNA-Canada. **Dr. Michael Webb**, Acting Chair for the Political Science Department of the University of Victoria acted as moderator for the event.

UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE 21ST CENTURY¹

The current context in which UN peacekeeping operates has changed fundamentally since the beginning of the 1990s. To reflect the changing strategic environment in which peacekeepers are deployed, the nature of peacekeeping operations has undergone major changes. Contemporary UN peacekeeping operations are increasingly complex and multidimensional, requiring greater coordination and cooperation between the various actors involved, including military, civilian police, and civilian organizations and agencies.

¹ In this chapter, the term 'peacekeeping' refers to operations authorized by the United Nations (under Chapters 6, 7 and 8 of the UN Charter) to monitor cease-fires and/or support the implementation of peace agreements, and to initiate peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities.

The nature of peacekeeping mandates has also changed, as missions are increasingly deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and require more robust rules of engagement. In addition, as the protection of civilians is more and more incorporated into peacekeeping mandates, it requires clear rules of engagement on the use of force.

As peace operations evolve, new challenges surface, some of which are more daunting than others. As the international community tries to tackle these challenges, it is important to realize that overcoming them can only strengthen the United Nations organization and UN peace operations in particular. Similarly, it is also crucial to identify opportunities for reinforcing the UN in order to enhance its capacity and effectiveness in conducting and sustaining peace operations.

IDENTIFYING NEW CHALLENGES

Participants to the roundtable first discussed several new challenges facing UN peacekeeping operations. They are: political will; troop and financial constraints; capacity of forces; rapid deployment and standing capacity; rules of engagement and the use of force; and the rule of law.²

POLITICAL WILL

The political will of western nations to engage in peacekeeping missions was a point of interest throughout the conference. Although participants acknowledged a decline in political will of developed nations to contribute larger contingents to UN peacekeeping missions, there was some disagreement over the extent of the phenomenon. Several participants pointed to a growing aversion on the part of developed countries to troop casualties and reluctance to deploy large contingents under UN command. These reasons, along with the increasing engagement of many western nations in Iraq and Afghanistan, led Ray Crabbe to suggest the future involvement of western states in peacekeeping to be questionable at best.

While agreeing with Crabbe on the importance of the West's strategic leadership, Jeremy Kinsman noted that perhaps the apparent waning willingness of western nations to commit forces to peacekeeping is overstated. While he admitted that there has been a decline in western troop contributions to UN missions relative to the contributions of developing nations, he argued that other factors are also responsible for this decline. In his view, the case for humanitarian intervention was stained by its use as an excuse for the United States (US) to enter Iraq. While he acquiesced that public opinion is beginning to regain confidence in the international system, electorates throughout the developed world remain split on the question of humanitarian intervention and governments remain risk averse in their foreign policy. Despite this setback to the case for humanitarian intervention, Kinsman sees a chance for progress on the horizon. As the Security Council is no longer paralyzed

² These challenges echo those identified by the 2000 Secretary-General's Panel on Peace Operations, chaired by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, and that are being tackled by the Security Council and other bodies: enhancing preparedness; speeding up deployment; strengthening the deterrent capacities of peacekeepers; and ensuring full political and financial support by Member States. See United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (Brahimi Panel), 2000. Available at: http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/.

by Cold War politics, and as the setbacks of the 1990s and beginning of the 21st century are slowly dissipating, he saw a reason to be cautiously optimistic about the future of UN peacekeeping. Russia and China are showing a new willingness to cooperate and the US is learning the inadequacy of unilateralism.

In light of the weakening political will on the part of developed countries, participants discussed the growing willingness of developing countries to get involved in UN peacekeeping. The last five years have seen an unprecedented growth in UN peacekeeping, contributing to a considerable increase in the demand for peacekeepers. As a result, developing countries have stepped up and are now assuming the burden by contributing the majority of peacekeepers.³ Once again, however, opinions varied widely as to the underlying reasons for such an increase.

Crabbe, for example, suggested that the increase in the contributions of developing countries partly reflects the desire of African states to assume greater responsibility in the area of peace and security. He questioned the motivation of some UN peacekeeping contingents, by pointing to the monetary incentives for countries to contribute troops, which can add up to a significant windfall for a developing economy. Skeptical of the phenomenon, he further noted that the growing involvement of developing countries in peacekeeping has created the negative perception that “developing country soldiers are being sent to keep western soldiers safe.” Kinsman offered a different view, suggesting instead that it is simply a division of labour according to capacity, as many of the developed states are operating at close to full capacity in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

TROOP AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS

Closely related to political will are the challenges posed by troop and financial constraints. Troop and financial support are crucial elements of a peacekeeping deployment, without which a peacekeeping mission cannot assume its full range of capabilities. Within this theme, participants addressed the challenges that an increase in the number of peacekeepers coming from developing countries poses to peacekeeping.

Most participants agreed that many of the concerns surrounding the increasing role of developing countries in peacekeeping stem from their lack of capacity. While it was acknowledged that there have been many good contingents from developing countries, several participants pointed to the fact that many of these contingents are under-funded and lack training and/or equipment. This view was echoed by Pierre Kyer, who stated that many of the developing country contingents he saw while working in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) were much less efficient. While on location in the field, he witnessed troops with little preparation (e.g. lacking a driver’s license) and with limited knowledge of the local culture and language.

³ As of 31 October 2006, the 10 top contributors of UN peacekeepers were Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Jordan, Nepal, Ghana, Uruguay, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa. Together, they account for 60 percent of all UN military and police personnel.

⁴ The Economist, “Call the blue helmets: Can the UN cope with increasing demands for its soldiers?,” 4 January 2007.

With these examples in mind, Greg Cran noted that the absence of developed nations poses new challenges to peacekeeping operations. Wider and more challenging mandates not only require more money, but also more specialized capacities (i.e., army engineers and logisticians, heavy-lift aircraft, proper command-and-control and intelligence-gathering, etc.).⁴ As Crabbe explained, peacekeeping missions rely on the command and control, logistics, as well as leadership strategies offered by western militaries and in the absence of this expertise, peacekeeping becomes much more challenging. This is an operational challenge which must be addressed, as specialized armies and capacities are in short supply.⁵ While the capacity exists, it is mostly concentrated in western countries with established militaries, and it requires each member state to voluntarily contribute their capacity and equipment to a UN mission. In response to this challenge, Cran remarked that the focus should be on improving the capacity of developing contingents.

An increase in peacekeeping operations also translates into financial implications for the UN system and its member states. The surge in operations witnessed in the past few years has not only raised the demand for peacekeepers, but also caused the annual budget of UN peacekeeping to triple from its level ten years ago, putting more pressure on member states. The annual budget is currently in the range of \$6 billion.⁶

RAPID DEPLOYMENT AND STANDING CAPACITY

A third issue under discussion was that of rapid deployment and the possibility of building a standing capacity under UN auspices. Rapid response to crises and post-conflict areas remain difficult to achieve, and as such, constitute a considerable obstacle to the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. It is increasingly recognized that to respond to the challenges posed by contemporary conflicts, forces must be mobile, flexible, effective, and sustainable. As the UN does not have a standing peacekeeping capacity, it must rely on voluntary contributions from member states, causing the process of planning, authorizing and deploying a peacekeeping operation to be extremely complex.⁷

Crabbe noted that according to the Brahimi Report, soldiers must be on the ground within six weeks for most peacekeeping missions to be successful and the majority of missions to date have failed to respond in a timely manner. He described organizations that study the UN structure as well as those conducting country background studies as absolutely invaluable for mission success. In his view, it is crucial to have an understanding of the multifaceted approaches to peacekeeping and to have command and control headquarters that possess regional knowledge. He suggested that there is a need for more multinational regional headquarters around the world if the UN is to create the ability for rapid deployment. He further explained that there is a need for greater flexibility in UN deployment requirements. Instead of reinventing the wheel for every mission and counting individual soldiers and equipment based on the monetary will of contributing nations, he advocated for working

⁵ Jean-Marie Guéhenno, *Key Challenges in Today's UN Peacekeeping Operations* (transcript) (Washington D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, May 18, 2006). Available at: <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10766/>.

⁶ The full deployment of the operation in Lebanon and the mission in Darfur could raise the budget to \$7 billion.

⁷ Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century Project, *Draft - UN Capstone Doctrine* (Sweden: The Challenges Project/Folke Bernadotte Academy, 2006). Available at: http://www.challengesproject.net/roach/UN_Doctrine.do?pageId=96.

with set peacekeeping “packages” that can be deployed much faster. Examples of such ‘force packages’ include SHIRBRIG, the NATO Response Force (NRF), the EU Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), the EU Battlegroups, and the African Standby Force (ASF). Crabbe also recognized that the UN has collected rosters of military and civilian personnel; however, these rosters, in his opinion, are largely unmonitored and have not worked in the past.

Regarding the issue of standing capacity, Gantz argued that a significant standing capacity for UN peacekeeping would not be created any time soon. He did note, however, that there is a small standing police capacity of about fifteen police officers in the UN system. The UN Standing Police Capacity (SPC) is a new UN mechanism to help establish police components in new UN peace operations. The SPC can also support ongoing operations. Although few in number, Gantz sees the initiative as a foot in the door for those advocating a permanent military and police force that could rapidly deploy to conflict situations as the need arises. In his view, while the will to create a standing capacity for UN peacekeeping forces remains elusive, it is difficult to overstate the value of having core staff in place to ensure that each mission builds on previous experiences. This would allow for continuous improvement in the speed and efficiency of future UN missions.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND THE USE OF FORCE

Participants discussed rules of engagement and the use of force. The fundamental principles of UN peacekeeping—consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence—have, in specific cases, become obstacles to the deployment and success of UN peacekeeping missions. In particular, respect for the non-use of force has, in many cases, proven to be impractical in the face of large-scale massacres and detrimental to the mission both morally and physically. Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia, and East Timor are stark examples of the consequences of the non-use of force. In response to the new strategic environment, today’s missions are for the most part deployed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorizing peacekeepers to use “all necessary means” to protect themselves and threatened civilians. For example, the missions in the DRC, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Haiti have, as part of their mandate, the explicit authorization to use force to protect civilians. However, this use of force raises a number of questions, such as the level of force at which it becomes too much and the extent to which peacekeepers should protect civilians if such protection can jeopardize a mission’s objectives.

Kinsman noted the need for military peacekeepers to have clear rules of engagement that are suited to the particular mission to avoid repeating situations where peacekeepers lacked in both capacity and mandate. Indeed, it is crucial that when a force is deployed, the mandate under which it will operate matches the needs on the ground. Boutilier agreed that there is a need for a much stronger UN in current missions and that this must start with robust rules of engagement. Crabbe, on the other hand, argued that mandates have improved in strength and clarity since the early days of peacekeeping, and rules of engagement are now very detailed. In Afghanistan, for example, he claimed that soldiers know exactly what they can and cannot do. In his view, the real issue with rules of engagement is the need for UN forces to develop a credible deterrent capability. According to him, the major mistake made in the Balkans was to offer no assurances as to the consequences of breaking the ceasefire. As a result, he argued that the UN must act as a greater deterrent by creating a fourth

principle of “credibility of force” to compliment the three principles already in place. One aspect of this credibility would be to force the UN to be clear about the consequences of violating cease-fires.

While all participants agreed that the UN has made progress on rules of engagement, the problem, according to Gantz, is that rules of engagement are still decided in an ad hoc way. In his view, the UN should develop a more professional approach to peacekeeping by developing doctrine. He argued that the UN should identify the desired outcome and identify how they are going to reach it. While Crabbe argued that UN peacekeeping operations already have an end-state in mind, he admitted that, since missions are often deployed hastily, defining an end-state can indeed be difficult. The process, he added, is further complicated by the need to draft rules of engagement appropriate for each national environment in which these missions operate.

Responding to Gantz’ proposal for a peacekeeping doctrine, Kinsman stated that because the UN is made up of member states, weaknesses in doctrine are simply a reflection of the inability of member states to come to a consensus. He pointed out that general guidelines would likely be too difficult to sell and that perhaps ad hoc rules of engagement are better. He further suggested that a case-by-case approach offers material reasons to support ad hoc rules of engagement. More specifically, Kinsman expressed the need for the UN to create a case-by-case ability to employ strong Chapter VII mandates to make peace in conflict zones, and argued that Canada should be at the vanguard of this movement. While the UN used to be divided along East-West lines, the new divisions, he explained, are between the haves and have-nots, the democratic and non-democratic states, and those worried about sovereignty and those who feel this sovereignty should be broken in cases where humanitarian intervention appears necessary. Kinsman noted that in Rwanda the international community failed to see the aggressor, failed to authorize resistance, and ultimately failed to protect citizens at risk. In his opinion, there has been a paradigm shift from the security of states to human security that sometimes necessitates force by the international community. Building on previous points, Webb argued that perhaps the best option for addressing peacekeeping is to have a balance between a case-by-case approach of building precedents and having guidelines in place from which to work.

On the question of the protection of civilians, Gantz recognized the need for a strong mandate to use force in order to offer security for civilians, but suggested that we need to be careful that this does not derail the larger mission. To clarify his point, he used the example of Darfur where both the Government of Sudan and the rebel groups are attacking civilians. If UN forces abide by the principles of consent and impartiality, both the Government and rebel groups become partners in peace. If, on the other hand, UN forces are forced into combat with members from either group in order to protect members of the civilian population, they run the risk of driving a partner in peace out of the peace process.

Overall, participants stressed the need to ensure that UN forces receive mandates appropriate for each mission, including a credible deterrent capability when necessary. At the same time, the UN must study the effects of supplying a strong mandate to use force on the wider goals of the mission. When defining rules of engagement, the UN must strike a balance between an ad hoc approach specific to each mission, and a general framework allowing for consistent and timely deployments.

RULE OF LAW

A final challenge explored by participants was the UN's ability to engage in comprehensive peacebuilding efforts through the establishment of post-conflict rule of law. This issue was found to be extremely pertinent to the future of peace operations, considering the increasing scope of UN peacekeeping missions in aspects relevant to the rule of law. According to Gantz, the immediate priority when first deploying a peacekeeping mission must continue to focus on ensuring a basic level of security, without which daily activities cannot commence. In the longer-term, however, he advised that the priority should shift to enhancing local institutional capabilities while simultaneously devolving authority to local establishments and actors. The challenge in establishing this local rule of law, Gantz argued, rests in the multiple issues at play, including the types of rules and laws that must be implemented, and the model (if any) to follow in doing so. The process requires, among other things, the elaboration of a constitution and the implementation of transparency mechanisms. It also requires training professionals, government officials, and a judiciary, including police, prisons and court officials, all of which demand special skills and special guidance. Gantz used the example of Haiti to demonstrate how the accomplishments of the international community can be as easily reversed if all factors for good governance are not in place before UN forces are withdrawn. He explained that while the police were fairly effective, the courts and prisons were not, causing an increase in extra-judicial responses to crimes and offenses. In the end, the lack of institutional capabilities was a major factor in the reversal of the situation in Haiti, and resulted in the efforts of the international community being compromised.

OPPORTUNITIES TO STRENGTHEN UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE FUTURE

Participants went on to discuss a number of opportunities for strengthening UN peacekeeping missions on the ground including the integration of peacekeeping capabilities and the transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. Other opportunities, such as new technology and civil society initiatives are also incorporated in this report, though participants did not specifically address them.

INTEGRATION OF PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES

Panelists first discussed the need for further integration of peacekeeping capabilities and actors. In this context, an integrated approach is one aimed at strengthening the coherence of UN deployments in post-conflict environments. More specifically, integrated missions "are supposed to bring the UN's resources and activities closer together and ensure that they are applied in a coherent way across the political, military, developmental and humanitarian sectors. The purpose is not simply to rationalise resources, however; just as importantly,

integration is seen as a prerequisite for tackling a set of peacebuilding challenges that are themselves narrowly intertwined.”⁸ Apart from benefiting the peacekeeping mission, greater integration will also benefit transition planning between peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, by promoting the inclusion of a comprehensive peacebuilding approach from the onset of a peacekeeping mission and by generating greater attention on the long-term process of peacebuilding.

Within this theme, participants examined four types of integration: the integration of military and police forces from different nations, the integration of UN forces with regional organizations, the integration of military and civilian actors, and the integration of NGOs in peacekeeping missions.

(1) Integrating national contingents

On the issue of integrating national contingents, Kyer spoke of the lack of coherence he witnessed in the DRC, as different national police and military forces trained local groups. The participants also discussed the unwillingness of many nations to place troops under the command of foreign officers in multinational forces. While there was general agreement that the desire to keep soldiers under national command was to ensure the protection of national forces, Webb suggested that this may also reflect nations’ fear of being invisible, as they often utilize these missions to build international influence and identity. Kinsman agreed and added that peacekeeping forces need positive acknowledgement in order to maintain public support at home.

(2) Integrating UN and regional forces

Given the constraints facing regional organizations, the development of strategic partnerships between regional organizations and the UN is increasingly looked upon as the preferred option for meeting the peacekeeping demand. Hybrid missions can help to bypass the challenges posed by political will and troop constraints, provide for a more rapid response to crises, and can prove to be more robust and capable than a UN mission on its own. Hybrid missions may be the best option for the future, owing to their combination of UN legitimacy and regional or local capacity.⁹ One example of a hybrid mission includes Afghanistan, where a UN Political mission, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is working alongside the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission. A hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force is also proposed for Darfur, though this hybrid force would be much more integrated than the operation in Afghanistan (the latter could be qualified as coordinated rather than integrated).¹⁰ Still, one must keep in mind that regional organizations vary in strength and capability.

⁸ Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, and Karin von Hippel, *Reports on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and London: King’s College, March 2005):

6. <http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/view/viewdocument.aspx?id=2&docid=665>.

⁹ See Center on International Cooperation, *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).

Echoing a James Dobbins study on the UN's role in nation-building, Fraser argued that the UN remains the option of choice for missions that require less than 20,000 troops; for missions requiring more than 20,000 troops, however, a larger organization like NATO, and increasingly the EU, may be much better suited for these tasks.¹¹ Under these circumstances, Fraser believes that Canada has an interest in supporting both the UN and NATO, as both offer a certain space for leverage in diplomacy and international negotiations.

(3) Integrating military and civilian actors in peacekeeping missions

Participants agreed that close communication and coordination between military and civilian actors are essential if peacekeeping missions are to be successful. Peacekeeping missions now incorporate a mix of actors, including military observers, civilian police and support staff, as well as civilian organizations and agencies, making the interaction between all parties crucial to the good functioning of the mission. Civilian organizations and agencies, including UN agencies, local and international NGOs, civilian relief and development agencies, are essential in addressing the demands of post-conflict societies that do not usually fall under the competency of the military. Such demands include delivering humanitarian aid, training police, monitoring elections, building local capacity and institutions, and supporting reconciliation. As a result, in recent years the concept of 'civil-military cooperation' (CIMIC) has become increasingly common, and a resounding expression in both training materials and at UN headquarters. In fact, support from CIMIC units and activities have become a necessity in peacekeeping operations to enhance the military's ability to communicate and coordinate efforts with civilians groups. Often, the sheer size of civilian groups present in the field and their wide-ranging levels of professionalization make for a difficult relationship, making CIMIC activities even more relevant.

(4) Integrating NGOs in peacekeeping missions

The participants recognized that NGOs are vital to peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions and that greater coordination between NGOs and UN missions on the ground can only strengthen the delivery of field operations. NGOs are crucial in helping to foster greater sustainability in peace operations and can play a major role in the development of local capacity building. They facilitate sustainability by creating local partnerships, they help to empower community-level establishments, and they engage in the transfer of knowledge and training. Their capacity and willingness to remain in the field well after a UN peacekeeping mission has left, also renders their presence essential to achieving sustainable peace. Nevertheless, there is still no standardized way of engaging NGOs in peacekeeping missions.

¹⁰ While a hybrid mission refers to the combination of UN and non-UN forces, these forces can portray different levels of cooperation. For example, Durch and Berckman identify four levels of operations: fully integrated, coordinated, parallel, and consecutive. See William Durch and Tobias C. Berckman, "Définition et délimitation des opérations de paix," in *Guide du maintien de la paix 2007*, ed. Jocelyn Coulon, 16 (Québec: CEPES, 2006).

While some participants viewed the integration of the NGO community as the next step toward greater coherence in peacekeeping missions, others observed that NGOs often object to being integrated, especially with government forces. Recognizing this reluctance on the part of NGOs, Will Mathews argued that NGOs may be more inclined to integrate at a later stage in the conflict cycle, in particular during the peacebuilding stage. This integration would require the clarification of the goals and roles of all parties involved.

Cran mentioned that he witnessed successful integration of military and civilian organizations while working in Eastern Indonesia where women's organizations are working on issues of post-conflict stress. Still, he recognized the need for further integration in order to ensure that all organizations involved in either peacekeeping or humanitarian relief can devise a coherent way forward. Part of this strategy, he mentioned, must involve the local population, as the most successful projects as part of the Tsunami relief effort were those conducted in partnership with the locals. Boutilier, for his part, referred to the way in which military and NGOs have come together on many occasions, as the "micro-globalization of the battlefield." In other words, the more complex and inter-connected situations in the field become, the more inter-dependency and coordination is required between both organizations working alongside in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions.

Overall, participants agreed that more work needs to be done to integrate UN peacekeeping forces from different nations, to integrate military and civilian components of UN missions, and to integrate the efforts of UN forces and the NGO community. These objectives can be realized in part by ensuring that the goals and roles of the various actors involved in peacekeeping are clearly defined.

TRANSITION FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACEBUILDING

Participants also examined the UN's ability to effectively transition between the shorter-term peacekeeping efforts and the longer-term peacebuilding processes that are required for the ultimate success of contemporary missions. The participants agreed that peacekeeping has changed drastically in recent years and that the transition to a long-lasting peace requires a concerted and lengthy peacebuilding process.

The 2005 Report of the Secretary-General entitled *In Larger Freedom* states, "Deploying peace enforcement and peacekeeping forces may be essential in terminating conflicts but are not sufficient for long-term recovery. Serious attention to the longer-term process of peacebuilding in all its multiple dimensions is critical; failure to invest adequately in peacebuilding increases the odds that a country will relapse into conflict." Many practitioners have realized that peacekeeping forces are not sufficient to help countries in their transition from war to lasting peace, making the inclusion of a sustainable peacebuilding strategy a necessary component of transition planning and management. In this regard, the newly created Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office intends to help fill the void between war and peace by creating institutional and systematic links between peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peacebuilding efforts.

Mathews noted that many times UN forces come into a conflict zone not knowing what to do, demonstrating the need for an integrated model. This, in turn, requires determining what constitutes sustainable peace in each context as well as what it will take to get there. He continued by arguing that in Kosovo the Canadian contingent was a fine example of what it means to build peace as they were out in the communities, working with locals building houses and being involved in various other community activities.

Crabbe further noted that police forces, legal systems, and other political infrastructure cannot be built overnight. In other words, local capacity takes time. Echoing this view, Fraser stated that it takes a minimum of seven years for peacebuilding results to occur. Other participants agreed, but still felt this timeline was too short.

NEW TECHNOLOGY

On the subject of technology and intelligence, Gantz mentioned that UN peacekeeping operations currently have limited intelligence and information analysis capability, making it extremely difficult for leaders in the field to operate.¹² Missions in the field also lack in advanced monitoring technology such as remote sensing and positioning expertise. However, such technologies are forthcoming and incredibly suitable for UN peacekeeping operations. As Walter Dorn explains, “Sensors can increase the range and accuracy of observation, and permit continuous monitoring over much larger areas. It is now possible to spot a person walking at night 10 kilometres away using ground-based radar. Much greater ranges can be obtained from planes and unpiloted aerial vehicles. Infrared viewers on the helmets of peacekeepers can greatly increase the effectiveness of patrols at night, when most of the nefarious activities, such as ceasefire violations and arms/contraband shipments, take place.”¹³ Such technological advancements will undoubtedly bring new opportunities for field missions. In particular, the use of greater technology will provide peacekeepers with greater access to information, making them more effective and enhance their safety by helping to protect them and detect intruders.

CIVIL SOCIETY INITIATIVES AND SUSTAINABILITY

Other opportunities for strengthening UN peacekeeping are created through civil society initiatives, which seek to increase support for the implementation of peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. One example is the development of skills and capacities outside the government such as the creation of rosters or catalogues of military officers, civilian and police experts, as well as other experts who can deploy to UN missions on short-notice (CANADEM’s civilian roster is one example). The use of these rosters can help to circumvent a lack of political will and can also enable more rapid deployments of peacekeeping forces.

¹¹ James Dobbins et al., *The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq* (Washington D.C.: RAND Corporation: 2005).

¹² See also Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping (PEP), “Capacity Problems with the UN Peacekeeping System,” *PEP Briefing Note* (Washington: PEP, 2004). Available at: <http://www.effectivepeacekeeping.org/bn-unglobal/>.

¹³ Walter Dorn, “Canada: The Once and Future Peacekeeper?,” *Peace Magazine* 30 (Dec. 2006): 16. <http://peacejournalism.com/ReadArticle.asp?ArticleID=12227>.

CANADA

In response to the decline in the willingness of developed nations to contribute larger contingents to UN peacekeeping missions, participants strongly agreed that Canadians should play a major role in mobilizing support within the Canadian government for future UN peacekeeping missions. Canada has a long history in peacekeeping and the Canadian public is proud of its nation's involvement. As such, participants firmly believed that Canada is in a unique position to utilize its identity as a champion of multilateralism to garner the necessary political will both domestically and internationally (at the UN and as part of the G8) to continue strengthening this tradition.

Participants also noted that Canadian institutions can play a significant role in the training of UN peacekeepers and in strengthening their effectiveness by engaging in capacity-building exercises. As many UN peacekeeping troops lack in preparation and equipment, participants recognized that UN forces would benefit from increased training and technologies provided by Canadian military and police personnel.

Participants also saw a role for Canada in further advancing the paradigm of human security and in operationalizing the norms surrounding the responsibility to protect (R2P). Canada should utilize the legitimacy it enjoys as a peacekeeping nation to help solidify support for these vital concepts. As Kinsman observed, peacekeeping is a Canadian legacy and, as such, it is the responsibility of each successive Canadian government to act as a steward of these multilateral ideals. As Canada largely contributed to the conceptualization of R2P, it must also contribute in solidifying and operationalizing the concept. In this respect, Kinsman insisted that Canada has both the burden and privilege to move R2P forward by helping to catalyze the international will for peacekeeping operations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

UN peacekeeping operations have evolved enormously since the 1990s, bringing with them new challenges, but also new strengths and confidence in UN structures and contributions to peace and security. Of noticeable importance is the fact that participants shared similar opinions when addressing the role of UN peacekeeping in the future. There also was a common recognition that the international community has drawn lessons from past operations and it is working to strengthen UN peacekeeping capacity and efficiency.

As new challenges are bound to appear in the future, it is important not to discourage ourselves and to view these challenges as positive obstacles for further strengthening the international community's response to crises. Similarly, it is important to look at the existing opportunities for bolstering UN peacekeeping, and for encouraging greater engagement on the part of Western countries, in particular Canada.

Many recommendations and possible future directions emerged from the February 6th event. These are presented on the following page.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL (SC):

1. To increase UN credibility in peacekeeping operations, it is crucial that the SC send clear messages to governments and rebel forces as to the consequences of violating cease-fires and the possibilities for sanctions and ICC extraditions.
2. In devising peacekeeping mandates, the SC must continue to ensure that the mandate under which a force will operate matches the needs on the ground, while at the same time being conscious of the possible negative consequences a stronger mandate can have on the overall goals of the mission. It is also important for the SC (and the international community) to be flexible in its response to crises. In particular, the SC should be able to take advantage of opportunities and to respond to changing conditions on the ground.
3. To encourage continuity between peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, the SC, DPKO, and the Peace Building Commission should work more closely together in identifying proper sequencing and prioritization of activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO):

1. In line with the recommendations already identified in the report on UN Reform, UN DPKO should move forward on the development of a unit of core UN staff, including both military and civilian personnel that could be in place at the onset of a peacekeeping operation to ensure that each mission does not have to start from scratch. This would allow for continuous improvement in the speed and efficiency of future UN missions.
2. DPKO should strengthen and expand the newly created Standing Police Capacity to enhance the UN's ability to deploy rapidly to post-conflict situations.
3. DPKO should promote the recruitment and deployment by Member States of women police officers to better contend with gender issues and crimes specifically targeting women.
4. In the context of UN integration with regional organizations, DPKO and the African Union should agree on practical measures to promote a systematic and structural approach to coordination and cooperation.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS ON THE GROUND:

1. Increase coordination and communication between the various countries involved in the training of local police through joint meetings and training exercises. Greater interaction could improve the consistency of the training and skills provided to local police, ensure the compatibility of objectives and interoperability among local police units and facilitate their future integration under one command.
2. To the extent possible, push for the integration of longer-term peacebuilding initiatives into UN missions by incorporating plans for addressing DDR and SSR at the onset of a peacekeeping mission. This could involve conducting needs assessment on which programmes could be devised that reflect the conditions on the ground. Doing so could also support the development of integrated institutional capabilities at the local level.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS:

1. The Canadian government should work together with like-minded states to push the Security Council to adopt a balanced approach to peacekeeping operations by emphasizing the use of both case-by-case analysis and guidelines. This could be achieved by supporting the in-depth study of the underlying socio-political setting that led to the current crisis or conflict, and tailoring measures to address the particular political, economic, and social context.
2. In strengthening peacekeeping operations, the Canadian government should:
 - a. Try to catalyze political will for the approval of UN peacekeeping missions within the UNGA, G8, and other international fora.
 - b. Work with like-minded states to try to make the SC more transparent in its decisions to undertake peacekeeping missions.
 - c. Create working groups among UN member states to address the issue of the “use of force.”
3. In ensuring the UN’s financial capacity, the Canadian government should review its overall financial contribution to UN peacekeeping, as well as its donations to specific peacekeeping missions (e.g., the UN mission in Haiti and the AU mission in Darfur).
4. In strengthening regional organizations, the Canadian government should devote more resources to building African military and civilian peacekeeping capacity and provide greater technological and logistical support to the AU for peacekeeping operations.

5. The Canadian government could organize a seminar on Canada-UN to discuss UN cooperation with regional organizations, focusing on the military and civilian aspects of this cooperation.
6. The Canadian government should strengthen its engagement in capacity-building exercises of developing country peacekeepers.
7. The Canadian government should consider greater involvement in Francophone countries where Canadians skills and expertise can make a difference.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO CANADIAN AND INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOS):

1. NGOs working alongside peacekeeping missions or that send personnel to field missions should ensure that all the personnel they deploy receive basic training in civil-military cooperation.
2. NGOs working alongside peacekeeping missions or that send personnel to field missions should promote communication with leading military officials in peacetime, through roundtable discussions, working groups, conferences and joint training. Increased interaction outside the context of operations will help once in the field.
3. Canadian NGOs engaged in peacekeeping issues should partner with leading Canadian peacekeeping training centres to develop joint training sessions where civilians and military could exchange knowledge and share lessons learned.

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The following provides an overview of the main themes and findings that emerged from the comprehensive consultation process facilitated by the United Nations Association in Canada (UNA-Canada). In addition, the policy actions and recommendations arising from the roundtables and public dialogues are summarized. It must be stressed that the recommendations put forward in this report do not represent agreement by consensus among the participants, and may not include all views outside of this limited consultation process.

UNITED NATIONS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

1. Integrated approach to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding

Recent conflicts have demonstrated the need for an integrated approach in responding to crises in which the efforts of military, police, and civilian institutions are synchronized. In this respect, coordination among the various elements of a UN peacekeeping mission, and with other actors in the field, is extremely effective in order to maximize resources and utilize the expertise that each partner offers. For peace operations to be more effective, civilian, police and military personnel need to share information about their activities and cooperation between the two must be much tighter.

2. Capacity building and local partnerships

The need for community involvement and the creation of local partnerships in peacekeeping missions is a crucial component of sustainable capacity building approaches. By creating or strengthening local partnerships, international actors contribute to the gradual transfer of knowledge and responsibility from the international community to local establishments. Empowering the local population to self-govern, under the rule of law, is fundamental to sustain capacity over the long-term.

3. From peacekeeping to peacebuilding

Planning for a smooth transition between peacekeeping and peacebuilding is crucial, and must commence during the initial planning and deployment of a peacekeeping mission. The sooner the various actors make efforts to cooperate and work together, the greater the chances are that the peacebuilding process will be carried forward. A carefully planned transition strategy is necessary to ensure that the gains made during a peacekeeping mission are sustained well after the mission has been completed.

4. Fostering rapid response to crises

New partnerships between the UN and other regional organizations (i.e., NATO, EU, ECOWAS, and AU) were welcomed by many participants, allowing for greater flexibility in peacekeeping operations, and a greater rapid response capacity due to the 'sequencing of operations' between regional and sub-regional organization and the UN. Several participants also expressed the necessity to ensure that there are sufficient military and civilian capabilities to guarantee success in rapid response missions. The importance of building skills and capacities outside the government that could take action when global crises arise and compensate for delays in political action was emphasized. Civilian capabilities are essential where military capabilities are insufficient.

5. Gender mainstreaming of peace operations

Gender must be recognized as a vital component of plans and programmes to avoid, mitigate and resolve conflict situations, and to build sustainable peace. As a result, women need to be involved at the earliest stage possible, at all levels of mission planning, peace negotiations, and implementation of peace processes. Bringing a gendered perspective to peace operations means ensuring an equal female voice and input at the table, and equal female participation on the ground. It also means that UN peace operations are relevant to all stakeholders involved, responsive to their needs, and effective in the promotion of equality. Lessons learned regarding the involvement of women in peace processes should also be compiled and distributed to future missions as a basis on which to build.

6. Protecting children in peace operations

In general, greater focus on child protection by peacekeeping missions was endorsed. While *The Paris Commitments to Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed Groups* (endorsed by over 60 countries in February 2007) outline what is needed, integrated missions need to quickly and clearly assign roles and responsibilities for developing operational plans and consistently implementing them.

The importance of building the capacity of local child protection networks was emphasized. The trend toward including specific language about protection of children in the mandates for peacekeeping missions was also affirmed as a good direction. In addition, there was agreement that peacekeepers should play an active role in the monitoring and reporting mechanisms established under Resolution 1612. Collating and analyzing the information gathered was identified as an area for further attention; it may be a role where military expertise in strategic analysis proves valuable. However, any reporting undertaken by military must be carefully coordinated with the civilian actors charged with child protection to ensure safe and proper procedures and common reporting indicators.

7. Training needs for today's peacekeepers

Training of military, police and civilian personnel for UN peacekeepers was recognized as a necessary factor in the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions. Contributing troops are trained in their home country, resulting in a wide variety of training within a particular mission. This is especially the case for training on gender, protection of children and other civilians, and cultural awareness. It was suggested that training be reinforced in the field, to ensure a common level of understanding among all members of a mission. Gender and child protection compete with many other priorities for training. Both should be given special emphasis, with particular attention to the role of peacekeepers in preventing abuse against women and children through reporting and appropriate response when they encounter it as well as by example through their own practice. The UN, through DPKO, must develop appropriate mechanisms for punishment that reinforce accountability to the affected persons, within the framework of respect for the ultimate control of troop-contributing countries over their own forces.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

1. Strengthening local partnerships

The creation and/or strengthening of local partnerships by international actors were seen as essential in ensuring the gradual transfer of knowledge and responsibility from the international community to local communities and authority. INGOs were described as playing a crucial role in the development of local capacity building and in strengthening grassroots capacity. INGOs are key actors in the creation of local partnerships, helping to empower community-level establishments and engaging in the transfer of knowledge and training.

2. Coordination and consultation

Many participants viewed coordination among different agencies as vital to sustainable capacity building. Coordination is necessary both at higher levels (between UN DPKO and other UN agencies) and on the ground (among NGOs, and between NGOs and the UN peacekeeping mission). Coordination with local actors and the government is crucial in order to ensure that projects undertaken reflect the actual needs on the ground with local ownership. In addition, coordination with humanitarian organizations in the field will help to take advantage of the expertise and knowledge of these organizations. Coordination is also important to avoid duplicating efforts and maximize the available resources. Consultation processes were also mentioned as necessary mechanisms for formalizing coordination efforts.

3. Clarifying roles for civilians and military

Further attention is needed to address the blurring of the lines between civilian and military activities. Several participants cautioned that the militarization of aid had further reduced the image of NGOs as impartial and had contributed to a sense of mistrust with national governments. However, there was also a sense that a relative level of security must be in place

before any delivery of aid can take place, and that beneficiaries do not differentiate between which actors deliver the aid. Still, participants highlighted the need to clarify civilian and military roles in general and within peacekeeping missions, to prevent increased risk for local populations and humanitarian workers, who rely on their neutrality for security.

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

1. UN Peacekeeping as a Canadian tradition

Canada has a long history in peacekeeping and the Canadian public is proud of its nation's involvement. Unfortunately, there was a strong sense of concern among a majority of participants that the Canadian government has drastically reduced its emphasis on UN peacekeeping. While Canada's strong contribution to NATO was acknowledged and widely supported, such orientation was viewed by many as weakening both the UN and UN peacekeeping. Canada was seen as having an interest in supporting the UN and NATO, as both offer space for leverage in diplomacy and international negotiations. Many participants firmly believed that Canada is in a unique position to utilize its identity as a champion of multilateralism to garner the necessary political will both domestically and internationally to continue strengthening this tradition.

2. The media and Canadian myths

National media was found to be partly responsible for fostering certain myths about Canada, most importantly that Canada is more involved in UN peacekeeping than it really is. The media's common reference to Afghanistan as a peacekeeping operation was also partly blamed from the public's misunderstanding of peacekeeping. Many participants agreed that the media should inform the debate on Canada's contribution to the NATO operation in Afghanistan. The media should also help to explain to Canadians the difference between what Canada is doing in Afghanistan, and what the UN and African Union are attempting to do in Darfur to help end the violence. Participants acknowledged the importance of finding ways to spark the interest of the Canadian public through relevant human interest stories.

3. Using Canadian expertise: "Training the trainers"

As many UN peacekeeping troops lack in preparation and equipment, participants recognized that UN forces would benefit from increased training and technologies provided by Canadian military and police personnel. Canadian institutions could build on their experience by continuing to play a significant role in the training of UN peacekeepers from around the world and in strengthening their effectiveness by engaging in capacity-building exercises. A number of participants also stressed that the experience and knowledge acquired by the military over the past decades should be used to provide lessons learned to other UN peacekeepers. While the changing security environment requires that soldiers maintain a high state of readiness in terms of combat skills, Canadian soldiers' growing peacekeeping training and expertise should be supported and further developed.

Participants also identified the need for more peacekeeping training on gender, protection of civilians (women and children), and on cultural awareness, both pre-deployment and

within missions. Making better use of the local diaspora communities in Canada for training of peacekeepers was recommended. The involvement of the diaspora was seen as crucial if Canada is to create policies and train for peacekeeping in a way that is appropriate to the local context of a country.

4. Canada's role in developing a rapid response to crises

Owing to its current involvement in NATO and Afghanistan participants did not feel that Canada currently has a vested interest in SHIRBRIG that can be underlined with an earmarked commitment. In light of this observation, participants agreed that Canada should consider devoting greater resources to SHIRBRIG so that it remains a valuable alternate in dealing with future crises. Participants also agreed that more Canadian Centres of excellence should be created that have the capacity to provide solutions in responding to crises. There was discussion around the need for greater research into global rapid response initiatives (the United Nations Emergency Peace Service in particular) to identify the most effective way to proceed on the issue, both globally and within Canada.

5. Moving human security and R2P forward

Canada's influence over the last decade on the development of a number of human security initiatives should be built upon. Participants saw a role for Canada in further advancing the paradigm of human security. Participants also saw a role for Canada in operationalizing the norms surrounding the responsibility to protect (R2P). As a major actor in the conceptualization of R2P, Canada was viewed as having a role in solidifying and operationalizing the concept. Canada has both the burden and privilege to move R2P forward by helping to catalyze the international will for peacekeeping operations.

6. Key Canadian priorities: Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan

Afghanistan

A majority of participants were supportive of Canada's contribution to the NATO-led ISAF operation in Afghanistan. However, many participants highlighted the need to focus on development, as well as security. Emphasized was the need to address the underlying issues in Afghan society, including poverty and illiteracy. More specifically, some participants advocated for allotting more of Canada's aid specifically for women-specific programmes and local initiatives that work on engaging men in gender equality issues. It was also iterated that Canada, as a major actor in Afghanistan, should deepen its understanding of the root causes of the conflict and avoid falsely categorizing sections of society as homogenous.

Haiti

A long-term Canadian engagement in Haiti will take time and will cost money. It was agreed upon that Canada must continue its efforts in Haiti to ensure that what is accomplished is sustainable in the long-term. One of the biggest concerns in Haiti underlined by the participants is the absence of a contract or understanding between the existing institutions and the population. Participants agreed on the necessity to create a real and sustainable partnership between the Haitian government and the population. A much stronger collaboration between the various institutions, the Haitian government and the UN is needed to provide for greater transparency in the management of such sectors as justice, police and civil society. As in Afghanistan, participants concluded that security in Haiti also implies addressing poverty and implementing development projects in order to give hope to the population.

African Union/ Sudan

Canada's continued support to the African Union and ECOWAS in their development of a capacity to prevent, resolve, and manage crises, and in particular, efforts towards an AU rapid reaction force were seen as extremely positive. Still, many participants felt that Canada should contribute more to the peacekeeping operation in Darfur, by allocating more resources to building African military and civilian capacity and by providing greater technological, logistical, and transport support to AU peacekeepers.

THE WAY FORWARD

It was recalled on numerous occasions that the United Nations is only as strong as its Member states allow it to be. This report demonstrates that UN peacekeeping is not only alive, but is invaluable to international peace and security. Thus it is the responsibility of those members who are committed to multilateralism, such as Canada, to ensure that the organization is capable of meeting present and future challenges. While it is important to be realistic about challenges, we should nevertheless remain optimistic about opportunities, if the UN is to remain a relevant and effective vehicle with which to navigate through global concerns.

ANNEX 1 LIST OF PANELISTS FOR PUBLIC DIALOGUES

ST. JOHN'S: TRAINING NEEDS FOR TODAY'S UN PEACEKEEPERS, AUGUST 6, 2006

Trista Grant, PhD Candidate, University of Western Ontario

Alex Morrison, MSC, CD, President, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies

Dave Munro, President, Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans Association

Mike O'Brien, Military Historian, Memorial University

Emily Schroeder, Project Officer, UNA-Canada, Moderator

HALIFAX: INTERNATIONAL MEDIA AND UN PEACEKEEPING, OCTOBER 5, 2006

Douglas T. Coffman, Public Information Officer, UN Dept of Public Information

Tim Dunne, Former Military Public Affairs for DND & NATO

Alex Morrison, President, MSC, CD, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies

Olivia Ward, Toronto Star

Kim Kierans, Director, University of King's College School of Journalism, Moderator

KINGSTON: CANADIAN STRATEGIES FOR RAPID RESPONSE TO CRISES, OCT 19- 20, 2006

Stephen Kinloch-Pichat, Strategic Planning Officer, UNDP, Haiti

Col Michael Hanrahan, Director of Peacekeeping Policy, National Defence

Peter Langille, Department of Political Science, University of Western Ontario

Brig-Gen Greg Mitchell (Retd), Former Force Commander of SHIRBRIG in Sudan, CF

Lt Col Michael Voith, Former Commanding Officer, DART, Canadian Forces

Jane Boulden, Politics & Econ Department, Royal Military College, Moderator

EDMONTON: BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITY: INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE STRATEGIES, OCT 24, 2006

Karen Foss, Peacekeeping & Peace Operations Group, DFAIT

Professor Tom Keating, University of Alberta

Sup. John White, Director, International Peacekeeping Branch, RCMP

LCdr Albert Wong, Public Affairs Officer, DND; Former member, Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan

Emily Schroeder, Project Officer, UNA-Canada, Moderator

QUEBEC CITY: SECURITY AND RULE OF LAW: UN PEACEKEEPING IN HAITI, NOV 7, 2006

Chief Supt. Dave Beer, DG, International Police Services, RCMP

Sgt. Gilles Brunet, International Police Services, RCMP

Marlye Gelin-Adams, Regional Consultant for Latin America & Caribbean, CARE

Major Robert Otis, Operations Officer, Canadian Forces – Valcartier

Marc Perron, President, UNA-Canada Quebec City Branch, Moderator

WINNIPEG: HUMAN SECURITY APPROACHES TO UN PEACEKEEPING, JANUARY 23, 2007

Ted Itani, CIDA Consultant, formerly Canadian Red Cross

Pierre Kyer, Civilian Member, RCMP, 20 months in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Emily Schroeder, Project Officer, UNA-Canada, Moderator

VICTORIA: NEW CHALLENGES FACING UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE 21ST CENTURY, FEB 6, 2007

Ray Crabbe, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute

Peter Gantz, Peacekeeping Advocate, Refugees International, Washington, DC

Jeremy Kinsman, Canadian Ambassador to European Union from 2002 – 2006

Emily Schroeder, Project Officer, UNA-Canada, Moderator

VANCOUVER: GENDER AND UN PEACEKEEPING/ PEACEBUILDING, FEBRUARY 26, 2007

Senator Mobina Jaffer, Canada's former Special Envoy to the Sudan and former Chair of the Canadian Committee of Women Peace & Security

Cheshmak Farhoumand-Sims, researcher, educator & activist on Afghanistan & women.

Kathryn Gretsinger, CBC radio broadcaster, Moderator.

TORONTO: CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT AND UN PEACEKEEPING, MARCH 6, 2007

Chol Kelei from Southern Sudan, advocate for children affected by armed conflict

Kimmi Weeks from Liberia, Youth Action International, supports war-affected youth

Youth Representative from Iran, received weapons training as a child

Kathy Vandergrift, Coordinator, Children & Armed Conflict Forum, CPCC, Moderator

OTTAWA: RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND CANADIAN CIVIL SOCIETY, MARCH 12, 2007

Nicole Deller, Programme Advisor, World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy

Don Hubert, Human Security Policy Division, Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Emily Schroeder, UNA-Canada, Moderator

OTTAWA CONFERENCE: "DARFUR: WHO'S RESPONSIBLE? APPLYING RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT TO THE CASE OF DARFUR", NOVEMBER 22 – 23, 2006

DAY 1: INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY-LEVEL DEBATE

Darfur: Who's Responsible? November 22, 2006

Geoffrey H. Pearson, O.C., Introduction about Peacekeeping and the Canadian Connection

Justin Trudeau, Moderator of Debate

Eitan Laufer, Debater, York University

Amanda Wong, Debater, Simon Fraser University

Tristan Solome, Debater, University of Colorado

Angélique Wojcik, Debater, University of New Brunswick

DAY 2: PUBLIC PANEL AND DINNER

Responsibility to Protect and the Case of Darfur November 23, 2006

Jan Pronk, Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN in Sudan

Wendy Gilmour, Director, Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Group, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada

Carolyn McAskie, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support

Kathryn White, Executive Director, UNA-Canada, Moderator

Kim Kierans	Director, School of Journalism, University of King's College
Ross Lord	National reporter, Global TV
Alex Morrison	Lecturer, Dalhousie & Mount St Vincent University
Jason Oliver	Communications Officer, United Nations Association in Canada
Ian Porter	Instructor, University of King's College, worked with IMPACT
Richard Starr	Research Associate, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives – NS
Alex Wilner	Researcher, Atlantic Institute for Market Studies

KINGSTON: CANADIAN STRATEGIES FOR RAPID RESPONSE TO CRISES, OCT 19- 20, 2006

Moderator

Amb. Louis Delvoie	Senior Fellow, Queen's Centre for International Relations
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Participants

Peter Armstrong-Whitworth	Continental Defence Relations Division, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
Jane Boulden	Politics & Economic Dept, Royal Military College
Colonel Michael Hanrahan	Director, Peacekeeping Policy, Department of National Defence
Ted Itani	Manager, Emergency Response Unit, Canadian Red Cross
Stephen Kinloch Pichat	Strategic Planning Officer, Office of the Resident Coordinator, UN Development programme, Haiti
Peter Langille	Department of Political Science, University of Western Ontario
Paul LaRose Edwards	Executive Director, CANADEM
Daniel Livermore	Director General, Security & Intelligence Bureau, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada

Brigadier-General (Ret'd) Greg Mitchell	Former Commander of SHIRBRIG in Sudan, Canadian Forces
Robert O'Brien	Project Manager, UNA-Canada
Charles Pentland	Director, Queen's Centre for International Relations
Lt. Col. Michael Rostek	DLCD Land Futures (Command), Canadian Forces
Emily Schroeder	Project Officer, UNA-Canada
Kristine St-Pierre	Research Consultant, UNA-Canada
Lt. Col. Michael Voith	Commanding Officer, DART, Canadian Forces
Nicole Waintraub	Event Coordinator, Queen's Centre for International Relations

EDMONTON: BUILDING LOCAL CAPACITY: INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE STRATEGIES, OCT 24, 2006

Moderator

Robert O'Brien Project Manager, UNA-Canada

Participants

Tonia Anselmo	Rapporteur & Youth Representative-Edmonton, UNA-Canada
Sandra Bibby	Coordinator, UNAC-Edmonton Branch
Donald Bourne	Logistics Delegate, ICRC, Operations Manager for Disaster Response, Red Cross Canada
Kristine Ennis	Policy Officer, D Air SP 2-7, Directorate of Air Strategic Plans, 11 NT, National Defence Headquarters
Karen Foss	Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Group, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
Dr. Joy Fraser	Edmonton Branch, UNA-Canada
Patricia Hartnagel	Peace activist, Formerly Project Ploughshares ,Edmonton
Tom Keating	Political Science Professor, University of Alberta
Emily Schroeder	Project Officer, UNA-Canada
Supt. John White	Director, International Peacekeeping Branch, RCMP
LCdr. Albert Wong	Former member of strategic advisory team in Afghanistan, Department of National Defence

QUEBEC CITY: SECURITY AND RULE OF LAW: UN PEACEKEEPING IN HAITI, NOVEMBER 7, 2006

Moderator

Julie Gagné Teaching Coordinator, Institut québécois des hautes études internationales (HEI), Université Laval

Participants

Daniel Atangana UNA-Canada Quebec City Branch

Chief Supt. Dave Beer Director General, Int'l Policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Sgt. Gilles Brunet Int'l Peacekeeping Operations, Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Vincent Fouda Sociology Department, Université Laval

Marlye Gélín-Adams Regional Advocacy Advisor for Latin America and the Caribbean

Major Laurent Giroux Canadian Forces

Dr. Kamanzi Université Laval

Edouard Onguene PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law, Université Laval

Diego Osorio Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Major Roger Otis Operations Officer, Defence engineering Valcartier, DRDC

Marc Perron President, UNA-Canada Quebec City Branch

Emily Schroeder Project Officer for UNA-Canada

Kristine St-Pierre Consultant for UNA-Canada

Camille Tremblay Consultant, World Bank and UNMIK in Kosovo

Dr. Gérard Verna Université Laval

WINNIPEG: HUMAN SECURITY APPROACHES TO UN PEACEKEEPING, JANUARY 23, 2007

Moderator

Dr. Shannon Sampert Politics Department, University of Winnipeg

Participants

Dr. Samantha Arnold Assistant Professor, Global Politics/IR, University of Winnipeg

Dr. Lloyd Axworthy President, University of Winnipeg

Kris Brekman	Board, UNA-Canada Winnipeg Branch
Jim Ferguson	Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba
Ted Itani	CIDA Consultant, formerly Canadian Red Cross
James Johnston	Local Liaison, UNA-Canada Winnipeg
Pierre Kyer	Civilian Member, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Robert O'Brien	Project Manager, UNA-Canada
Emily Schroeder	Project Officer, UNA-Canada
Mary Scott	Co-President for the Winnipeg Chapter, UNIFEM
Kristine St-Pierre	Consultant, UNA-Canada
Lasha Tchantouridze	Research Associate, Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba
Mya Wheeler	Staff, Project Peacemakers

VICTORIA: NEW CHALLENGES FACING UN PEACEKEEPING IN THE 21ST CENTURY, FEB 6, 2007

Moderator

Dr. Michael Webb Acting Chair, Political Science Dept, University of Victoria

Participants

Michael Bloomfield	Rapporteur, University of Victoria
Dr. Jim Boutilier	Special Advisor (Policy), Maritime Forces Pacific HQ, Department of National Defence
Ray Crabbe	Fellow, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute
Dr. Greg Cran	Director, School of Peace and Conflict Management, Royal Roads University
Derek Fraser	President, Canadian Institute of International Affairs
Peter Gantz	Peacebuilding Programme Officer, Refugees International
Jeremy Kinsman	Canada's Ambassador to the European Union 2002 – 2006, University of Victoria
Pierre Kyer	Former Peacekeeper, Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Will Matthews	Manager, Resilient Communities Disaster Preparedness, Western Canada, Red Cross , BC Coastal Region office
Emily Schroeder	Project Officer, UNA

VANCOUVER: GENDER AND UN PEACEKEEPING/ PEACEBUILDING, FEBRUARY 26, 2007

Moderator

Kathryn Gretsinger Radio broadcaster

Roundtable Participants

Lubna Abalderhamn National Congress of Black Women Foundation

**Dr. Mary-Wynne
Ashford** Education, University of Victoria

Katharina Coleman Professor, University of British Columbia

**Angela Contreras-
Chavez** Doctoral Candidate – War Crimes and ICC,
Simon Fraser University

Cst. Michel Drayton Royal Canadian Mounted Police

**Cheshmak
Farhoumand-Sims** Professor, St. Paul's University, Ottawa

Alroy Fonseca Policy Analyst, Department of National Defence

Patsy George President, UNA-Canada Vancouver Branch

Rosanna Hille Partner, Hille-Magassa & Associates & Susila
Dharma International

Senator Mobina Jaffer Senator, Government of Canada

Nisaa Jetha Intern, Senator Jaffer's Office

Sarah Kambites programme Manager, UNA-Canada

Stacey Makortoff Programme Coordinator, EFP-International (Canada)

Moussa Magassa Programme Coordinator, Immigrant Services
Society of BC

Lisa Mighton Rapporteur and Local Liaison, UNA-Canada

Lauryn Oates Independent Consultant, Int'l Human Rights,
Development, Gender

Corwin Odland Communications Officer, National Defence Public
Affairs Office Pacific

Julia Payson Volunteer, International Humanitarian NGO

Emily Schroeder Project Officer, UNA-Canada

Claire Trevena MLA, North Island

Zsuzsanna I. Toth Canadian Forces Captain, Served as UN military
observer in the Sudan

TORONTO: CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT AND UN PEACEKEEPING, MARCH 6, 2007

Moderator

Kathy Vandergrift Consultant, CPCC, Forum on Children &
Armed Conflict

Participants

Jennifer Adams Programme Manager, Plan Canada

Svetlana Ageeva Coordinator, Red Cross Canada

Imram Ahmad Staff, Office of Senator Romeo Dallaire

Sara Austin Senior Policy Advisor, Child Rights

Linda Dale CAP Coordinator, Children/Youth as Peacebuilders

Myriam Denov Associate Professor, Social Work, McGill University

Kristine Ennis Policy Analyst, Department of National Defence

Chol Kelei Youth Representative, Winnipeg

Philip Lancaster Consultant, Victoria, BC, Canada

Guillaume Landry programme Manager, Int'l Bureau for Children's Rights

Marlen Mondaca Programme Manager, Americas & CPB,
Save the Children Canada

Jean-François Morel Department of National Defence

Youth Representative, Toronto

Rachel Schmidt MA Candidate, Human Security & Development,
Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Emily Schroeder Project Officer, UNA-Canada

Julie Stevens Programme Manager, International programmes,
UNICEF Canada

Emmanuelle Tremblay Senior Analyst – Children's rights, Policy Branch,
Canadian International Development Agency

Carrie Vandewint Programme Officer, International and Canadian programmes,
World Vision Canada – Ottawa Office

Kimmi Weeks Founder, Youth Action International

OTTAWA: RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND CANADIAN CIVIL SOCIETY, MARCH 12, 2007

Moderator

Emily Schroeder Project Officer, UNA-Canada

Participants

Nicole Deller Programme Advisor, World Federalist Movement-
Institute for Global Policy

Dr. Don Hubert Human Security Policy Division, Department of
Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade

Marja Hughes Rapporteur, Consultant

Bill Janzen Ottawa Office, Mennonite Central Committee

Peter Jones Senior Fellow, Queen's Centre for International
Relations

Paul Larose-Edwards Executive Director, CANADEM

Dr. Richard Price Research Associate, CIR, Canadian Consortium on
Human Security, Director, Graduate Programme,
Poli Sci Dept, UBC

Shane Roberts National Capital Regional Branch, UNA-Canada

Natalie Senst Director Internal Communications, STAND Canada

Sara Siebert IHL Awareness Committee , Canadian
Red Cross, Ottawa

Susan Thomson PhD candidate at Dalhousie and Fellow,
Canadian Consortium on Human Security & Int'l
Development Research Centre, 2006 – 07

Kathy Vandergrift Children and Armed Conflict Forum, CPCC

Kathryn White Executive Director, UNA-Canada

Yasemin Ugursal Gender and Peacebuilding Working Group, CPCC

ANNEX 3 LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFS	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CAC	Children in Armed Conflict
CARICOM	Caribbean Community and Common Market
CCHS	Canadian Consortium on Human Security
CF	Canadian Forces
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
CPCC	Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee
CPVA	Canadian Peacekeeping Veterans Association
CUNPK	Center for United Nations Peacekeeping in New Delhi
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DND	Department of National Defence
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EU BG	European Union Battlegroup
GPSF	Global Peace and Security Fund
GPWG	Gender and Peacebuilding Working Group
GTI	Gender Training Initiative
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICRC	International Committee for the Red Cross
INGO	International non-governmental organisation
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force

KAITPC	Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Training Centre
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NRF	NATO Response Force
OAS	Organisation of American States
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PPC	Pearson Peacekeeping Centre
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSTC	Peace Support Training Centre
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RCRC	International Red Cross Red Crescent Movement
SEA	Sexual exploitation and abuse
SSR	Security Sector Reform
START	Stabilization and Reconstruction Taskforce
SHIRBRIG	Standing High Readiness Brigade
UMAC	Unified Mission Analysis Centre
UNEP	United Nations Environment programme
UNEPS	United Nations Emergency Peace Service
UNDP	United Nations Development programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITAR POCI	The United Nations Institute for Training and Research programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding

ABOUT THE AUTHOR & EDITOR

AUTHOR

Kristine St-Pierre holds an M.A. (Conflict Analysis and Conflict Resolution) from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University (2006). Her research focused on the role of natural resources in the outbreak of intrastate armed conflict in theory, and in practice through the examination of four case studies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to pursuing international studies, Kristine completed an Honours B.A. in Environmental Studies from the University of Ottawa (2004). As part of this degree, she spent her final semester in Spain, studying geography at the Universidad de Granada.

Between 2002 and 2005, she held a number of positions in the fields of international security and environmental policy, in both government and non-government sectors. These included both internships and contracts at Foreign Affairs Canada, at the Climate Change Bureau and International Relations divisions of Environment Canada, at the Ontario Clean Water Agency, and in the Environmental Services division of Construction Defence Canada.

In September 2006, Kristine joined UNAC as a research consultant for the project marking the 50th Anniversary of UN Peacekeeping. In February 2007, she joined the Canadian Mission to the European Union in Brussels, as part of a three-month internship working on issues of security and defence. She is fluent in French, English, and Spanish, and has studied Italian. She is also presently learning Swahili. Her main areas of interest are conflict prevention and resolution, UN peacekeeping, Canadian and European defence policy, as well as environmental policy and sustainable development.

EDITOR

Emily Schroeder has five years of experience in research, programme management and field experience in security and development issues. Emily obtained her Honours B.A. in Political Science and International Development Studies from McGill University in 2001. From 2001 to 2003, she worked at the United Nations in New York, analyzing disarmament negotiating fora at the UN. In the summer of 2003 she worked with the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, in the conventional arms branch. In December 2004, Emily graduated from the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) in California, with a Master of Arts in International Policy Studies, with a focus on security and development. Research focused on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. During her last semester, she undertook an International Professional Service Semester at the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa, with the Arms Management programme, where field research was pursued on small arms issues in South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland.

Following consultancy work for the Coalition for Gun Control on crime prevention and the World Bank on demobilization and reintegration in the Great Lakes, Emily was a United Nation Volunteer with the UN Mission in Sudan in Southern Sudan from 2005 – 2006. She worked in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) unit, focusing on community-based security initiatives.

Since returning from Sudan, Emily has been working in Ottawa for the United Nations Association in Canada on the 50th Anniversary of UN Project, a project facilitating domestic outreach and dialogue on UN peacekeeping.

UNA-CANADA & PEACEKEEPING 50

The 50th Anniversary of United Nations Peacekeeping Public Dialogue Series aimed to promote a discussion across Canada on the importance of UN Peacekeeping in contemporary post-conflict contexts and the need for a sustained and strengthened Canadian contribution. The public dialogue series was part of a wider project that celebrated Canada's outstanding contributions, past, present and future to a more peaceful world. The project reached academics, field practitioners, government officials, the media, civil society and the Canadian public in general.

Activities of this multi-dimensional project included the development of public education and outreach resources, public events featuring Canadian peacekeepers, internship opportunities for youth, policy research on the future of peacekeeping, an interactive website at <http://www.unac.org/peacekeeping>, a video challenge for Canadian youth on peacekeeping, and 10 roundtable discussions and public dialogues spanning the country to address cutting-edge issues of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

UNA-Canada is a national charitable organization having recently celebrated its landmark 60th Anniversary. As a 'think and do' organization, UNA-Canada supports a network of 17 volunteer branches and local contacts, with a National office in Ottawa and a Western professional office in Vancouver. Our mandate is to engage Canadians in the work of the UN and the critical global issues which affect us all, through innovative projects, policy research, and on-going dialogues with Canadians.



United Nations Association in Canada
Association canadienne pour les Nations Unies